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This dissertation investigates the effects of firm financial distress on two key firm 
decision variables: sales prices and inventories. These analyses contribute to the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm literature. Specifically, the feedback loop 
between financial distress, a result of poor past performance, and two firm conduct 
parameters, prices and inventories, is explored in great detail. 
 
The first essay is motivated by the ambiguity of prior research on the relationship 
between firm financial distress and prices. The extant economics, corporate finance and 
strategic management literatures differentially approach this relationship, and empirical 
research has found only limited, at times ambiguous support for any single theoretical 
contention. These theoretical perspectives are reviewed and an attempt is made to 
reconcile the apparent conflict by adopting a strategic contingency perspective that 
    
identifies in which way and in what instances firm financial distress may impact prices. 
The model is empirically tested using data from the U.S. airline industry. The results 
indicate that firm financial distress and prices are generally negatively related. Moreover, 
this effect is substantially stronger for firms operating under Chapter 11 protection than 
for firms approaching bankruptcy. It is further shown that the magnitude of the effect of 
financial distress on prices depends on firm factors such as operating costs, market 
power, and firm size, as well as on competitive characteristics such as market 
concentration and the financial condition of competitors. 
 
The second essay analyzes the impact of firm distress on firm inventories and 
investigates if this relationship is impacted by a firm’s power relative to its upstream and 
downstream supply chain partners. Building on prior work in the economics field, this 
research is not only based on microeconomics theory, but also draws on inventory theory 
as well as on prior work on supply chain relationships. A comprehensive inventory 
estimation model is specified, and novel measures of inventory determinants and power 
are developed. The hypotheses are tested using panel data from the U.S. manufacturing 
industry. It is shown that distressed firms hold less inventory and that a firm’s power 
within the supply chain will determine to what extent inventory ownership is reduced 
during times of financial distress. Implications for supplier selection and supply chain 
cooperation are discussed. 
 
In summary, this research significantly enhances researchers’ understanding of why, 
how, and when firm financial distress affects prices and inventories. 
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“No matter what the state of the economy, no 
company is immune from internal hard times—
stagnation or declining performance.” (Hofer 1980) 
 
“Global competition, technological turbulence, high 
costs of capital, and other nettlesome factors will 
cause more and more businesses to face occasional 





Firm financial distress is an omnipresent phenomenon in manufacturing and service 
industries. While there is no unique definition of financial distress, distress firms are 
generally loss-making and suffer from (severe) liquidity constraints. Based on these 
criteria, Altman (2002, 1968) developed the Z score as a composite measure of a firm’s 
financial condition. Altman suggests that firms with a Z score of less than 1.81 are 
considered financially distressed and face a high risk of bankruptcy. Following this 
definition, about one third of all U.S. manufacturing firms1 and about half of all U.S. 
airlines (The Economist 2005) were considered financially distressed in 2005. Most 
recently, car manufacturers such as Ford and General Motors (McCracken 2006), and air 
carriers like Northwest Airlines and Delta Airlines (Carey and Trottman 2005), to 
mention but a few examples, have been experiencing financial difficulties. This 
dissertation investigates the impact of financial distress on managerial decision variables 
such as prices and inventories. 
                                                 
1 This estimate is based on the analysis of 2,323 manufacturing firms listed in the Compustat database. 
Thirty-two percent of these firms had Z scores (Altman 1968) of less than 1.81. 
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Most research in the broad field of business management is concerned with 
understanding how managerial decisions come about and how these decisions affect firm 
and market performance. Many researchers therefore follow the tradition of the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm which essentially posits that the structure of 
markets impacts firms’ conduct which, in turn, is a key determinant of the performance of 
firms and markets (Bain 1956, Mason 1949, 1939). The term “structure” thereby refers to 
structural characteristics of markets that are indicators of the competitiveness of markets. 
Commonly used measurement variables include industry concentration, the number of 
firms in the market or barriers to entry and exit (Waldman and Jensen 2001). Firms 
compete in the marketplace by means of actions that aim at maximizing firm 
performance. These rivalrous activities are summarized by the term “conduct” which 
may, for example, refer to pricing and product strategies (Waldman and Jensen 2001). 
The aggregate performance of firms in a market can be measured in terms of allocative 
efficiency or production efficiency, for example (Waldman and Jensen 2001). The 
individual performance of firms, in turn, is typically evaluated based on financial (e.g. 
profitability) or operating measures (e.g. productivity). Figure 1 graphically illustrates 
the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. 








Figure 1: The structure-conduct-performance paradigm 
 
Firm-specific factors are added to the depiction of the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm in Figure 1 to indicate that not only (market) structural, but also other firm 
characteristics (besides the firm’s financial condition) such as operating costs and firm 
size, for example, may impact a firm’s conduct in the market (e.g. Spanos et al. 2004). 
 
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, as presented by Waldman and 
Jensen (2001), also recognizes that certain feedback loops may exist within the structure-
conduct-performance framework. An industry’s above-average performance, for 
example, may attract new entrants, thus affecting the structure of markets. By the same 
token, a firm’s past performance may impact future managerial decisions relating to, for 
example, prices and sales quantities, thus linking the firm’s performance/distress to its 
conduct. Also, a firm’s distress may ultimately impact other firm characteristics such as 
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within the SCP paradigm2. While there are many such feedback mechanisms, one specific 
link is of particular interest in this dissertation research: The effect of financial distress, a 
direct result of poor past performance, on a firm’s conduct in terms of sales prices and 
inventories. 
 
Pricing and inventory decisions are important indicators of a firm’s competitive conduct 
in the marketplace. Basic game-theoretic models suggest that firms compete on either 
price (Bertrand competition) or quantities (Cournot competition) (Gibbons 1992). With 
inventories being a function of sales quantities, both inventories and prices, thus, are 
essential decision variables that reflect a firm’s competitive behavior. Consequently, 
numerous researchers have investigated the competitive implications of firms’ pricing 
(e.g. Busse 2002) and inventory (e.g. Cachon 2001, Mahajan and Ryzin 2001) decisions. 
It is therefore deemed appropriate and relevant to investigate the effects of financial 
distress on these two firm conduct parameters. 
 
Clearly, a feedback mechanism between financial distress and conduct is intuitively 
appealing: Managers of distressed firms must turn the situation around and ensure the 
company’s future profitability. Given the widespread occurrence of financial distress, 
researchers have been interested in understanding the effects of distress on firm conduct. 
Specifically, researchers have examined the anatomy of corporate turnarounds: What do 
financially troubled firms do to return to profitability? 
 
                                                 
2 Note that the changes in a firm’s conduct caused by a deretioration of the firm’s financial condition will 
then impact the firm’s performance. The relationship between performance/distress and conduct (as well as 
structure and firm-specific variables), thus, is iterative over time. 
    5
Hofer (1980) notes that price cutting is a popular measure implemented by distressed 
firms. Arogyaswamy and Yasai-Ardekani (1995) and Sudarsanam and Lai (2001), in 
turn, suggest that firms frequently reduce inventory levels as a part of their restructuring 
efforts. While anecdotal evidence and conceptual work suggest that greater levels of 
distress imply lower prices and inventories, ceteris paribus, empirical evidence in support 
of this contention has been scant. In a similar vein, conceptual and empirical work has 
arrived at the conclusion that there is no unique turnaround strategy and no single recipe 
for turnaround success. Rather, different turnaround gestalts have emerged: Hofer (1980), 
for example, distinguishes between revenue-generating, product-market refocusing, cost-
cutting, and asset reducing strategies. Both Hofer (1980) and Hambrick and Schecter 
(1983) suggest that the choice of a turnaround strategy will be contingent on the gravity 
of financial distress and other firm and market-related contingencies. This contention is 
illustrated in Figure 2: The effect of financial distress (poor past performance) on 







Figure 2: The moderated distress-conduct feedback mechanism 
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distress on firm conduct is contingent on other factors. This contention is consistent with 
the basic tenet of contingency theory. Contingency theory was originally motivated by 
the observation that “[p]rominent theorists promote their ascribed frameworks as 
conceptually valid and pragmatically applicable to all organizations in all situations” 
(Luthans and Stewart 1977, p.182). This concept of universality, however, has been 
questioned by researchers on the grounds of both theoretical and empirical 
counterevidence. Instead, researchers have increasingly recognized the importance and 
moderating role of situational characteristics in defining causal relationships (Hitt et al. 
2004). 
 
Proponents of the situational approach argue “that the most effective management 
concept or technique depends on a set of circumstances at a particular point in time” 
(Luthans and Stewart 1977, p.182) and that empirical research based on simple “linear 
models [has generally] provided disappointing results” (Hitt et al. 2004, p.11). 
Consequently, researchers have proposed a “general contingency theory of management” 
(Luthans and Stewart 1977) which rests on the key premise that environmental, resource 
and management variables intervene in cause-and-effect relationships in the context of 
strategic management research.  
 
There is, however, no defined set of contingency variables and no universal prescription 
as to how, when and where contingencies ought to be considered (see e.g. Hofer 1975 for 
a review of important control variables and contingency factors in the context of business 
strategy research). Many researchers have therefore criticized contingency theory as an 
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“illusion” (Longenecker and Pringle 1978) and have attacked the theory’s vagueness and 
“lack of clarity” (Schoonhoven 1981). The use of contingency frameworks has 
nonetheless been popular in the strategic management literature (Hitt et al. 2004). 
 
This dissertation follows this research tradition and defines context-specific contingency 
variables that are expected to affect the relationship between firm financial distress and 
prices and inventories, respectively. Specifically, it is suggested that structural and firm-
specific factors moderate the effects of firm distress on prices and inventories. 
 
To date, the model shown in Figure 2 has not been subject to large-scale empirical 
testing. While some researchers have investigated the effects of financial factors on firm 
decision parameters such as prices (e.g. Borenstein and Rose 1995) and inventories (e.g. 
Carpenter et al. 1994), the moderating effects of structural and firm-specific factors on 
the distress-conduct relationship remain largely unexplored. The sole exception is the 
work by Ferrier et al (2002): These authors investigate the effect of financial distress on 
competitive aggressiveness as measured by the number and nature of firms’ competitive 
actions. Ferrier et al (2002) thereby find evidence that the effect of distress on 
competitive behavior is moderated by industry characteristics3 and the educational and 
functional heterogeneity of top management teams. This dissertation builds on the work 
of Ferrier et al (2002) and extends it to the study of two particular firm conduct 
parameters: sales prices and inventories. 
 
                                                 
3 Industry growth, industry concentration, and barriers to entry. 
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Clearly, gaining a better understanding of how financial distress impacts firms’ pricing 
and inventory decision is a timely and relevant research endeavor. Prior research has 
shown that linear models of the distress-price and distress-inventory relationships may be 
overly simplistic and do not do justice to the complex nature of decision problems 
relating to price and inventory management under financial distress (e.g. Singh 1986). 
While most researchers contend that greater financial distress should result in lower 
prices and lower inventory holdings, the empirical findings are largely inconsistent and 
often times statistically insignificant. The basic premise of this research is that structural 
and firm-specific characteristics moderate the distress-conduct relationship as shown in 
Figure 2, thereby explaining why the distress-conduct effect may be substantial in some 
instances and insignificant in other cases. 
 
In summarizing, this dissertation investigates the following research questions: 
▪ Does financial distress have an impact on prices and inventories, after controlling 
for other relevant parameters? 
▪ And how can these effects be characterized, i.e. what factors influence the 
magnitude of the distress-price and distress-inventory relationships? 
This dissertation addresses these questions and thereby makes a number of significant 
contributions. 
 
This is—to the best of the author’s knowledge—the first study to empirically investigate 
the feedback loop between financial distress (poor past performance) and two key firm 
conduct parameters: prices and inventories. Particular attention is paid to the moderating 
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effects of structural and firm factors on the distress-conduct relationship. This research, 
thus, contributes to the SCP literature by analyzing the distress-conduct feedback loop 
and empirically evaluating the effect of interactions between structural, firm, and 
financial characteristics on firm conduct parameters. 
 
This framework is empirically tested in two distinct contexts: Prices and inventories are 
studied in the context of the U.S. airline industry and the U.S. manufacturing industry, 
respectively. In both instances, context-specific contingency variables are proposed and 
their moderating effects on the distress-price and distress-inventory relationships are 
evaluated. This research draws on a broad array of theoretical arguments from the 
strategic management, economics, and corporate finance literatures to identify these 
contingency variables and to hypothesize about their impact on the distress-conduct 
relationship. The validity of the theoretical arguments and models set forth in this 
dissertation is underlined by solid estimation results. It is shown that financial distress is 
an important explanatory variable that significantly impacts a firm’s sales prices and 
inventories. This research thus also contributes to furthering empirical research on prices 
and inventories. 
 
In addition, answering these research questions also paves the way to exploring further 
managerial implications of financial distress with respect to prices and inventories in 
greater detail: When are pricing and inventory actions economically viable turnaround 
strategies? And how will the distressed firm’s actions affect competition and inter-firm 
cooperation? 
    10
 
This dissertation comprises four chapters. Following this introduction (Chapter 1), 
Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to the study of the effects of financial distress on prices and 
inventories, respectively, while Chapter 4 provides a summary of the findings and 
contributions of this dissertation research. 
 
The impact of distress on prices is discussed in Chapter 2. Two specific research 
questions are investigated in this essay: How does a firm’s financial distress impact its 
pricing behavior? And what parameters moderate the effect of firm financial distress on 
the firm’s prices? These questions arise upon reviewing a broad set of extant research 
which is marked by ambiguous empirical findings. This conflict is addressed by 
developing a contingency framework. It is suggested that firm factors such as operating 
costs, firm size and market shares, as well as market characteristics such as market 
concentration and competitors’ financial conditions determine to what extent financial 
distress affects prices. A large-scale empirical analysis using panel data from the U.S. 
airline industry is conducted. The results provide ample support for the proposed 
contingency framework. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the distress-inventory relationship. This essay is primarily 
motivated by two observations: First, prior studies have approached the firm finance-
inventory link from an economics perspective only, thus ignoring the insights provided 
by inventory theory. Second, most extant research has failed to put firm inventory 
decisions into a supply chain context where inter-firm power balances may affect 
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inventory ownership in supply chains. Consequently, two research questions are 
formulated: Does a firm’s financial situation have an impact on its inventories after 
controlling for other relevant parameters prescribed by inventory theory and supply chain 
research? And is the magnitude of the presumed effect of financial distress on inventories 
impacted by power (im)balances in supply chain relationships? To investigate these 
questions, a thorough review of related economics, inventory, and supply chain research 
is provided and testable hypotheses are formulated. Based on this theoretical foundation, 
an empirical estimation equation is specified. Data from U.S. manufacturing industries is 
used to test the hypotheses. Specifically, it is shown that greater levels of firm financial 
distress are associated with lower firm inventory levels, ceteris paribus. In addition, there 
is some support for the hypothesis that greater levels of power over suppliers and buyers 
not only reduce inventory ownership in general, but also increase the effect of financial 
distress on inventories. 
  
Chapter 4 presents a summary of this dissertation research and highlight its contributions. 
In addition, a research agenda for further studies of the effects of firm financial distress is 
outlined. 
 
    12
2. The impact of firm financial distress on prices: A contingency approach 
 
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between 
financial distress and sales prices. This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 
provides a brief overview of prior research on the financial condition-prices link and 
clearly states the research questions and contributions of this dissertation essay. In 
Section 2.2, a comprehensive review of the literature and relevant theories is provided, 
and hypotheses are derived. The research model is introduced in Section 2.3, the data and 
variables are discussed, and econometric issues are addressed. In Section 2.4, the 
regression results are presented. The article concludes with a summary of the study’s 
findings and a discussion of their implications for managers and policy makers (Section 





The question of how a firm’s financial condition impacts the firm’s sales prices has been 
investigated from multiple perspectives. Researchers from the economics, corporate 
finance, and strategy fields have published a substantial amount of literature on this and 
related issues (e.g. Borenstein and Rose 1995, Ferrier et al. 2002, Opler and Titman 
1994). Yet, in summary, the findings have been largely inconclusive, not only across but 
also within the respective research streams. Empirical research has found only limited, at 
times ambiguous support for the contention that distressed firms’ sales prices tend to be 
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lower. This study draws on various theories from the economics, corporate finance and 
strategic management fields to investigate this issue and attempts to reconcile the 
apparent conflict by adopting a strategic contingency perspective that identifies in which 
way and under what conditions firm financial distress may impact sales prices. 
 
This research question is of particular interest given that firm financial distress is often 
argued to lead to and result from price competition: Low market prices may drive firms 
into bankruptcy, and the latter may, in turn, affect a firm’s competitive pricing behavior. 
The so-called sick industry problem, thus, is intimately associated with the issues of 
financial distress and price competition as repeatedly evidenced in the U.S. airline 
industry. In recent years, many U.S. airlines have sought bankruptcy protection under 
Chapter 114, the ultimate manifestation of financial distress. Between 2001 and 2005 
alone, seven of the top 20 U.S. carriers took advantage of the provisions of this code to 
facilitate their restructuring processes5. An article in The Economist (2005) noted that “at 
least half of America's airline industry has now been declared bankrupt” when Delta Air 
Lines and Northwest Airlines declared bankruptcy in September 2005. 
 
Airlines can achieve significant reductions in labor, leasing, and debt costs under Chapter 
11 protection (McCafferty 1995), thus giving bankrupt firms a competitive advantage 
over their non-bankrupt counterparts. Following Delta’s and Northwest’s bankruptcy 
                                                 
4 Title 11 of the U.S. code, commonly referred to as Chapter 11, is a form of interim bankruptcy and grants 
the filing company protection from its creditors until a reorganization plan is developed and approved by 
the creditor committees.  
5 The top 20 U.S. commercial carriers were ranked based on 2001 passenger data (available from 
www.transtats.bts.gov). The following carriers filed for Chapter 11 protection between 2001 and 2005: 
TWA (2001), United (2002), US Airways (2002, 2004), Hawaiian (2003), ATA (2004), Delta (2005), 
Northwest (2005). 
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filings, analysts therefore warned of potentially adverse consequences for other carriers 
such as American Airlines and Continental Airlines (Trottman 2005). Consequently, 
researchers (see e.g. Kennedy 2000, Rollman 2004) and managers of non-bankrupt firms 
have repeatedly criticized the destructive implications of Chapter 11 protection. Gary 
Kelly, then Chief Financial Officer with Southwest Airlines, for example, notes that “the 
length of time an airline can go through bankruptcy protection and offer distressed prices 
is very unsettling” (McCafferty 1995). Similarly, Robert Crandall, the former Chief 
Executive Officer of American Airlines, argues that “Chapter 11 also undermines 
responsible managements. In an intensely competitive industry providing a commodity 
product, the ‘dumbest competitor’—unrestrained by fear of failure—sets the standard” 
and hence calls for “bankruptcy laws designed to incentivize success and penalize 
failure” (Crandall 2005). The criticism of Chapter 11 protection as unfair and destructive 
is all but new: a 1989 article published in The Economist discusses the “uses and abuses” 
of Chapter 11 and concludes that “what was designed as a shield has become a sword” 
(Anonymous 1989). 
 
Most of the previous statements make the explicit or implicit assumption that financially 
distressed firms sell at lower prices than their healthier competitors. This contention, 
however, has not found consistent theoretical and empirical support. 
 
In the economics stream of research, Borenstein and Rose (1995) find that air fares 
slightly decrease prior to bankruptcy filings, but do not further change in the time period 
thereafter.  Kennedy (2000) and Brander and Lewis (1986) assert that a firm’s financial 
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condition affects its market conduct, and Busse (2002) supports this contention, 
indicating that financially distressed firms are more likely to start price wars than their 
healthier competitors. The traditional economics literature, however, negates a 
relationship between financial condition and firm output market behavior (e.g. 
Modigliani and Miller 1958)6, and stresses the importance of demand fluctuations in 
instigating price reductions. 
 
From a corporate finance perspective, Baker (1973) argues that highly leveraged firms 
are more risk-seeking than relatively profitable firms which take some of their “returns in 
the form of reduced risk” (Hall and Weiss 1967, p.328). Along the same lines, 
Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) suggest that financially distressed firms are more likely 
to choose riskier (pricing) strategies. Opler and Titman (1994), in contrast, attribute the 
lower performance of troubled firms to the (predatory) aggressiveness of competitors and 
the costs of financial distress rather than to the firm’s own pricing behavior. 
 
The strategy literature, finally, has focused the attention on the link between performance 
distress and competitive behavior in general. Bowman (1982) contends that troubled 
firms may be more risk-assertive (i.e. inclined to compete more aggressively) than 
healthy firms, and Miller and Chen (1994) also relate past financial distress to 
competitive aggressiveness. Ferrier et al (2002), however, find “that poor-performing 
firms were less likely to exhibit aggressive competitive behavior” (p.311) when looking 
at the direct relationship between performance distress and competitive aggressiveness. It 
                                                 
6 See also Brander and Lewis (1986) and Kennedy (2000). 
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is noteworthy that none of the studies in the strategy field have examined the link 
between financial distress and prices in particular. Rather, competitive behavior has 
typically been measured by counting and categorizing competitive actions and reactions 
(Chen et al. 1992, Ferrier et al. 2002, Smith et al. 1991, Young et al. 1996). 
 
These examples illustrate the inconclusiveness of prior research and suggest that the link 
between financial distress and prices may be more complex (Singh 1986). The general 
questions, thus, remain: 
▪ How does a firm’s financial distress impact its pricing behavior? 
▪ What parameters moderate the effect of firm financial distress on the firm’s prices? 
 
As the research results referenced in the preceding paragraphs demonstrate, the answer to 
these questions cannot be a straightforward one. There are multiple theoretical 
perspectives and contingencies that may partly explain the variability of a troubled firm’s 
pricing behavior. Focusing on competitive actions in general, Ferrier et al (2002) have 
presented a first attempt to reconcile these conflicting views. They stress the importance 
of context-specific contingencies such as industry growth and concentration, as well as 
top management team heterogeneity in defining the relationship between performance 
distress and competitive behavior. In fact, the strategy literature offers rich insights into 
the contingencies that may moderate this relationship. This research builds on the work of 
Ferrier et al (2002) in drawing on a broad theoretical basis and proposing a 
comprehensive contingency framework that aims at characterizing the relationship 
between financial distress and prices, and identifying factors that may affect the 
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magnitude of this relationship. In addition to developing and empirically testing this 
contingency framework in the context of the U.S. airline industry, this research extends 
the extant body of knowledge in three important respects: 
 
First, price is used as a criterion variable. As mentioned earlier, none of the studies 
published in strategic management journals examine the impact of financial distress on 
prices. Yet, price is probably the single most important and relevant measure of 
competitive behavior: From a consumer perspective, for example, prices are decisive in 
determining consumer welfare − the lower the prices, the greater the consumer surplus. 
Consequently, prices are – under the assumption that the products and services offered by 
firms are sufficiently homogenous – the primary driver of purchase decisions. From a 
firm perspective, price is a key managerial decision variable affecting revenues and a 
firm’s bottom line. Low prices may allow a firm to gain market share and obtain an 
advantage over competitors, while a differentiation strategy may enable a firm to skim 
the market and achieve higher prices (Porter 1980). Moreover, price is of interest from a 
public policy point of view. Regulatory government bodies, such as the former Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) in the airline industry, and consumer interest groups survey 
and screen markets for evidence of predatory pricing and intervene when free market 
mechanisms of demand and supply fail to produce satisfactory market outcomes. Using 
price as a dependent variable, rather than count and categorical variables such as number 
and type of competitive actions, also allows for a more detailed evaluation of the 
magnitude of a firm’s reaction to changes in its financial condition. 
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A second contribution lies in examining firm financial distress in more detail than has 
been evident in most prior empirical work. While some studies focus on bankruptcy 
filings (e.g. Borenstein and Rose 1995), others use measures such as Altman’s Z score 
(Altman 1968) to evaluate a firm’s financial situation (e.g. Ferrier et al. 2002). There is, 
however, substantial evidence that financial distress may differentially impact firm 
behavior before, during, and after a Chapter 11 filing occurs (Borenstein and Rose 1995, 
Busse 2002, Kennedy 2000). Therefore, both measures (a Z score-based distress measure 
and bankruptcy dummy variables) are included in the empirical analyses to more 
precisely sort out the effects of financial distress and bankruptcy per se. Furthermore, a 
firm’s financial standing relative to its competitors in the market is considered. In fact, 
financial distress in absolute terms may not necessarily imply any pricing actions if 
competing firms find themselves in similar financial situations. More specifically, it is 
expected that such pricing actions will be more pronounced when a distressed firm’s 
financial situation is significantly different from that of its rivals. 
 
Finally, this study is unique with respect to its empirical detail. A panel data set from the 
U.S. airline industry is used to investigate the relationship between financial distress and 
price. Unlike in many previous studies, the unit of observation in the analyses is a 
specific route (i.e. “product”) market rather than a firm year or firm quarter (Busse 2002, 
Chattopadhyay et al. 2001, Ferrier et al. 2002). This allows for a much more fine-grained 
and statistically robust examination of the hypotheses. 
 
This essay reports a comprehensive effort to understand if, when, and how firm financial 
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distress impacts prices. The empirical results suggest that financially distressed firms 
offer lower prices than their healthier competitors, ceteris paribus. The magnitude of the 
effect of firm financial distress on prices, however, is shown to decrease with unit 
operating costs, increase with firm size, and decrease with firm market shares. The price 
effects of financial distress are also stronger in more concentrated markets and when a 
firm’s competitors are in significantly different financial situations. The insights provided 
by this research will be useful to both firms and policy makers. Distressed firms and their 
competitors gain a better understanding of how financial conditions typically impact 
pricing decisions and customer demand. Managers of financially distressed firms may 
benefit from this knowledge when developing turnaround strategies. Competing (healthy) 
firms, on the other hand, can more accurately anticipate distressed firms’ pricing actions 
and act accordingly. For policy makers, the findings of this study will help clarify if, 
when, and to what extent financial distress and Chapter 11 protection impact sales prices 
and the competitive behavior of firms. The findings presented here may help clarify if 
current bankruptcy laws serve the purpose they were intended for, and contribute to 
maintaining or improving the allocative efficiency of markets. 
 
2.2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
 
As briefly outlined above, there are competing perspectives on the relationship between 
financial distress and prices. In this section, an overview of these theories from the 
strategy, economics and corporate finance fields is provided and hypotheses are derived. 
The research hypotheses are developed in two steps: In line with the Structure-Conduct-
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Performance paradigm (see Figure 1), it is expected that there is a relationship between 
financial distress and firm conduct in terms of prices. Several theories which further 
support this contention are discussed in Section 2.2.1. Theories that may negate this 
relationship are reviewed in Section 2.2.2. A contingency framework is proposed which 
suggests that the relationship between firm financial distress and a firm’s pricing 
behavior may be moderated by certain firm and structural characteristics (Section 2.2.3). 
 
2.2.1. Financial distress as a driver of competitive pricing behavior 
 
The strategy literature offers two theories, prospect theory7 and organizational learning 
theory that may support a negative relationship between financial distress and a firm’s 
prices. Both theories are discussed in turn before empirical evidence and arguments from 
standard microeconomic and corporate finance theory are set forth. 
 
Prospect theory posits that decision makers are more risk seeking when facing situations 
of likely loss while the inverse is true for decision makers operating in the domain of 
profitability (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Prospect theory can, thus, readily be applied 
to evaluate the risk-taking behavior of financially troubled firms: Managers of low-
performing, troubled firms may be risk-assertive in their strategic choices in the 
expectation of positive long-term returns to risk (in terms of increased market shares, 
revenues, or profits, for example). 
 
                                                 
7 While prospect theory has its origins in the economics field, its concepts have been widely adopted by 
strategic management researchers. 
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There is substantial support for the contention that troubled firms choose riskier strategies 
in the strategic management literature (Bowman 1982, Moses 1992, Singh 1986, 
Wiseman and Bromiley 1996). Chattopadhyay et al (2001) further investigate firms’ 
responses to threats such as declining organizational performance by considering 
elements such as organizational characteristics and strategic type, and Wiseman and 
Gomez-Mejia (1998) examine managerial risk taking across different governance modes. 
While extending the basic framework of prospect theory, both papers still support the 
hypothesized relationship between a firm’s level of distress and risk seeking behavior. 
Authors have, thus, based their arguments on prospect theory when investigating the 
relationship between organizational decline and risk taking behavior in general (Bowman 
1982, Chattopadhyay et al. 2001, Shoham and Fiegenbaum 2002, Singh 1986, Wiseman 
and Gomez-Mejia 1998), organizational adaptation (McKinley 1993) or innovation 
(Mone et al. 1998). 
 
With the connection between financial distress and risk taking behavior established, the 
relationship between the latter and a firm’s pricing strategy can be characterized as 
follows: As noted by Ferrier (2001), pricing actions represent a particular type of 
competitive actions which have been associated with organizational risk taking (Ferrier et 
al. 2002). Similarly, (Borenstein and Rose 1995) equate bankrupt firms’ “preference for 
greater risk” (p.397) to competitive aggressiveness. Moses (1992) further notes that low 
price strategies “sacrifice short-run profits in an attempt to establish a market and 
generate profits over the long run” (p.40).  He concludes that penetration strategies are 
high risk strategies because the firm might incur further losses if costs fail to decrease 
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below price levels in the longer term. Pricing actions also entail the risk of imitation or 
retaliation by competing firms. LeBlanc (1992), for example, suggests that low-cost 
incumbents may choose to price aggressively in response to firms entering their (low-
price) markets. In more general terms, authors have investigated the dynamics of 
competitive actions and responses and have found that a firm’s actions drive competitors’ 
responses (Chen et al. 1992), which in turn, determine the effectiveness and performance 
effects of the focal firm’s actions (Chen 1996, Peteraf 1993, Smith et al. 1991). The risk 
of choosing low price strategies in a homogenous competitive environment, thus, lies in 
the possibility of unbalancing the competitive equilibrium (Xu and Tiong 2001) and the 
potential loss resulting from aggressive competitive responses (Young et al. 1996). In 
summary, prospect theory supports the argument that financial distress induces firms to 
commit to a riskier, more aggressive pricing behavior, i.e. to lower prices. 
 
Organizational learning theory also provides support for a positive relationship 
between performance distress and strategic change or competitive aggressiveness (Ferrier 
et al. 2002). Lant et al (1992) argue that previously unsuccessful firms undergo a learning 
process which may lead to strategic reorientation, and Ferrier (2001) suggests that the 
discrepancy between an organization’s goals and its actual performance provides 
motivation for future actions and increases the likelihood of strategic change. To the 
extent that pricing actions reflect changes in the underlying firm strategy, one may thus 
argue that financially distressed firms are more likely to change their prices than are 
healthy firms. Ferrier et al (2002), for example, note that “poor performance provides the 
firm with strong incentives to aggressively search out new approaches to compete more 
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effectively in the marketplace” (p.304). It is thereby implicit that potential price changes 
will typically involve lower prices (see also e.g. Ferrier 2001).  
 
From a microeconomics and corporate finance perspective, Brander and Lewis 
(Brander and Lewis 1986) argue that a firm’s “output market behavior will, in general, be 
affected by [its] financial structure” (p.957, brackets added). Investigating the linkages 
between financial and product markets, they demonstrate that highly leveraged firms will 
likely compete more aggressively by increasing their output since riskier strategies with 
(potentially) higher returns are more attractive to equity holders as a result of the limited 
liability effect of equity financing, than are conservative strategies which primarily 
appeal to debt holders. In a similar vein, Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) suggest that 
highly leveraged firms choose technologies which are riskier in terms of their expected 
cash flows. Hendel (1996) supports this assertion, arguing that “firms under financial 
distress use aggressive pricing to generate cash” (p.309) and that prices are a function of 
a firm’s liquidity. 
 
A number of authors have empirically examined the relation between firm financial 
condition and pricing behavior. Borenstein and Rose (1995) regress the change in prices 
on a set of Chapter 11 indicator variables8 and use a panel dataset from the U.S. airline 
industry (1988-1992 data) to estimate their model. They find support for the theoretical 
contentions summarized above, indicating that air fares drop by five to six percent in the 
months preceding the carrier’s Chapter 11 filing. Kennedy (2000) demonstrates that a 
                                                 
8 As noted by the authors, the effects of many other variables typically included in price estimation 
equations are assumed negligible and are excluded from the model specification. 
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distressed firm’s sales revenues and profits (and that of its rivals) decrease prior to 
bankruptcy as a result of its altered product market conduct. He analyzes 51 bankruptcy 
filings and uses Chapter 11 indicator variables and a small set of market and firm-specific 
control variables to predict revenues and profit margins. Analyzing U.S. airline data from 
the 1985 to 1992 period, Busse (2002) finds that highly leveraged firms are more likely to 
start price wars. Busse also argues that “firms in poor financial condition discount future 
revenues more heavily than do financially sound firms” (p.298), thus focusing on 
boosting short term sales (by cutting prices, for example). 
 
Taken together, there is theoretical and empirical support for the contention that 
financially distressed firms choose riskier strategies and price more aggressively, i.e. 
follow a low-price strategy in an effort to gain market shares and boost sales9. Hypothesis 
1 is stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Financial distress negatively impacts prices. 
 
It may also be argued that a firm’s prices will affect firm financial condition. If prices are 
consistently below marginal costs, the firm’s financial situation will deteriorate. Prices 
above marginal costs, in turn, will positively impact firm financial condition as long as 
marginal costs are larger than average costs. The possibility of such reverse causality is 
not further explored in this research. Firm financial condition is, of course, a firm-level 
phenomenon while prices are market-specific. A firm’s financial distress may, as argued 
                                                 
9 See also Ferrier et al (2002) for a definition of competitive aggressiveness. 
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here, impact a firm’s pricing behavior in all markets, but the sales price in an individual 
market will not necessarily affect the firm’s financial standing. In fact, the latter may only 
be true if all prices are systematically lower (or higher) than marginal costs. This is, 
however, a strong assumption which requires empirical and theoretical substantiation. 
Such work is not within the scope of this analysis and is left for future research. This 
research uses firm level financial distress to estimate multi-market firms’ market level 
prices. It is therefore assumed that problems of endogeneity, caused by reverse causality, 
do not arise. 
 
Hypothesis 1 implies that financially distressed carriers may be expected to sell at lower 
prices, all else equal. Prior research, however, suggests that the above hypothesized price 
effect of firm financial distress may intensify as bankruptcy occurs. As Borenstein and 
Rose (1995) and Kennedy (2000) have shown, firms try to prevent insolvency by 
generating cash through aggressive competition prior to bankruptcy filings. Once these 
firms operate under Chapter 11 protection, however, they benefit from lower operating 
costs as debt payments are paused (Barla and Koo 1999, Rose-Green and Dawkins 2002) 
to support the restructuring of the firm. This lower cost base may allow bankrupt firms to 
charge even lower prices. Moreover, soft demand may force carriers to cut fares once 
they operate under bankruptcy protection since the latter signals uncertainty to consumers 
(Hofer et al. 2005). Barla and Koo (1999) further suggest that firms “under protection of 
Chapter 11 are more likely to adopt short term profit maximization behaviors” which 
equate to “prices that are well below long run marginal costs” (p.104) when demand is 
low (see also Hofer et al. 2005). 
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In summary, there are three rationales which support the contention that the effect of 
financial distress on prices should be stronger during bankruptcy than prior to the Chapter 
11 filing (see also Hofer et al. 2005): First, when operating under bankrupt protection, 
firms benefit from lower costs and may pass these savings on to consumers in the form of 
lower prices. Second, bankrupt firms may experience lower demand due to the 
uncertainty concerning the firms’ future operations. Third, bankrupt firms may focus on 
short term profit maximization and thus offer lower prices, ceteris paribus. Consequently, 
the following hypothesis is suggested: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The negative impact of financial distress on prices is greater during 
bankruptcy than prior to the Chapter 11 filing. 
 
As indicated previously, a different set of theories suggest that a firm’s financial distress 
may not significantly impact its prices. These perspectives are reviewed below, and 
hypotheses that suggest that the relationship between financial distress and prices is 
moderated by other factors are formulated. 
 
2.2.2. Conflicting theoretical arguments 
 
In this section, theoretical arguments and empirical results from the industrial 
organization economics, game theory and finance literatures that do not provide support 
for the financial distress-price relationship are reviewed.  
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The threat-rigidity model has emerged as a counterhypothesis to prospect theory. Staw 
et al (1981) argue that individuals, groups, and organizations exhibit restrictive 
information processing patterns, centralize control and conserve resources when faced 
with threatening situations. These mechanisms result in increased rigidity which reduces 
an organization’s ability to change and adapt to its environment (McKinley 1993). As 
noted by McKinley (1993) and Mone et al (1998), there is broad empirical support for the 
threat-rigidity model: Smart and Vertinsky (1984), for example, find that executives 
consult fewer information sources during crises, and Chattopadhyay et al (2001) present 
some evidence that organizations respond to control-reducing threats with low risk, 
internally directed actions. From this perspective, firms in poor financial conditions may, 
thus, be expected to not reduce prices in the short-term, but to behave passively and 
conservatively (Ferrier et al. 2002). 
 
Similar rigidity arguments can be found in the industrial organization economics, game 
theoretic and finance literature. First, the kinked demand curve theory suggests that 
firms in oligopolistic markets with few sellers and rather homogenous products face 
highly inelastic demand for price decreases (Waldman and Jensen 2001). Put differently, 
firms will refrain from price competition given that their rival firms may be expected to 
match these moves, thus offsetting any profit gains (Scherer 1980). This argument is 
further supported by game theory: Derfus et al (forthcoming) argue that pricing actions 
are negative-sum actions since all competing firms will be worse off after implementing 
successive price reductions. Consider, for example, a sequential game between 
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duopolists: Firm Two observes Firm One’s move and subsequently acts in response to 
Firm One’s action. Firm One, in turn, observes Firm Two’s action and may choose to 
react, etc. (Gibbons 1992). When such moves consist of price reductions, the price may 
fall below average cost levels in the course of this competitive interaction of moves and 
countermoves (see also Dasgupta and Titman 1998). These theories are, thus, in line with 
the imitation/retaliation argument discussed earlier (Busse 2002, Chen 1996, Chen et al. 
1992, Peteraf 1993, Smith et al. 1991). 
 
In summary, the threat-rigidity model and arguments from the industrial organization, 
game theoretic, and finance literatures suggest that financially distressed firms may 
refrain from lowering prices as information processing and decision making processes are 
altered in the face of threats or for fear of retaliation. 
 
2.2.3. The contingency approach 
 
This essay attempts to reconcile the apparent theoretical and empirical conflict that has 
shaped previous research on the relationship between financial condition and prices. Each 
of the groups of theoretical arguments – those supporting and those denying a negative 
impact of financial distress on prices – may be valid under specific circumstances. As 
will be discussed below, there are a number of contingencies that may impact the 
relationship under investigation. Similar to Ferrier et al (2002), a contingency framework 
which suggests moderating effects of organizational and market structural characteristics 
is developed. This framework aims at defining in what instances the price effects of 
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financial distress are largest.  
 
As shown in Figure 2, two groups of contingencies are hypothesized to impact the 
relationship between financial distress and prices are presented: organizational 
characteristics and market characteristics. Both groups of variables are discussed in turn, 
and hypotheses are formulated. 
 
Organizational characteristics 
It is suggested that the relationship between firm financial distress and prices is 
moderated by certain organizational characteristics. More specifically, a firm’s operating 
costs, its size and market shares are hypothesized to influence the extent to which firm 
financial distress impacts the firm’s pricing behavior. The importance of these factors has 
been shown in prior research. 
 
Prior research has suggested that a firm’s particular strategic type may impact its 
behavior. Chattopadhyay et al (2001), for example, find that a firm’s propensity to 
respond to threats with externally as opposed to internally oriented actions is impacted by 
its strategic focus. They present empirical support for the contention that firms focusing 
on product-market development (prospectors) are more likely to act externally (by 
changing prices, for example) since the “effectiveness of a product-market development 
strategy depends to a large extent on controlling or modifying the external environment” 
(p.940/941). Firms focusing on domain defense (defenders), in turn, “are more likely to 
act within themselves to become more efficient through standardizing organizational 
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processes” (p.941). Therefore, a differential impact of financial distress on a firm’s prices 
by strategic type is expected, given the firms’ differential inclinations to act externally 
versus internally in response to changes in financial situation. 
 
Although there are multiple definitions and classifications of strategic types (see e.g. 
Shoham and Fiegenbaum 2002), these can be simplified and synthesized as follows (see 
also Chattopadhyay et al. 2001): Defenders are those firms that operate in a stable, well-
defined set of market segments, tend to act conservatively, and are characterized by 
deadlocked organizational structures and operating routines. Prospectors, in turn, are 
those firms that constantly seek opportunities to expand their business and whose most 
distinctive features are their innovativeness and cost-leadership. 
 
In the empirical practice, many operationalizations of strategic types have been 
suggested, ranging from simple dichotomies (e.g. Peteraf 1993) to multidimensional 
clusters (Smith et al. 1997). There is, however, substantial agreement in the literature that 
a firm’s costs are an important differentiator with respect to its strategic type (see the 
above definitions of prospectors and defenders). This is particularly true in the U.S. 
airline industry: Both the academic and trade presses frequently refer to specific airlines 
as either high-cost carriers or low-cost carriers. Peteraf (1993), for example distinguishes 
between pre- and post-deregulation air carriers, the former being mostly high-cost firms10 
while the latter are virtually all low-cost airlines. A firm’s strategic type is therefore 
identified by means of its operating costs. In fact, an airline’s relative cost 
                                                 
10 Southwest Airlines being a notable exception. 
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(dis)advantage may impact its choice of strategy. Assuming that lower operating costs 
also imply higher profit margins, low-cost firms have some financial flexibility to allow 
for price reductions and potentially ensuing price wars. Higher operating costs (and lower 
profit margins), in turn, would imply that price cuts likely lead to increased operating 
losses. 
 
The crucial assumption for this reasoning to be valid is, of course, a negative correlation 
between operating costs and profit margins. The empirical analyses will be conducted 
using data from the U.S. airline industry11. Accordingly, financial data on U.S. airlines 
were collected for a total of eight quarterly time periods (1992 and 2002) from the 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics. An analysis of these data indicates that the 
correlation coefficient between operating costs per available seat-mile and operating 
profit per available seat-mile is equal to r = -0.1481 and is statistically significant at the 
five percent level (p = 0.0485)12. This result provides some support for the contention that 
firms with lower operating costs tend to achieve higher profits and may be able to operate 
profitably even if prices are cut. Firms with higher costs and lower profit margins, in turn, 
do not have this flexibility and may tend to refrain from lowering prices. The negative 
effect of financial distress on prices may thus be expected to decrease with the magnitude 
of the firm’s operating costs as depicted in Figure 3 below. The coefficient of the 
associated interaction term is, thus, expected to be positive. 
 
                                                 
11 Further information about the data sources and the nature of the data set is provided in Chapter 2.3. 
12 This correlation analysis is based on firm-level 228 observations. 










Figure 3: The moderating effect of operating costs on the distress-price relationship 
 
Accordingly, Hypothesis 3 is proposed as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The negative effect of financial distress on prices decreases with the 
magnitude of the firm’s operating costs. 
 
The effect of firm financial distress on prices may also be impacted by the firm’s size. 
Commenting on the survivability of large firms, Tiras (2002) notes that creditors have 
greater confidence in the turnaround performance of large distressed firms and thus grant 
them more favorable loan conditions than to small firms. In a similar vein, Smith and 
Graves (2005) suggest that “larger firms are likely to have a higher probability of 
survival, as the potential losses to stakeholders are greater. Also, such firms are likely to 
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Looking at bankrupt firms, in particular, prior research suggests that larger bankrupt 
firms have a bankruptcy cost advantage due to scale effects in reorganization costs 
(Campbell 1996). The costs of bankruptcy consist of both direct and indirect costs, where 
the former “include lawyers’ and accountants’ fees, other professional fees, and the value 
of managerial time spent in administering the bankruptcy”, and the latter “include lost 
sales, lost profits, and possibly the inability of the firm to obtain credit or to issue 
securities” (Warner 1977, p.338)13. Numerous researchers have attempted to estimate 
these costs. Their estimates vary significantly due to differences in cost definitions, 
variable measurement, sample composition, and estimation methodology. The estimates 
range from an average of 1.3% of the change in firm value during bankruptcy in the 
railroad industry (Warner 1977) to 4% of the firm value in the retail business (Altman 
1984), and up to 16.35% of the firm value for a cross-section of industries (Branch 
2002)14. 
 
Many researchers note, however, that there are significant scale economies in bankruptcy 
costs: Warner (1977), for example, finds that bankruptcy costs are linearly decreasing 
with firm size. His analyses indicate that bankruptcy costs may be as high as about nine 
percent of the firm’s market value for firms with a market value of less than 30 million 
dollars and as low as two percent for firms with a market value of around 120 million 
dollars. Analyzing bankruptcies in the U.S. trucking industry, Guffey and Moore (1991) 
also find a significant negative correlation between firm size (as measured by total asset 
                                                 
13 A more detailed discussion of the composition of bankruptcy costs can be found in Guffey and Moore 
(1991) and Branch (2002). 
14 See also Bradbury and Lloyd (1994) for a summary of prior research estimating bankruptcy costs. 
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values) and bankruptcy costs. Betker (1997), in turn, finds that the relationship between 
firm size (total assets) and bankruptcy costs follows an inverted U shape: The direct 
effect of assets on bankruptcy costs carries a positive coefficient while the coefficient of 
the squared asset value carries a negative coefficient. The observation of the relationship 
between firm size and bankruptcy costs has led researchers to conclude that such 
bankruptcy costs may significantly impact smaller firms’ decisions while they may not 
substantially impact large firms (Bradbury and Lloyd 1994). Consequently, it is expected 
that larger bankrupt firms may be able to offer lower prices than smaller firms due to 
their bankruptcy cost advantage. 
 
Previous research has also found that larger firms tend to remain in bankruptcy for longer 
periods of time and exhibit significantly higher survival rates than smaller firms (Queen 
and Roll 1987, Rodgers 2000). The latter observation may be attributed to lower 
bankruptcy costs (Campbell 1996), for example. These advantages in terms of credit 
conditions, stakeholder confidence, and bankruptcy costs may allow larger distressed 
firms to commit to riskier turnaround strategies that involve more aggressive pricing 
behaviors. While detrimental in the short term, the latter may drive competitors out of the 
market and result in greater long term returns. It is expected that the negative effect of 
firm financial distress on prices will be stronger for larger firms. Consequently, the 
interaction effect between financial distress and firm size is hypothesized to positively 
affect prices, as noted in Hypothesis 4 and illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: The moderating effect of firm size on the distress-price relationship 
 
The magnitude and direction of the effect of firm financial distress on prices may also 
depend on the firm’s market share in the particular product (i.e. route) market. In the long 
run, greater market shares may result in the achievement of lower marginal costs 
through economies of density (Ferrier et al. 2002). Furthermore, high market shares may 
be indicative of barriers to entry and mobility that isolate market-leading firms from 
intense competition (Caves and Porter 1978, Caves and Ghemawat 1992). From this 
perspective, high market shares may be considered a valuable firm resource that allows 
for above-normal returns. Consequently, some researchers have argued that firms will 
likely try to defend their market power. Busse (2002), for example, presents empirical 
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LeBlanc (1992) argues that firms strive to maintain monopoly profits by implementing 
limit or predatory pricing. 
 
These predictions may, however, not hold when explicitly considering distressed firms. 
First, note that distressed firms typically focus on short term survival rather than on long 
term strategic positioning. While the latter is the ultimate purpose of distressed firms’ 
turnaround efforts, generating sufficient cash flows is a mandatory obligation these firms 
face in the immediate future. In this vein, bankrupt U.S. airlines frequently terminate 
unfavorable aircraft leases and collective labor agreements right upon entry into Chapter 
11 protection. If liquidity is the prime objective, however, price cuts in an effort to 
maintain market shares may prove counter-productive for high market share firms: Any 
price reductions will imply lower total revenues since the incremental increase in 
customer demand likely will not outweigh the detrimental effect of lower sales prices. 
Assuming (quasi-)fixed production costs in the short run, these revenue losses directly 
affect the firm’s bottom line. Low-market share firms, in turn, may see a substantial 
increase in customer demand when reducing prices. The prospect of increased volume 
may, thus, offset the negative effect of lower sales prices. This implies that engaging in 
price competition is more appealing to firms with smaller market shares: The potential 
market shares to be gained are greater, and any pricing actions hurt the market leading 
firm(s) significantly more than the smaller firm. This reasoning reflects the concepts of 
Judo economics (Gelman and Salop 1983) and Judo strategy (Yoffie and Kwak 2002), 
which essentially posit that a firm’s market shares (and/or size) may constitute a 
competitive disadvantage when adequately leveraged against it by smaller firms (in terms 
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of market shares). 
 
Standard microeconomic theory further suggests that firms with greater market shares 
possess market power and can charge price premiums (see e.g. Borenstein 1989). 
Extending this argument to the present research context, it is expected that distressed 
firms with higher market shares have higher degrees of market power and will be 
required to compete on prices to a lesser extent than firms with lower market shares and 
little market power. Firms with higher market shares may be able to retain greater shares 
of market demand due to customer retention instruments such as loyalty programs which 
create higher switching costs for consumers. The latter may thus be reluctant to switch to 
financially stronger competitors even though they may seem more reliable or offer lower 
prices. From this perspective, demand inelasticity confers firms with greater market 
shares greater degrees of market power. And such market power, in turn, enables even 
distressed firms to maintain higher price levels, ceteris paribus. 
 
In summary, these arguments thus suggest that higher market shares reduce the negative 
effect of firm financial distress on prices (see Figure 5), and the associated interaction 
effect is expected to be positive. Hypothesis 5 below formally states this contention: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The negative effect of financial distress on prices decreases with the 
firm’s market share. 











Figure 5: The moderating effect of market shares on the distress-price relationship 
 




Besides organizational characteristics, select market characteristics are hypothesized to 
impact a distressed firm’s pricing strategy. Market concentration is one of the most 
widely used measures of the competitiveness of markets in the extant literature. While 
there are many alternative measures of market structure—the number of sellers in the 
market and multi-market contact measures, for example, have been used to characterize 
the structure of markets in prior research (e.g. Mazzeo 2002, Scott 1982)—the degree of 
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appropriately captures the structural characteristics of a market. The second market-
specific factor included in this study is the financial condition of all the firms in a market. 
This variable is included to evaluate how a firm’s financial condition differs from the 
average distress level of the other firms in the market and how this relative difference 
impacts the magnitude of a firm’s pricing actions. 
 
First, market concentration will likely affect a firm’s pricing decision. More 
specifically, the expectation of competitive responses and retaliatory moves in highly 
concentrated markets impacts a firm’s valuation of the effects of any price changes. The 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm posits that industry concentration reduces the 
level of competition (Scherer 1980, Waldman and Jensen 2001). Young et al (1996) find 
empirical support for this contention, noting that firms in concentrated markets or 
industries carry out fewer competitive moves. The underlying assumption of this 
reasoning is, however, that the competing firms are similar to one another and that their 
products are largely homogeneous. Waldman and Jensen (2001) list a variety of factors 
that violate this homogeneity assumption and may hinder effective collusion between 
firms in concentrated markets. Cost differences between competing firms, for example, 
may negatively affect the ease of collusion. 
 
A deterioration in a firm’s financial position, and bankruptcy in particular, may bring 
about such cost differences: firms operating under Chapter 11 protection, in particular, 
may pause debt payments and shed financial obligations such as contributions to pension 
plans, for example (Rose-Green and Dawkins 2002). This new cost structure may then 
    40
lead to the firm’s repositioning in the product market. Specifically, a change in a firm’s 
operating costs changes the firm’s profit maximization problem, and consequently its 
optimal price levels. The interaction of market concentration and financial distress may 
therefore lead to a destabilization of collusive arrangements and increase pricing 
competitiveness (Barla and Koo 1999). While market concentration is expected to be 
positively related to prices, this research contends that this positive relationship will 
diminish in magnitude in the light of an aggravation of a firm’s financial condition.  Put 
differently, the interaction of financial distress and market concentration is expected to 
negatively affect prices, ceteris paribus (Hypothesis 6). 
 
Hypothesis 6: The impact of financial distress on prices is greater, the higher the level 
of market concentration. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the differential effect of financial distress on prices as a function of 
the degree of market concentration. 
 










Figure 6: The moderating effect of market concentration on 
the distress-price relationship 
 
A distressed firm’s pricing decisions will, in part, also depend on its competitors’ 
financial situations. If a firm’s rivals experience similar degrees of distress as the focal 
firm does (and assuming that the firms’ products are undifferentiated), then these rivals 
may be expected to exhibit comparable or symmetric pricing behaviors. A focal firm’s 
price reductions would then be matched by the other firms, and no single firm could gain 
a competitive advantage. In fact, game theory suggests that in a perfectly competitive 
setting each firm will always have an incentive to slightly undercut its competitor’s 
prices, thus eroding profit margins to zero (Gibbons 1992). Financially distressed firms 
will, therefore, avoid competing on price when their competitors find themselves in 
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Hypothesis 7: The greater a firm’s financial distress relative to its competitors, the 
lower the firm’s sales prices. 
 
In summarizing, a set of hypotheses on the link between firm financial distress and firm 
prices has been formulated based on a variety of theoretical perspectives. Conflicting 
viewpoints that may suggest the absence of any significant relationship respectively are 
presented, and a contingency framework that more precisely defines for what type of 
firms and under what circumstances changes in a firm’s financial situation may indeed 
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In the following section, information about the sample data that is used for the empirical 
analyses is provided, and measurements of the variables in the research model as well as 
methodological issues are discussed. 
 
2.3. Data and methodology 
 
The U.S. airline industry provides the setting for the empirical analyses. This selection is 
particularly suitable for a number of reasons. First, the markets are clearly defined (Smith 
et al. 1991), and all firms operating in these markets are dominant-business firms (Peteraf 
1993), i.e. firm-specific data reflect the firms’ aviation activities and are not diluted by 
non-aviation business activities. Second, the U.S. airline industry is highly competitive 
and encompasses a large cross-section of routes that differ significantly with respect to 
their market characteristics (Peteraf 1993, Smith et al. 1991). Third, the industry has 
experienced periods of severe financial distress (Borenstein and Rose 1995), but is 
sufficiently heterogeneous with respect to the airlines’ financial conditions. Finally, there 
is a wealth of publicly available data on the U.S. airline industry due to the U.S. 





                                                 
15 Some sections of this chapter, particularly the sample data and variable descriptions, are similar or equal 
to the corresponding sections of a related paper published by Hofer et al (2005). 
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2.3.1. Data sample 
 
Data were collected on the top 1000 U.S. domestic origin and destination route markets16, 
for all quarters in 1992 and 2002. These years were chosen because the airline industry 
experienced serious distress in the early nineties (Barla and Koo 1999) and in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. At the same time, limiting the analyses to two years only 
allowed keeping the dataset at a manageable size. The sensitivity of the empirical results 
with respect to the selection of these particular time periods is investigated by re-
estimating the regression models using an extended data set that also includes 1997 data. 
These results will be discussed in Section 2.4.3. 
 
Quarterly data are used to capture the short-term effects of financial distress and Chapter 
11 filings on air fares. The top 1000 route markets cover a wide range of route 
characteristics in terms of traffic volume, distance, and intensity of competition. The unit 
of observation is a specific carrier’s fare on a particular route market in a given time 
period. 
 
The raw data were purchased from Database Products Inc. (DPI), a reseller of the 
Department of Transportation’s DB 1A data which contain a 10% sample of all U.S. 
domestic origin and destination tickets. DPI downloads the DB 1A data and screens them 
for erroneous and redundant data entries. These entries and data points from non-revenue 
                                                 
16 Based on 2002 traffic figures, 48 contiguous states only. 
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transactions17 are removed from the dataset. The data obtained from DPI thus are filtered 
and quality-controlled and provide airline and route specific information on fares, 
nonstop and itinerary miles, the number of passengers, and the number of coupons. 
Additional air traffic and airline operating and financial data were gathered from the 
DOT’s T-118 and Form 4119 databases. Other data sources include the American 
Transport Association (ATA; U.S. airline bankruptcy data), the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS; income data and inflation indexes) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA; population statistics).  
 
Observations from carriers with less than five percent route market share were deleted 
from the data set to keep the data set at a manageable size20. Furthermore, a total of 577 
observations were excluded because of unidentified carriers21, or unavailable airport and 
airline-specific data. A total of 23,039 observations were retained for the analyses. Each 
observation indicates data for a specific carrier on a specific route market in a specific 
time period. 
 
2.3.2. Variables and measurement 
 
This section provides detailed information on the variables used in this research model. 
                                                 
17 E.g. personnel travel and frequent flyer award travel. 
18 Table T-1 provides summaries of T-100 data by carrier, aircraft type and service class and includes 
information on available seat miles (ASM) and revenue passenger miles (RPM). 
19  Form 41 (financial schedule) contains financial information on large U.S. certified air carriers including 
data from balance sheets, income statements, and information on cash flows, and aircraft operating 
expenses. 
20 This is common practice: Borenstein and Rose (1995), for example, exclude all observations of carriers 
with less than ten percent route market shares. 
21 “XX – unduplicated commuters” and “UK – unknown carrier”. 
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The purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of financial distress on prices. 
Consequently, ticket prices (fares) are used as the dependent variable. Among those 
factors that may explain and predict variations in ticket prices, firm financial distress is of 
particular interest here. Other independent variables include not only the aforementioned 
moderating factors—operating costs, firm size, market shares, and market concentration 
(see also Figure 7)—but also a set of airline-specific, route-specific, and airport-specific 
characteristics that have been shown to impact air fares in prior research (Hofer et al. 
2005).  The dependent variable is discussed first, followed by the independent variables 
of interest. In addition, information on the set of control variables included in the 
empirical estimation model is provided. Descriptive statistics and a correlation table are 
provided in Section 2.3.3. 
 
2.3.2.1. Dependent variable 
 
Previous studies published in the strategic management literature have measured the 
impact of financial condition on firm behavior in terms of the number and type of 
competitive actions, response speed and delay, for example (Chen et al. 1992, Ferrier 
2001, Ferrier et al. 2002, Smith et al. 1997, Smith et al. 1991, Young et al. 1996). While 
price data are commonly used as dependent variables in the economics literature, this is, 
to the best of the author’s knowledge, the first study to investigate the impact of financial 
distress on prices from a strategic management perspective. More specifically, Farekij is 
the average price carrier k charges on the route between airports i and j22. All fare values 
                                                 
22 Fare values are averages across all booking classes and do not include taxes and fees. 
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are one-way fares based on roundtrip purchases and are given in real 1992 U.S. dollars23.  
 
2.3.2.2. Independent variables 
 
The measurement of financial distress is of particular interest in the context of this study. 
Previous studies of financial condition have generally relied on one of two measures. 
Ferrier et al (2002) and Chakravarthy (1986), for example, relied on a composite measure 
to evaluate a firm’s financial situation. Altman’s (1968) Z score is the most prominent 
member of this group of measures and takes into account the firm’s past and present 
profitability, its liquidity and its degree of activity. Other researchers have focused on 
Chapter 11 filings24, the most visible and definite sign of financial distress, to investigate 
the effects of firm financial distress (e.g. Borenstein and Rose 1995, Kennedy 2000). 
While both measures have their merit, it is important to note that they capture different 
aspects of financial distress. Z score-type measures are indicators of a firm’s financial 
health (or distress), while Chapter 11 filings refer to a specific point in time at which the 
firm is no longer able to meet its debt obligations. The model builds on both of these 
indicators and includes four measures of financial distress to more precisely sort out its 
effects on firm behavior in terms of pricing: 
▪ Distressk is a measure of Airline k’s financial distress. The Distress variable is the 
inversion of firms’ Z scores. More specifically, Z’’ scores (Altman 2002) are used, a 
revised version of Altman’s original Z score formulation (1968) which is particularly 
suitable for firms operating in service industries (such as the airline industry). The 
                                                 
23 All nominal values were converted to real 1992 dollars using the appropriate price indexes published by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
24 See Daily (1994) for a comprehensive explanation and discussion of the U.S. Code Chapter 11. 
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more recent Z’’ scores (Altman 2002) are also preferred over the original Z score 
formulation (Altman 1968) since it has been shown that “the relation between 
financial ratios and financial distress changes over time” (Grice and Ingram 2001) 
such that more recent formulations are more reliable and effective in predicting a 
firm’s financial distress. Based on discriminant analysis, Altman (2002) developed 
the following model to estimate a firm’s financial fitness: 
1 2 3 4'' 6.56* 3.26* 6.72* 1.05*Z X X X X= + + +  where X1 = working capital / total 
assets; X2 = retained earnings / total assets; X3 = Earnings Before Interests and Taxes 
(EBIT) / total assets; X4 = book value of equity / total liabilities. All airline financial 
data needed to compute the Z’’ scores were obtained from the Department of 
Transportation’s Form 41 data which are available online on a carrier-time period 
basis. High Z’’ scores indicate financial health, while low and negative scores 
indicate (serious) financial distress. Specifically, it has been suggested that scores of 
2.60 or above indicate financial health, while scores of 1.10 or lower indicate severe 
distress. To facilitate the interpretation of the estimation results, the Z scores are 
inverted, i.e. ( )1Distress ZScore= − ⋅ , such that higher (positive) Distress scores 
indicate financial distress (see also Ferrier et al. 2002). This variable is used to test 
Hypothesis 1. Moreover, the airlines’ Distress scores are used to test the moderating 
effects from Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 4, Hypothesis 5, and Hypothesis 6, 
respectively. 
▪ Chpt11Opsk is a binary (0/1) variable that identifies those carriers that operate under 
Chapter 11 protection (“1”). It thus is an alternate, though rather coarse, measure of a 
firm’s financial distress. All bankruptcy data were obtained from WebBRD, a 
    49
bankruptcy research database that is accessible online at http://webbrd.com/. This 
database is maintained by Professor Lynn M. LoPucki with the University of 
California at Los Angeles. This database specifies the dates at which firms (airlines) 
entered into and exited from Chapter 11 protection. These data were also double-
checked with the bankruptcy data which are available online at the Air Transport 
Association’s website (http://www.airlines.org/econ/). No discrepancies were found. 
▪ Pre4Chpt11k, identifies those carriers that will face bankruptcy within the following 
four quarters. In the latter case, this binary variable takes on the value of “1”. This 
variable is based on the same sources as the Chpt11Ops variable defined above. A 
four-quarter period (prior to the Chapter 11 filing) is selected to best capture price 
reactions to aggravating financial distress in the time period immediately preceding 
bankruptcy.  
▪ Post4Chpt11k is similar to the Pre4Chpt11k variable, but identifies those carriers that 
filed for Chapter 11 within the past four quarters (“1”). This variable is based on the 
same sources as the Chpt11Ops variable defined above. The inclusion of the 
Pre4Chpt11k and Post4Chpt11k variables allows capturing the differential impact of 
financial distress over time as stated in Hypothesis 2.  
▪ The Chpt11k variable is an indicator variable which is equal to “1” if the focal carrier 
filed for bankruptcy protection in the current quarter. The number of observations in 
which this is the case is small such that this variable is only used for descriptive 
purposes (see Figure 9) and is not included in the regression analysis. An overview of 
the Chapter 11 dummy variables is provided in Figure 8 below. Note that the 
Pre4Chpt11, Chpt11, and Post4Chpt11 variables are mutually exclusive. 







Figure 8: Overview of Chapter 11 indicator variables 
 
▪ DistressDiffkij is an indicator of an airline’s financial standing relative to its route 
competitors. It is based on Altman’s Z’’ score and is computed for each carrier in 
each route market for each time period. It is the difference between the focal carrier’s 
Z’’ score and the route market share weighted average of its route competitors’ Z’’ 
scores: 











. Higher scores, 
thus, indicate that the focal carrier is financially better off relative to its route 
competitors and vice versa. The DistressDiffkij variable is designed to test Hypothesis 
7 which refers to an airline’s financial standing relative to its competitors. This 
variable, thus, differs from the Distress and Chpt11 variables in that it indicates an 
airline’s relative financial standing, i.e. the focal firm’s Distress relative to the market 
share weighted average Distress of its competitors, rather than its absolute financial 
distress. Positive DistressDiff values indicate that the airline is financially worse off 
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Further, a set of moderating variables is included as suggested in Hypothesis 3 to 
Hypothesis 6. More specifically, it is hypothesized that the impact of financial distress on 
prices varies by strategic type/operating costs (Hypothesis 3), firm size (Hypothesis 4), 
firm market shares (Hypothesis 5), and market concentration (Hypothesis 6). These 
moderating variables are operationalized as follows: 
▪ AirlineCostk is an indicator of an airline’s operating efficiency. It is defined by the 
ratio of operating expenses to available seat miles (ASM). 
▪ Sizek indicates the firm’s size in terms of its total assets (measured in 000s of U.S. $). 
▪ RouteSharekij measures an airline’s market share on a route market (based on its share 
of route passengers). 
▪ RouteHHIij is a measure of route market concentration. It is based on the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index (HHI), the sum of the squared market shares of all firms 
competing in the route market. The route HHI is computed on an airport-to-airport 
basis rather than on a city-to-city basis. This allows capturing airport-specific effects. 
These variables are interacted with the Distress variable to estimate their moderating 
effects in the relationship between firm financial distress and prices. 
 
2.3.2.3. Control variables 
 
A set of firm and market specific control variables that have been shown to impact prices 
in previous research (see e.g. Borenstein 1989) is included in the empirical model. The 
firm-specific variables are the following: 
▪ MaxAirportSharekij indicates an airline’s market share in the airport market i or j, 
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whichever is highest.  The rationale for this approach is that a higher market share at 
an airport conveys an airline some degree of market power in that airport market 
which may be expected to impact fares in route markets involving that airport 
(Borenstein 1989). Higher airport market shares likely imply higher fares. 
▪ Circuitykij is another measure of the quality and convenience of carrier k’s service 
between airports i and j. Circuity is the ratio of itinerary miles; i.e. the distance 
actually flown, and nonstop miles between airport i and j. The higher this ratio; i.e. 
the larger the detour, the lower the quality of the transportation service. At the same 
time, however, higher circuities mean higher operating costs. The impact on fares is, 
thus, undetermined. 
▪ AirlinePasskij is the number of passengers carried by airline k between airports i and j 
in a given time period. Higher numbers of passengers may be associated with 
economies of density, and, thus, lower costs and lower fares. On the other hand, high 
traffic volumes reflect high demand levels which may result in high prices. 
▪ Loadfactork is the average fill rate of a carrier k’s passenger aircraft during a given 
time period. Note that this variable is not route specific since data were not available 
on a route basis. Higher load factors may imply economies of density and utilization, 
and fares may be expected to be lower for carriers with high load factors. At the same 
time, high load factors may be associated with poorer service quality (e.g. possibly 
lower frequency of service, less space for each traveler in a fully booked cabin, less 
attentive/personalized cabin service) and lower fares. 
 
The group of market specific control variables consists of the following variables: 
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▪ Distanceij is the distance (in miles) between airports i and j. In general, fares may be 
expected to rise as distance increases. 
▪ DistanceSquaredij is the square of the Distanceij variable. Its inclusion allows for a 
nonlinear relationship between distance and fares. 
▪ SlotRouteij is a binary variable that indicates whether one or both airports i, j are slot-
controlled25. Such airports are typically highly congested and access is limited. Fares 
are therefore expected to be higher on routes to or from these airports. 
▪ MaxAirportHHIij indicates the degree of concentration of an airport market. Rather 
than including two values for both airports i and j, only the higher HHI value is 
retained in this analysis. The rationale for this approach is that the more concentrated 
airport is more likely to be the “bottleneck”, and fares on routes involving this airport 
may be expected to be higher than fares on routes between “unconcentrated” airports. 
▪ LCCCompForHCCij is a binary variable. It takes on the value “1” when the carrier in 
the observation is a high cost carrier and faces route competition by a low-cost 
carrier. While some studies focused on Southwest Airlines only (e.g. Morrison, 
2001), others employed a wider definition of low-cost carriers and defined all carriers 
that started operations after deregulation as low-cost carriers (e.g. Dresner et al. 
1996). In an effort to rigorously define LCCs in this research, financial data on all 
airlines included in this analysis were collected. To account for the fact that operating 
expenses per available seat mile (ASM) are likely higher for airlines operating 
predominantly short haul flights, a carrier’s operating expenses per ASM were 
regressed on its average stage length. The error terms, thus, reflect differences in 
                                                 
25 Presently, JFK, LGA, and DCA are the only slot-controlled airports in the U.S.; ORD was slot controlled 
until June 2002 
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operating costs that cannot be attributed to differences in average stage length and are 
indicators of an airline’s operating efficiency.  A ranking of these error terms revealed 
consistent patterns across all time periods considered in this research, and twelve 
airlines were identified as low-cost carriers (see Appendix 1): Southwest Airlines, 
Reno Air, Sun Country Airlines, Spirit Air Lines, JetBlue Airways, Western Pacific 
Airlines, Airtran Airways, American Trans Air, Braniff Int'l Airlines, America West 
Airlines, Frontier Airlines, Valujet Airlines. 
▪ LCCCompForLCCij is a binary variable which takes on the value “1” when the carrier 
in the observation is a low-cost carrier and competes with another low-cost carrier in 
the route market. LCCCompForHCCij and LCCCompForLCCij specify the presence 
of low-cost carrier competition. These two variables are used to allow for differential 
impacts in terms of pricing on LCCs and high cost carriers. 
▪ AltRouteLCC1Mij is another dummy variable which indicates if there are one or more 
adjacent route markets that are served by one or more low-cost carriers. The inclusion 
of this variable builds on the work by Dresner, Lin and Windle (1996) and Morrison 
(2001) who analyzed the impact of adjacent route competition on fares. Based on the 
population statistics (i.e. PMSA, CMSA, MSA) published by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), the following markets have been defined as metropolitan multi-
airport markets in this research: Boston (BOS, MHT, PVD), Chicago (ORD, MDW), 
Cleveland (CLE, CAK), Dallas (DAL, DFW), Detroit (DTW, FNT), Houston (HOU, 
IAH), Los Angeles (BUR, LAX, LGB, ONT, SNA), Miami (MIA, FLL), New York 
(EWR, JFK, LGA, ISP, HPN), Norfolk (ORF, PHF), Philadelphia (PHL, ACY), San 
Francisco (OAK, SFO, SJC), Tampa (TPA, PIE), Washington (BWI, DCA, IAD). 
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▪ Time variables are also included in the analysis to capture macroeconomic changes as 
well as seasonal fluctuations (quarter dummies Quarter2, Quarter3, Quarter4) and 
general trends over time (year dummy 2002). 
▪ Populationij is used as a first-stage instrument and is the product of the metropolitan 
area populations around airports i and j: 
ij i j
Population Population Population= ⋅ . A 
first stage estimation of the AirlinePass variable is required to address the 
endogeneity of the Fare and AirlinePass variables (see Section 2.3.4 for further detail 
on this endogeneity issue). For econometric reasons, the first-stage estimation of the 
endogenous variable (AirlinePass) requires the use of at least one instrumental 
variable. Population is one of two instrumental variables used in this research. 
▪ Incomeij is also used as a first-stage instrument and is the population-weighted 
average income in the metropolitan areas around airports i and j: 
( ) ( )
( )
i i j j
ij
i j








2.3.3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Correlations are presented in Table 1 below. Due to the large number of observations, 
most correlations are statistically significant at the five percent level. Few correlations 
coefficients, however, are larger than 0.50. The market share and market concentration 
measures are highly correlated26, as are the measures of firm financial distress27.
                                                 
26 Airport market shares (MaxAirportShare) and route market shares (RouteShare), for example, have a 
correlation coefficient of 0.72. 
27 The correlation coefficient for the Distress and DistressDiff variables is 0.79, for example. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 Fare
2 Distance 0.52
3 SlotRoute 0.13 -0.04
4 RouteHHI -0.19 -0.59 0.01
5 MaxAirportHHI 0.15 -0.21 -0.10 0.50
6 RouteShare -0.12 -0.40 0.04 0.52 0.25
7 MaxAirportShare 0.05 -0.34 -0.01 0.44 0.46 0.72
8 Size 0.20 0.11 0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.20
9 LCCCompForHCC -0.10 0.19 -0.12 -0.29 -0.19 -0.18 -0.14 0.28
10 LCCCompForLCC -0.27 -0.04 -0.10 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 -0.06 -0.31 -0.20
11 AltRouteLCC1M -0.06 0.06 0.26 0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.07 0.00
12 Circuity 0.00 0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.37 -0.28 0.11 0.11 -0.07 -0.14
13 Distress 0.10 0.06 0.06 -0.05 0.01 -0.13 -0.16 -0.37 0.06 -0.13 -0.01 0.00
14 DistressDiff -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.13 -0.32 0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.79
15 Chpt11Ops 0.08 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.23 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.43 0.33
16 Pre4Chpt11 -0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.11 0.14 -0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.18 0.16 -0.08
17 Post4Chpt11 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.08 -0.18 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.23 0.18 0.55 -0.04
18 Loadfactor -0.17 0.12 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.32 0.24 -0.05 0.10 0.05 -0.12 -0.02 -0.18 0.18 -0.14
19 AirlineCost 0.43 0.00 0.09 -0.03 0.06 -0.05 0.06 0.20 0.06 -0.37 -0.10 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.07 -0.31
20 AirlinePass -0.32 -0.41 0.12 0.35 0.08 0.71 0.56 -0.05 -0.10 0.09 0.18 -0.47 -0.10 -0.06 -0.10 0.02 -0.07 0.08 -0.17  
(correlation coefficients in bold are significant at the 5% level) 
 
Table 1: Correlation matrix (n = 23,039) 
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The change of firms’ Distress during bankruptcy is illustrated in Figure 9: For each 
possible state with respect to bankruptcy, the airlines’ unweighted mean Distress scores 
are graphed. The averages are computed for all carriers and across all time periods (eight 
quarters in 1992 and 2002) included in the dataset. The sample size n indicates the 
number of firm-quarter observations the respective statistics are based on. As can be seen 
in Figure 9, non-bankrupt (i.e. comparatively healthy) carriers have a mean Distress 
score of 0.8, with the minimum and maximum Distress scores being -3.0 and 18.6, 
respectively. Financially sound airlines are thereby assumed to have negative Distress 
scores while troubled (yet non-bankrupt) carriers have positive Distress scores. Mean 
Distress scores for carriers approaching bankruptcy (Pre4Chpt11) are substantially 
higher (12.2) and always positive, ranging from 0.4 to 69.5. A Welch-Aspen two-sample 
t test for independent groups28 is performed to evaluate whether these differences are 
statistically significant. The test statistic is t = 2.55 with 15.1 degrees of freedom (df). 
This result is statistically significant at the five percent level, indicating that firms 
approaching bankruptcy have significantly higher distress scores. Carriers’ Distress 
scores average 1.7 during the quarter in which the Chapter 11 filing occurs (Chpt11). It 
should be noted, however, that this statistic is based on four carrier observations only29. 
Bankrupt carriers’ Distress scores averaged 7.7 in the four quarters following the entry 
into bankruptcy (Post4Chpt11). In this latter case, the Distress scores range from 0.4 to  
26.8. Based on these descriptive statistics it is concluded that financially distressed 
carriers will always have positive Distress scores. Financially sound airlines, in turn, 
have negative Distress scores.
                                                 
28 Given the difference in sample sizes, unequal variances are assumed. 
29 TWA filed for Chapter 11 in the first quarter of 1992, Markair filed in the second quarter of 1992, US 
Airways filed in the third quarter of 2002, and United Airlines filed in the fourth quarter of 2002. 












Figure 9: Distribution of Distress scores prior to and during bankruptcy 
 
Table 2 provides the mean and standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for 
some selected variables included in the model. The mean Distress score of 0.59 indicates 
that most carriers experienced some level of financial distress in 1992 and 200230. While 
there is no direct interpretation for this value, it implies that a significant proportion of 
passengers used (severely) troubled carriers. This contention is further substantiated by 
the mean of the Chpt11Ops variable (0.11) which suggests that eleven percent of all 
passengers traveled with bankrupt airlines.  It is further noted that approximately seven 
percent of all passengers traveled with near-bankrupt carriers (Pre4Chpt11, 1571 
observations), while approximately five percent of all passengers used airlines that filed 
                                                 
30 The mean of the Distress variable is significantly different from 0. A one-sample mean comparison test 
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for Chapter 11 protection within the past year (Post4Chpt11, 1196 observations). 
Moreover, the data set contains 2,414 carrier-route market observations (out of a total of 
23,039 observations) with DistressDiff values larger than 2.86 (one standard deviation 
above the mean), indicating an airline’s severe financial distress relative to its route 
competitors. 
 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Fare (1992 U.S. dollars) 114.26 60.61 25.17 1140.19
Distress 0.59 2.28 -3.02 69.53
DistressDiff 0.05 2.81 -31.97 68.59
Chpt11Ops 0.11 0.31 0 1
Pre4Chpt11 0.07 0.25 0 1
Post4Chpt11 0.05 0.21 0 1
AirlineCost ($) 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.24
RouteShare 55.47% 27.28% 5% 100%
RouteHHI 5298.78 2172.02 1259.66 10000
Size (1,000 $) 11,900,000 8,887,998 3,936 29,300,000
AirlinePass 1570.76 2408.01 1 29368
Distance (miles) 950.86 643.09 30 2717
SlotRoute 0.22 0.41 0 1
MaxAirportShare 46.09% 23.89% 0.015% 100%
MaxAirportHHI 3966.56 1885.11 1131.37 10000
Circuity 1.02 0.05 1 2.2
Loadfactor 67.81% 6.18% 35.1% 84.6%
Quarter1 0.23 0.42 0 1
Quarter2 0.26 0.44 0 1
Quarter3 0.27 0.44 0 1
Quarter4 0.25 0.43 0 1
1992 0.42 0.49 0 1
2002 0.58 0.49 0 1











































Table 2: Descriptive statistics for selected variables (n = 23,039) 
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2.3.4. Empirical methodology 
 
A log-linear price estimation equation forms the basis of the model used in this research. 
More specifically, an airline’s fare on a route is modeled as a function of a set of route, 
airport, and carrier specific variables, as well as a number of control variables. The 
estimation of the model requires the implementation of a two-stage least squares 
procedure since AirlinePasskij is an endogenous variable; i.e. the number of airline 
passengers may impact airfares while at the same time the latter may have an effect on 
the number of passengers. In a first stage regression, the number of airline passengers 
(AirlinePass) is modeled as a function of all exogenous variables including two 
instrumental variables, Income and Population. Fitted values for AirlinePass are then 
used to estimate fares (Fare) in the second stage model. The basic estimating model is 
defined as follows: 
 
Equation 1: First-stage regression model 
 
lnAirline Passengers = α0 + α1 lnDistance + α2 (lnDistance)
2+ α3 Slot Route  
+ α4 lnRoute HHI + α5 lnMax Airport HHI + α6 Route Share + α7 Max Airport Share 
+ α8 LCC Comp for HCC + α9 LCC Comp for LCC + α10 Alt Route LCC 
+ α11 lnCircuity + α12 Distress + α13 Load Factor + α14 lnAirline Cost + α15 lnSize 
+ α16 lnPopulation + α17 lnIncome + α18 2002 + Σγt Quartert
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Equation 2: Second-stage regression model 
 
lnFare = β0 + β1 lnAirline Passengers (fitted) + β2 lnDistance + β3 (lnDistance)
2
 
+ β4 Slot Route + β5 lnRoute HHI + β6 lnMax Airport HHI + β7 Route Share 
+ β8 Max Airport Share + β9 LCC Comp for HCC + β10 LCC Comp for LCC 
+ β11 Alt Route LCC + β12 lnCircuity + β13 Distress + β14 Load Factor 
+ β15 lnAirline Cost + β16 lnSize + β17 2002 + Σγt Quartert 
 
The OLS assumptions of homoskedasticity and independence are frequently not met 
when dealing with cross-sectional time series data (Greene 2003). Therefore, tests to 
detect the potential problems of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error terms 
are implemented. 
 
First, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Lagrange multiplier test (Breusch and Pagan 
1979, Cook and Weisberg 1983) uses fitted values of the dependent variable (Fare) to 
determine whether the residuals vary with the fitted values of the dependent variable; i.e. 
violate the homoskedasticity assumption. This test is implemented after an OLS 
regression similar to the second stage model described above (the sole difference being 
that the actual values of Airline Passengers are used rather than fitted values; see 
Appendix 2). The implementation of this test yields a test statistic of 614.33 which 
follows a χ2 distribution. The null hypothesis of constant variance is clearly rejected with 
a significance level of less than one percent. 
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Second, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data (Drukker 2003, Wooldridge 
2002) suggests the presence of first-order auto-correlation with an F-statistic of  
F = 829.37 which is statistically significant at the less than one percent level. Given the 
presence of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and endogeneity (as discussed previously), 
a generalized two-stage least squares (G2SLS) procedure is recommended (Greene 
2003). 
 
The generalized least squares procedure is typically implemented in one of two distinct 
econometric specifications: fixed effects or random effects31. These two specifications 
differentially address the heterogeneity of unobserved group and time specific effects, 
which in the classical ordinary least squares approach, are subsumed in the error term. 
 
In the fixed effects model, the constant term is adjusted for each group and each time 
period such that the regression model becomes '
it i t kit
y xα β γ δ ε= + + + + . The first term 
on the right-hand side of the equation is the constant term ( )α , and the second term 
represents the sum of the products of the regressors ( )x  and their respective 
coefficients ( )β . The third and fourth terms are the group ( )iγ  and time ( )tδ  fixed 
effects which effectively adjust the constant term for group and time specific effects. The 
last term in the model is the individual error term associated with the kth observation in 
group i in time period t ( )kitε . 
                                                 
31 The reader is referred to any econometrics textbook for a detailed discussion of the econometric issues 
revolving around generalized least squares models and the choice between fixed and random effects 
specifications. The overview provided here is based on Greene (2003). 
    63
 
The random effects model proposes a different specification of the error term in the 
econometric model. In this case, the unobserved individual heterogeneity is assumed 
independent of the regressors ( )x , and the group and time specific adjustments to the 
constant term are assumed to be randomly distributed across cross-sectional units and 
time. The benefit of the random effects procedure relative to the fixed effects procedure 
lies in the preservation of a significant number of degrees of freedom since only two 
random variables are needed (random group and time effects) rather than an exhaustive 
set of group and time specific dummy variables. If, however, the group and time effects 
are correlated with the regressors, the random effects procedure may produce inconsistent 
estimates. 
 
To decide whether it is appropriate to use the fixed effects or random effects procedure, 
the Hausman specification test (Hausman 1978) is used to test for orthogonality between 
the regressors and the random effects. If the null hypothesis of no correlation cannot be 
rejected, the random effects model is both consistent and efficient and preferred over the 
fixed effects model which, in this case, is inefficient. If, however, the null hypothesis is 
rejected, only the fixed effects model is consistent and thus preferred over the random 
effects model. The implementation of the Hausman specification test requires the 
estimation of the model (Equation 1 and Equation 2) using the fixed effects and random 
effects procedures, respectively. The test statistic W is based on the covariance matrix ψ  
of the difference vector of the respective coefficients [ ]b β−  and is given by 
[ ] [ ]1'W b bβ ψ β−= − −  (Hausman 1978). The test produces a 2χ  distributed statistic of 
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W  = 995.43 which is significant at the less than one percent level. The null hypothesis of 
no correlation is therefore clearly rejected, suggesting that the fixed effects model should 
be selected. 
 
As noted above, the fixed effects model has the disadvantage of consuming a large 
number of degrees of freedom due to the inclusion of group and time specific dummy 
variables in the regression analysis. Greene (2003) and Yaffee (2003) therefore suggest 
carefully evaluating the benefits of the fixed effects G2SLS procedure relative to the 
standard 2SLS procedure. The F test of joint significance of fixed effects (Greene 2003) 
evaluates the contribution of the fixed group and time effects to the fit of the model. To 
that end, two regression analyses must be performed: The baseline regression which does 
not include any fixed effects, and the fixed effects regression. The improvement in the fit 
of the model which is achieved by adding fixed effects is measured by the following F 
statistic: 
( ) ( )
















 (Greene 2003, Yaffee 2003), where n 
is the number of groups, nT is the number of observations, and k is the number of 
regressors. 
 
In this study, the cross-section is defined by route-carrier combinations (a total of 4,508 
groups), and there are eight distinct time periods (two years with four quarters each). This 
implies that 4,514 dummy variables must be added to the baseline 2SLS regression 
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equation32. The statistical software package used for this research (Intercooled STATA 
8.2) does not support such an operation due to the software’s insufficient matrix size. For 
the purpose of this test, the number of dummy variables is therefore reduced by 
estimating fixed carrier effects only as opposed to fixed route-carrier effects, thereby 
reducing the number of cross-sectional indicators from 4,508 to 30. By constraining 
seasonal (quarterly) effects to be constant over time (in 1992 and 2002), the number of 
time indicators is reduced to four as specified in Equation 1 and Equation 2. This test is a 
highly conservative approximation of the full fixed effects test with 4,514 fixed effects 
and therefore provides a lower bound for the joint significance of the fixed effects33. The 
baseline model (see Appendix 3) yields an R2 of 0.376, while the reduced fixed effects 
model (see Appendix 4) yields an R2 of 0.512. The resulting F statistic is F = 194.22 
which is significant at the less than one percent level. It is therefore concluded that the 
fixed effects generalized two-stage least squares procedure is the most appropriate data 
analysis technique. 
 
2.4. Empirical results and discussion 
 
The regression results are discussed in two stages: The first-stage regression, in which 
AirlinePass is the dependent variable, is discussed, before the second-stage regression 
results are presented. The second-stage regression uses Fare as the dependent variable 
and tests the hypotheses set forth in this essay. 
                                                 
32 Note that this must be done manually to ensure consistency of the R2 computation (the computation of 
the R2 statistic differs between the 2SLS and [fixed effect] G2SLS). 
33 The breakdown of the 30 carrier indicator variables to 4,508 route-carrier indicator variables will 
necessarily result in an increased R2 statistic. 
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2.4.1. First-stage regression 
 
In the first-stage regression, all independent variables (which are assumed exogenous) 
and the Population and Income instruments are used to estimate exogenously determined 
fitted values for AirlinePass. Table 3 presents the coefficient estimates of the first stage 
regression as specified in Equation 1. 
 
Most of the results displayed in Table 3 are in accordance with prior theoretical reasoning 
and empirical research: The relationship between the number of passengers and route 
distance is nonlinear as evidenced by the negative coefficient of the Distance variable 
and the positive sign of the DistanceSquared coefficient. This suggests that the number of 
passengers increases with the distance flown at a rate which increases in route length. 
The positive coefficient of the SlotRoute dummy variable is indicative of congestion and 
higher passenger volumes on slot-controlled routes. Moreover, greater firm market shares 
at the route and airport market levels (RouteShare and MaxAirportShare) imply greater 
numbers of passengers. Holding market shares constant, an increase in market 
concentration (RouteHHI, MaxAirportHHI) then results in lower passenger numbers (see 
also Ravenscraft 1983). Competition in adjacent route markets (AltRouteLCC1M) has a 
slight negative effect on the number of passengers, while more circuitous routings 
(Circuity) exhibit significantly decreased passenger numbers. Higher load factors 
(LoadFactor) are, of course, associated with more passengers, and higher operating costs 
(AirlineCost), presumably implying higher prices, negatively affect demand. The 
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coefficient of the Size variable is statistically insignificant, indicating that firm size per se 
does not influence passenger demand. The positive coefficients of the quarter dummies 
indicate seasonal effects (Quarter2-4), while the time trend variable (2002) carries a 
negative, though statistically insignificant coefficient, thus hinting at the downturn in the 
airline industry in 2002. The first instrumental variable, Population, carries a positive 
coefficient indicating that passenger numbers increase as the potential market volume 
increases. The coefficient of the Income variable is statistically insignificant which may 
be attributed to its limited variability. 
 
There are three variables with unexpected signs: First, the LCCCompForHCC and 
LCCCompForLCC variables both have positive coefficients, indicating that the presence 
of a low-cost competitor increases passenger demand for the focal carrier. This result is 
most likely due to the focal airline lowering its prices as it faces aggressive competition. 
These lower prices then translate into higher passenger demand. The Distress variable 
carries a positive and statistically insignificant coefficient which suggests a firm’s 
financial distress does not impact passenger demand. A potential explanation may be that 
distressed carriers mitigate potentially negative demand effects by charging lower prices 
or that passengers have few or no alternative carrier choices. 
 
In summary, it is noted that the first-stage model is highly significant (F = 1,038.3, 
significant at the less than one percent level), and that most independent variables are at 
least marginally significant with most coefficients having the expected signs. Appendix 5 
presents the first stage regression results for all five specifications of the model. 




















Quarter 2 0.048 0.000
Quarter 3 0.074 0.000





R-squared (within) 0.541  
 
  
Table 3: First stage G2SLS regression estimates (n = 23,039)34 
 
 
2.4.2. Second-stage regression 
 
In this section, the results from five different second-stage regression analyses are 
reported. The first and second second-stage analyses test Hypothesis 1 by including the 
Distress and Chpt11Ops variables, respectively. The third regression tests the differential 
                                                 
34 The carrier fixed effects are omitted in this table. 
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effect of financial distress over time (Hypothesis 2) by estimating the model with the 
Pre4Chpt11 and Post4Chpt11 variables. Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are tested 
separately to avoid confounding the results by including both the Distress and Chpt11 
variables in a single regression (since all bankrupt airlines have high Distress scores). 
The fourth second-stage regression model tests the moderating effects of firm costs, firm 
market shares, and market concentration (Hypothesis 3 to Hypothesis 6). These 
interactions are not included in model 1 to allow for a direct interpretation of the direct 
effect of the Distress variable in model 1. As noted by Aiken and West (1991), when 
interaction effects are present, a variable’s direct effect cannot be assessed by interpreting 
the variable’s coefficient only, but it must be evaluated in conjunction with all its 
interactions. The fifth and final model tests the importance of a firm’s relative financial 
distress as discussed in Hypothesis 7. Similar to the argumentation above, the 
DistressDiff variable is tested separately to avoid confounding the effects of absolute 
(Distress) and relative (DistressDiff) financial distress. The second-stage regression 
results are presented in Table 4. 
 
Before focusing on the variables of interest in the respective regressions, it is noted that 
all second-stage models are highly significant (Wald χ2 ≥  23,900,000). Caution must be 
used, however, when interpreting the R-squared statistics35. In the generalized least 
squares (GLS) procedure, the total sums of squares are not broken down as in the 
ordinary least squares procedure. The GLS R-squared, therefore, is not bounded between 
zero and one and cannot be interpreted as the percentage of variability explained. In 
                                                 
35 The information on the use and meaning of R-squared statistics in GLS regressions was obtained from 
the STATA manuals and the STATA website at www.stata.com. 
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addition, there are two sources of variation: within variation and between variation. When 
fixed effects models (i.e. within estimators) are used, only the within R-squared should be 
used36. The R squared for within variation indicates to what extent the model is able to 
predict a new observation on one of the subjects already in the study. The R squared for 
total variation indicates the quality of predictions relating to a new observation on a new 
subject. While all R-squared (within, between, overall) statistics are reported, the reader’s 
attention is directed toward the within R-squared measures which range between 0.741 
and 0.783 as reported in Table 4.
                                                 
36 This statistic is obtained by fitting a mean-deviated regression model where all the group effects are 
assumed to be fixed. These group effects are subtracted out of the model and no attempt is made to quantify 
their overall effect on the fit of the model. 
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Second-stage G2SLS regression Number of obs. 23039 Obs. per group: min. 1
(fixed effects) Number of groups 4508 avg. 5.1
max. 8
Dependent variable:
Fare Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z|
Constant -231.741 0.000 -237.998 0.000 -247.393 0.000 -245.434 0.000 -268.520 0.000
AirlinePass (fitted) -0.093 0.000 -0.076 0.006 -0.042 0.138 -0.141 0.000 -0.022 0.441
Distance 69.277 0.000 70.705 0.000 73.037 0.000 74.364 0.000 78.903 0.000
DistanceSquared -5.006 0.000 -5.108 0.000 -5.268 0.000 -5.420 0.000 -5.671 0.000
SlotRoute 0.090 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.088 0.000
RouteHHI -0.009 0.495 -0.003 0.795 0.008 0.553 -0.008 0.518 0.021 0.130
MaxAirportHHI 0.055 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.030 0.019 0.105 0.000
RouteShare 0.002 0.010 0.001 0.053 0.001 0.437 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.994
MaxAirportShare 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
LCCCompForHCC -0.110 0.000 -0.118 0.000 -0.130 0.000 -0.091 0.000 -0.132 0.000
LCCCompForLCC -0.024 0.034 -0.014 0.242 -0.001 0.914 -0.011 0.311 -0.005 0.684
AltRouteLCC1M -0.027 0.000 -0.026 0.000 -0.027 0.000 -0.021 0.000 -0.028 0.000
Circuity -0.443 0.000 -0.402 0.000 -0.320 0.000 -0.536 0.000 -0.269 0.001





Loadfactor -0.015 0.000 -0.014 0.000 -0.014 0.000 -0.013 0.000 -0.015 0.000
AirlineCost 0.224 0.000 0.210 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.223 0.000 0.226 0.000
Size 0.055 0.000 0.119 0.000 0.152 0.000 -0.018 0.061 0.130 0.000
Quarter 2 -0.031 0.000 -0.040 0.000 -0.044 0.000 -0.034 0.000 -0.045 0.000
Quarter 3 -0.026 0.000 -0.034 0.000 -0.048 0.000 -0.028 0.000 -0.044 0.000
Quarter 4 -0.034 0.000 -0.046 0.000 -0.054 0.000 -0.027 0.000 -0.053 0.000





Wald χ2 26,800,000 25,900,000 24,500,000 28,500,000 23,900,000
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared:                           within 0.769 0.761 0.748 0.783 0.741
between 0.080 0.084 0.092 0.041 0.101
overall 0.087 0.091 0.097 0.049 0.104
52 41 3
 
Table 4: Second-stage G2SLS regression estimates 
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Turning to the control variables first, it is noted that most coefficient estimates are 
consistent across all five second-stage models and are statistically significant at the less 
than one percent level: Prices are shown to increase with Distance, but at a decreasing 
rate, as evidenced by the negative coefficient of DistanceSquared. As expected, fares 
tend to be higher in route markets involving one or two slot-controlled airports 
(SlotRoute), and both airport market concentration (MaxAirportHHI) and airport market 
shares (MaxAirportShare) are associated with higher fares, ceteris paribus. The presence 
of low-cost carrier competition has a strong negative effect on a high cost carrier’s prices 
(LCCCompForHCC), as does the presence of low-cost carriers in adjacent route markets 
(AltRouteLCC1M). Prices for less convenient connecting traffic are shown to be lower 
than for direct service (Circuity), and higher load factors (LoadFactor) – indicative of 
economies of density – also tend to result in lower fares. An airline’s operating costs 
(AirlineCost) and size (Size), finally, are both shown to positively impact air fares. The 
time variables capture both seasonal price fluctuations (Quarter2-4) as well as a clearly 
negative time trend (2002). 
 
The following variables have either unexpected or statistically insignificant coefficients:  
While the coefficient of the AirlinePass variable is negative as expected in all instances, 
it is statistically insignificant in models 3 and 5. There is, nonetheless, at least some 
evidence that higher passenger numbers – implying economies of density – result in 
lower prices, all else equal. Note that the coefficients of the RouteShare variable, while 
positive as expected, are also statistically insignificant in models 3 and 5. The two 
variables (AirlinePass and RouteShare) are highly correlated as expected (ρ = 0.57, see 
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Table 1) with RouteShare being the ratio of AirlinePass and the total number of 
passengers in the route market. It is, therefore, likely that multicollinearity between right-
hand side variables cause some degree of variance inflation. The RouteHHI variable 
carries a statistically insignificant coefficient in all model specifications, suggesting that 
route market concentration does not have a direct effect on prices. Also, the presence of 
LCC competitors does not appear to impact other low-cost carriers’ prices as indicated by 
the insignificant coefficient estimates of the LCCCompForLCC variable in models 2-5. 
Only in the baseline model (1) can the expected negative effect be observed. 
 
The attention is now directed to the variables of interest that test the hypotheses set forth 
in this paper. 
 
The negative and significant coefficient of the Distress variable in the first second-stage 
regression (β = -0.036, p = 0.000) provides clear support for the contention that greater 
levels of financial distress result in lower prices, ceteris paribus (Hypothesis 1). This 
result thus confirms the basic finding in the extant literature that financially distressed 
firms behave more aggressively in the output market. More specifically, this result 
suggests that the reduction of a firm’s Distress score by one unit leads to a price 
reduction of 3.6 percent, all else held constant. The second regression presents an 
alternative test of Hypothesis 1 using the ChptOps variable. The latter carries a 
statistically significant coefficient of -0.072 (p = 0.000) which implies that, on average, 
airlines operating under Chapter 11 protection charge about seven percent less than their 
non-bankrupt competitors, ceteris paribus. This finding is consistent with the result of the 
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Distress variable and clearly in support of Hypothesis 1. 
 
The third regression presented in Table 4 tests the differential impact of financial distress 
prior to and after Chapter 11 filings. The coefficient of the Pre4Chpt11, while negative, 
is statistically insignificant (β = -0.007, p = 0.170) which suggests that there are no 
significant price changes as an airline approaches bankruptcy. The Post4Chpt11 variable, 
however, carries a negative and statistically significant coefficient (β = -0.042,  
p = 0.000). This indicates that airlines tend to lower prices upon declaring bankruptcy and 
that the effect of firm financial distress on prices is substantially larger (-4.2%) once the 
airline operates under bankruptcy protection. This finding supports the contention that 
passengers may be reluctant to choose bankrupt carriers given the uncertainty about its 
reliability and future operations. This may entice such firms to cut prices in an effort to 
stimulate or maintain passenger demand. Moreover, bankrupt carriers may simply pass 
some of the cost savings that result from operating under bankruptcy protection37 on to 
consumers. Hypothesis 2 is thus supported. 
 
The fourth column in Table 4 presents a test of the hypothesized interaction effects 
(Hypothesis 3 to Hypothesis 6). Hypothesis 3 argues that a firm’s operating costs 
positively moderate the relationship between financial distress and prices, meaning that 
the effect of firm financial distress on prices will be of lesser magnitude for high-cost 
firms than for lower-cost firms (see Figure 3). The rationale for this contention is that 
low-cost firms likely have higher profit margins and can more easily (and profitably) 
                                                 
37 Due to paused leasing and debt payments, for example. 
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afford price cuts than high-cost firms. The strategic management literature further argues 
that operating costs are a good proxy for a firm’s strategic type: Low-cost firms are often 
referred to as prospectors, and high-cost firms have been termed defenders. Prior 
research has shown that prospectors tend to act more aggressively (in terms of prices, for 
example), while defenders tend to behave more conservatively and focus on internally-
oriented rather than market-oriented actions which involve price and product changes. 
The coefficient of the interaction term AirlineCost*Distress is positive and statistically 
significant at the less than one percent level (β = 0.062, p = 0.000). As discussed above, 
the effect of financial distress on prices is generally negative, implying that distressed 
firms sell at lower prices, all else equal. The interaction with operating costs 
(AirlineCost) then adds a positive term to the distressed firm’s price, where the value of 
this addition increases in the firm’s operating costs. The analyses, thus, present some 
evidence for the contention that distressed firms will tend to refrain from competing on 
price when their operating costs are higher, as suggested in Hypothesis 3. 
 
It has been suggested in Hypothesis 4 that firm size will increase a distressed firm’s 
tendency to compete on price (see Figure 4). More specifically, it has been argued that 
larger firms benefit from greater reputation, creditor trust and resource availability which 
increase their survivability. Consequently, it is expected that larger distressed firms 
leverage their size advantage and do not avoid price competition to the extent smaller, 
more fragile airlines do: Larger firms can afford the detrimental short-term effects of 
price cuts and may pursue such aggressive pricing strategies in an effort to eliminate 
smaller competitors and thus enhance their long-term profitability prospects. The 
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interaction term between Distress and Size is negative and statistically significant (β = -
0.013, p = 0.000). This result thus implies that larger distressed firms will price more 
aggressively than smaller distressed firms, all else equal. Consequently, Hypothesis 4 is 
supported. 
 
In Hypothesis 5, it was argued that the impact of firm financial distress on prices is 
moderated by firm market shares (see Figure 5). Firm with higher market shares may 
have higher degrees of market power and therefore experience less pressure to lower 
prices in the light of financial distress. In addition, for firms with high market shares, the 
potential benefits of cutting prices are limited since the expected gains in terms of market 
volume may not offset the losses due to lower sales prices. The coefficient of the 
interaction term of the RouteShare and Distress variables is positive and significant  
(β = 0.0002, p = 0.000). Higher route market shares, thus, reduce a distressed firm’s 
pricing aggressiveness as stated in Hypothesis 5. 
 
As to the moderating effect of (route) market concentration, it was hypothesized that the 
interaction of financial distress and route market concentration will positively impact 
prices (Hypothesis 6), ceteris paribus (see Figure 6). While high market concentration 
per se may facilitate collusive price fixing among firms, deteriorations in a firm’s 
financial condition and ensuing changes in that firm’s cost structure may lead to the 
breakdown of collusive arrangements with competitors and greater degrees of price 
competition. The interaction term of RouteHHI and Distress has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient (β = -0.023, p = 0.000). As stated in Hypothesis 6, this 
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implies that greater levels of distress and market concentration increase a heavily 
troubled firm’s tendency to compete aggressively and sell at lower prices (after 
controlling for the moderating effects of route market shares). 
 
 
Hypothesis 7 suggests that the difference between a focal firm’s Distress score and that of 
its (route market) competitors affects the focal firm’s prices. This hypothesis is motivated 
by the fact that firms that are in similar financial conditions may be expected to behave 
symmetrically. In this case, no single firm would benefit from price reductions and 
reinforced price competition. It is, therefore, expected that a focal firms pricing actions 
will be more pronounced the greater the focal firm’s financial distress relative to its 
competitors. To test Hypothesis 7 the coefficient of the DistressDiff variable from the 
fourth second-stage regression can be interpreted straightforwardly. The negative and 
significant coefficient (β = -0.009, p = 0.000) indicates that a firm’s financial distress 




2.4.3. Second-stage regression: Sensitivity analysis 
 
The results discussed above are based on the analysis of 1992 and 2002 data. These time 
periods were chosen since the airline industry experienced substantial financial distress 
during those years. To investigate the sensitivity of the results with respect to the 
                                                 
38 Recall that positive DistressDiff values indicate relative financial distress, while negative values indicate 
relative financial wellbeing. 
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selection of the time period studied, the regression models are re-estimated using data 
from 1992, 1997, and 2002. The addition of 1997 data brings the total number of 
observations to 34,097. 1997 data were selected since this year is in the middle of the 
1992-2002 time period. Also, the airline industry as a whole performed relatively well 
during that year. It is therefore expected that the findings with respect to the effect of 
financial distress on prices will be weaker when 1997 data are included in the analyses. 
Nonetheless, the empirical results should be consistent with the contentions set forth in 
Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 7. 
 
Table 5 presents the second-stage regression results which are based on the analysis of 
the extended data set (including 1997 data). It is noted that the fit of the regression 
models is generally inferior compared to the results presented in Table 4 which were 
based on 1992 and 2002 data only. Specifically, the R-squared within statistics shown in 
Table 5 suggest that the models explain only about fifty to sixty percent of the variability 
as compared to the seventy to eighty percent variability explained for the 1992 and 2002 
data (see Table 4). While most variables have statistically significant coefficients with the 
expected signs, the Distance and DistanceSquared variables have insignificant coefficient 
estimates in all models. 
 
The hypothesis testing results can be summarized as follows: 
▪ Hypothesis 1: The negative coefficient of the Distress variable (β = -0.020,  
p = 0.000) in the first regression, provides support for the contention that greater 
levels of financial distress result in lower prices. This contention is further 
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corroborated by the negative and significant coefficient of the Chpt11Ops variable 
in the second regression (β = -0.047, p = 0.000). 
▪ Hypothesis 2: The differential effect of financial distress over time (prior to versus 
during bankruptcy) is empirically examined in the third regression where the 
Pre4Chpt11 and Post4Chpt11 variables are included in the model. While the 
Pre4Chpt11 variable carries a statistically significant negative coefficient, the 
coefficient of the Post4Chpt11 variable is statistically insignificant. This suggests 
that, on average, carriers approaching bankruptcy tend to cut prices, while carriers 
operating under bankruptcy protection do not cut prices. This finding is contrary 
to Hypothesis 2 and inconsistent with the results shown in Table 4. It is noted that 
virtually no airline bankruptcies were observed in 1997. As a result, it is not 
surprising that adding 1997 data to the regression analysis weakens the robustness 
of the regression results with respect to the effect of bankruptcy on prices. 
▪ Hypothesis 3: Hypothesis 3 suggests that a firm’s operating costs positively 
moderate the relationship between financial distress and prices. The positive and 
significant coefficient of the AirlineCost*Distress interaction effect (β = 0.015,  
p = 0.000) confirms this expectation. This finding is consistent with the results 
shown in Table 4. 
▪ Hypothesis 4: The distress-price effect was hypothesized to be stronger for larger 
firms than for smaller firms. In line with the regression results reported earlier, 
this hypothesis is supported even when 1997 data are included: The Size*Distress 
interaction effect carries a negative and significant coefficient (β = -0.009,  
p = 0.000). 
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▪ Hypothesis 5: The results shown in Table 5 suggest that the distress-price effect 
does not change in magnitude as a firm’s route market share increases. The 
RouteShare*Distress interaction effect does not yield a statistically significant 
coefficient (β = 0.0000, p = 0.495), whereas this interaction effect was positive 
and significant in the analysis of 1992 and 2002 data (see Table 4). Again, the 
lack of a significant finding may potentially be attributed to the fact that the 
addition of 1997 data tends to dilute statistical effects of financial distress since 
the airline industry experienced little distress in that year. 
▪ Hypothesis 6: The RouteHHI*Distress interaction carries the expected negative 
coefficient (β = -0.008, p = 0.001), suggesting that the distress-price effect is 
greater in more concentrated markets than in less concentrated markets. This 
finding is consistent with Hypothesis 6 and the previously reported results (see 
Table 4). 
▪  
▪ Hypothesis 7: A firm’s financial distress relative to its competitors in the route 
market is also shown to significantly impact prices (β = -0.003, p = 0.000). 
Hypothesis 7 is, thus, supported. 
 
In summary, five out of seven hypotheses are supported when 1997 data are included in 
the analyses. The lower model fit statistics and smaller coefficient values, however, 
confirm the contention that adding 1997 data—a period of relative financial health in the 
airline industry—tends to dilute the results. Nonetheless, the hypothesis testing results are 
shown to be largely robust.
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Second-stage G2SLS regression Number of obs. 34097 Obs. per group: min. 1
(fixed effects) Number of groups 4798 avg. 7.1
max. 12
Dependent variable:
Fare Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z|
Constant -30.762 0.477 -16.919 0.707 -27.484 0.531 -40.643 0.364 -29.798 0.489
AirlinePass (fitted) -0.505 0.000 -0.544 0.000 -0.515 0.000 -0.550 0.000 -0.493 0.000
Distance 13.024 0.318 8.645 0.525 11.527 0.384 16.686 0.217 12.118 0.351
DistanceSquared -1.025 0.295 -0.690 0.498 -0.895 0.368 -1.315 0.195 -0.936 0.338
SlotRoute 0.188 0.000 0.194 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.183 0.000 0.188 0.000
RouteHHI -0.161 0.000 -0.177 0.000 -0.168 0.000 -0.172 0.000 -0.157 0.000
MaxAirportHHI -0.079 0.000 -0.087 0.000 -0.073 0.000 -0.105 0.000 -0.067 0.000
RouteShare 0.013 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.013 0.000
MaxAirportShare 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000
LCCCompForHCC -0.054 0.000 -0.047 0.000 -0.055 0.000 -0.036 0.000 -0.060 0.000
LCCCompForLCC 0.073 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.084 0.000
AltRouteLCC1M -0.043 0.000 -0.043 0.000 -0.044 0.000 -0.039 0.000 -0.045 0.000
Circuity -1.266 0.000 -1.359 0.000 -1.285 0.000 -1.373 0.000 -1.231 0.000





Loadfactor -0.011 0.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.010 0.000
AirlineCost 0.062 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.052 0.000
Size 0.049 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.098 0.000 -0.010 0.225 0.094 0.000
Quarter 2 0.005 0.126 0.001 0.796 -0.002 0.582 0.006 0.047 -0.002 0.483
Quarter 3 0.027 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.020 0.000
Quarter 4 -0.018 0.000 -0.018 0.000 -0.025 0.000 -0.010 0.001 -0.023 0.000







25,300,000 23,300,000 24,600,000 23,600,000 25,500,000
Prob > χ
2
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared:                           within 0.565 0.528 0.552 0.533 0.569
between 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.033 0.010
overall 0.001 0.006 0.015 0.019 0.019
52 41 3
 




2.5. Summary and discussion 
 
The study’s results are summarized in Table 6 below. Ample support for the theoretical 
arguments set forth in this paper is found. The implications of these findings are 
discussed in this section, and some limitations and directions for future research are 
noted. 
 
The primary objective of this research is to reconcile the extant theoretical conflict 
revolving around the impact of firm financial distress on prices. Based on a review of 
varied theoretical perspectives and numerous empirical studies, it is suggested that 
financial distress is negatively related to prices. It is noted, however, that this may not be 
true in all cases. More specifically, it is hypothesized that operating costs, firm size and 
market shares, as well as market concentration and a firm’s financial standing relative to 
its competitors may impact the magnitude of a troubled firm’s pricing actions. A strategic 
contingency framework which incorporates these moderating effects is developed and 
tested using a comprehensive panel dataset from the U.S. airline industry.  
 
The empirical results provide clear statistical support for all hypotheses: Firm financial 
distress negatively impacts prices, and it is shown that these price effects are greatest for 
carriers that operate under bankruptcy protection. The empirical results further suggest 
that this is particularly true for firms with lower operating costs and smaller market 
shares, and for firms operating in highly concentrated markets. The difference between a 
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focal firm’s financial distress and that of its competitors is also shown to impact the 



























< 0 Yes 
3 AirlineCost + + Yes 
4 Size – – Yes 
5 RouteShare + + Yes 
6 RouteHHI 
 
– – Yes 
7 DistressDiff –  – Yes 
  
Table 6: Summary of results 
 
This study’s results suggest that passengers traveling on distressed or bankrupt carriers 
pay nearly four percent less than other passengers, all else equal. This is, of course, a 
desirable outcome from a consumer perspective as a distressed firm’s lower prices 
implies increases in consumer welfare. Since bankruptcy only sometimes results in a 
firm’s liquidation, there is no indication for longer term negative effects of Chapter 11 
protection on consumer welfare through, for example, reduced competition or reduced 
service levels. 
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For managers and policy makers, however, this finding may be troubling. Financial 
distress appears to negatively affect a firm’s revenue streams by virtue of lower prices 
and, in some instances, lower demand39 and may ultimately reduce the firm’s profitability 
(see also Kennedy 2000). Taken together, these findings raise questions about the 
rationality of a distressed firm’s pricing behavior and the adequacy of Chapter 11 
protection. The results suggest that financial distress is both at the beginning and at the 
end of a vicious circle of literally destructive price competition (see also Moulton and 
Thomas 1993 for a discussion of the success rates of reorganizations under bankruptcy). 
Managers and policy makers try to avoid organizational failure by offering lower prices 
and supporting reorganization efforts respectively, but the very opposite effect may be 
observed in at least some instances: Financial distress, and Chapter 11 protection in 
particular, lead to an increase in the competitive pressures, thus increasing the firm’s 
distress and spreading it beyond the firm’s boundaries. While it is not an objective of this 
research to make any managerial or public policy prescriptions, the findings presented in 
this study may be useful in gaining a greater understanding of the effects of financial 
distress on prices by considering the moderating effects of firm and market 
characteristics. 
 
The key message of this study is clear: Microeconomic and corporate finance theory 
alone cannot fully explain the relationship between a firm’s capital structure and its 
output market behavior. The diversity of firms and circumstantial characteristics have to 
be considered when investigating the effect of financial distress on prices. Strategic 
                                                 
39 See Table 38: the negative coefficient of the Post4Chpt11 variable implies that bankrupt firms face lower 
demand, all else equal. 
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management research offers an array of theoretical approaches to further explore this 
issue, and a contingency framework appears to be an appropriate means to do so. In that 
vein, the hypotheses reflect and the results present evidence for elements of prospect 
theory, organizational learning theory, and strategic groups research, for example. The 
author is unaware of any other research that has examined the research question at hand 
from a strategic management perspective. By combining multiple theoretical perspectives 
and incorporating them in a single, comprehensive contingency framework, the 
understanding of the link between firm financial distress and prices is advanced. 
 
Data from the U.S. airline industry are used for the empirical analyses. While this 
selection has many desirable qualities in terms of the detail and availability of data, one 
must consider the possibility that these findings may not be generalizable to other 
industries. The U.S. airline business is particularly competitive and, to some extent, still 
marked by the era of regulation40. The exploration of the effects of financial distress on 
prices in a cross-section of industries is left for future research. Moreover, the DOT 
airline data do not contain any information about booking and service classes. As noted 
by Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005), the failure to recognize these distinctive attributes of 
the tickets purchased is a potentially critical shortfall of any empirical analysis of air 
fares. 
 
Research of the impact of financial distress faces a general dilemma: While financial 
distress is a firm-level phenomenon, prices are clearly market-specific. In this research, 
                                                 
40 Regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board ended in 1978, but has shaped the industry in many ways. 
Although formally deregulated, regulatory controls (e.g. slot controls, antitrust rulings) continue to impact 
the industry.  
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the impact of firm-level financial distress on individual product market prices is 
investigated. This approach presents some challenges in that it is more difficult to isolate 
statistical effects, and it may be desirable to investigate this research question in the 
context of single-market firms. The latter are, however, hard to find nowadays. 
 
On a final note, it should be stated that this study’s results may also depend upon the 
measurement of financial distress. This study employed distress measures based on Z 
scores and Chapter 11 dummy variables given that they have been widely applied in the 
extant literature. The finance literature offers numerous variations of these measures as 
well as entirely different ones (see e.g. Gritta 2004 for a comprehensive review of some 
of these measures). Future research may explore the sensitivity of the results with respect 
the measurement of financial distress. 
 
This research contributes to the literature on the link between firm financial distress and 
output market behavior. It is shown that this issue is far from being fully understood and 
that strategic management theory offers avenues for further exploration of the impact of 
financial distress on prices. This study has made a first step in this direction by estimating 
the moderating effect of a number of strategic contingencies on this relationship. 
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3. The effect of firm financial distress on firm inventories: A supply chain 
perspective 
 
In this chapter, the effects of financial distress on inventory holdings are discussed and 
tested empirically. The structure of this chapter is similar to that of Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation: The subject matter of this essay is introduced in Section 3.1. The latter 
includes a statement of the research questions and contributions of this research. Section 
3.2 presents a review of theories and prior research on the relationship between firm 
financial condition and inventories, and a baseline hypothesis is formulated. A supply 
chain perspective is discussed in Section 3.3. It is hypothesized that firm power not only 
directly impacts firm inventories, but also moderates the effect of financial distress on 
inventories. Details about the data sample and the empirical methodology are provided in 
Section 3.4. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 3.5, and the 
study’s findings are summarized in Section 3.6. Managerial implications are discussed, 




Financial considerations play an important role in inventory decision making. The survey 
results presented by Osteryoung et al (1986), for example, indicate that 73.5% of all 
respondents consider the firm’s cash position, and 57.3% factor in anticipated changes in 
interest rates when making inventory decisions. It is intuitively appealing to assume that 
firms under financial distress will shed inventories to generate liquidity. For American 
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car manufacturer Chrysler Corp., for example, reducing inventories was a major 
component of its turnaround efforts (Stundza and Milligan 2001). Case Corporation, a 
U.S. manufacturer of construction and agricultural equipment, also drastically cut 
inventories when it restructured its business in the early 1990s (Buxbaum 1995). 
 
While anecdotal evidence suggests that declining firm financial condition implies lower 
inventory levels, prior empirical research on this relationship has produced ambiguous 
results (see e.g. Corbett et al. 1999, Guariglia 1999). Upon closer examination of 
previously published work, which relies exclusively on finance and economic theory, it 
becomes clear that the link between firm finances and inventories is not yet well 
understood, both in theoretical and empirical terms. Insights from inventory theory and 
supply chain research will be useful to better understand this relationship and to improve 
upon the specification of empirical estimation models. 
 
A supply chain perspective on the link between financial distress and inventories is of 
particular interest in this research. More specifically, this research is concerned with the 
effect of a (distressed) firm’s power relative to buyers and suppliers on the firm’s 
inventory decisions. In other words, can a distressed firm with greater levels of power 
push greater amounts of inventory onto suppliers and buyers? If so, firms may want to 
pay more attention to the financial condition of potential supply chain partners and be 
aware of the potentially adverse impact of distressed firms’ inventory decisions. The 
interplay between financial distress, supply chain power, and inventories remains 
unexplored. The following paragraphs summarize the state of knowledge in this area and 
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outline the agenda of this research. 
 
A sizeable literature in the economics and finance fields deals with the effects of financial 
parameters on inventories. Some researchers have taken a rather macroeconomic 
approach, analyzing the impact of monetary policy on aggregate inventory levels across 
industries (see e.g. Corbett et al. 1999). Another set of research papers has investigated 
the relationship between firm financial parameters such as bank lending rates or cash 
flows and firm inventories (see e.g. Carpenter et al. 1998, Gertler and Gilchrist 1994). 
While approaching the phenomenon from different theoretical and methodological 
angles, many researchers contend that unfavorable financial conditions are associated 
with lower inventory levels across an economy and within firms. The empirical findings, 
however, provide only partial support for the researchers’ contentions. Corbett et al 
(1999), for example, find that interest rates are a significant predictor of inventory levels 
in certain industries only. Similarly, the results presented by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) 
suggest that the coverage ratio, i.e. the ratio of a firm’s cash flow and short term interest 
expenses, explains the inventory behavior of small firms but not that of large firms. A 
study by Guariglia (1999), finally, establishes a significant relationship between firm 
finances and firm inventories during recessionary periods only. 
 
The inconsistency of prior findings may, in part, be explained by differences in variable 
measurement, the composition of data samples, estimation techniques, and perhaps most 
importantly, variations in model specification. As the relationship between firm financial 
factors and firm inventories appears to be more complex than previously assumed, 
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important explanatory variables may have been omitted in past research. In fact, most 
published articles in this area rely exclusively on corporate finance and economic theory. 
As pointed out by Roumiantsev and Netessine (2007), authors thereby ignore the insights 
provided by inventory theory. Classical inventory models suggest that firm inventories 
are a function of factors such as average demand, average lead times, holding costs, 
demand and lead time variability, for example. Out of these factors, only demand has 
been incorporated in the models of the articles referenced in the previous paragraph. 
Potential specification problems encountered in prior research may therefore be alleviated 
by drawing on inventory theory to a greater extent than has been done before. 
 
Another shortcoming of the extant literature relating firm financial factors to inventories 
may be the myopic treatment of inventories as firm decision parameters and the neglect 
of the supply chain context in which most firms operate. While a firm’s managers 
ultimately decide on the amount of inventory they order and sell, firms typically operate 
within the confines of the terms and conditions negotiated with buyers and suppliers. 
Some firms, for example, commit to specified service levels and must hold more 
inventory to meet these performance targets. In other instances, buyers and sellers closely 
cooperate by implementing Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI) programs, for example. 
Under this regime, a firm physically holds inventory that is managed (and possibly 
owned) by a supplier until items are used in production or sold. Regardless of the 
inventory policy in place, a firm’s bargaining power relative to its buyers and suppliers 
will significantly impact the extent to which the firm exerts control over its inventories 
(Wallin et al. 2006). Supply chain considerations, thus, may have a substantial impact on 
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a firm’s inventory holdings and on the degree to which a firm’s financial distress affects 
inventories. This research adds to prior work in the firm finance-inventory area by 
drawing on the supply chain power literature and incorporating associated measures in 
the empirical analysis. 
 
In summarizing, this essay theoretically and empirically revisits the link between firm 
financial distress and firm inventories. An objective of this research thereby is to gain a 
refined understanding of why a firm’s financial situation may have an impact on 
inventories. This relationship is also tested empirically. Particular attention is paid to the 
specification of the regression equation using not only microeconomic theory, but also 
inventory theory, and insights from supply chain research. Also investigated is how the 
nature of supply chain relationships, i.e. inter-firm power (im)balances, impact the extent 
to which firms can reduce inventory holdings when experiencing financial distress. The 
following research questions, thus, emerge: 
1. Does a firm’s financial situation have an impact on its inventories after controlling for 
other relevant parameters prescribed by inventory theory and supply chain research? 
2. How does a firm’s (supply chain) power impact its inventory holdings? 
3. Is the magnitude of the presumed effect of financial distress on inventories impacted 
by power (im)balances in supply chain relationships? 
 
The contributions of this research are manifold. First, it is shown that firm inventories 
should respond to changes in firm financial condition. Prior research has not provided 
such theoretical rationales. This is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the first attempt 
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to investigate the research question at hand from both a microeconomic and an inventory 
theory perspective, thus providing a broader, more complete theoretical basis for the 
empirical analyses. Second, the impact of supply chain relationship variables on 
inventory management is investigated. To date, few researchers have empirically 
analyzed how the nature of buyer-supplier power balances impact firm inventory levels41. 
In this essay, the role of firm power and concentration in both the upstream (supplier) and 
downstream (buyer) markets in explaining focal firm inventories is examined. Moreover, 
the analysis of the relationship between firm financial distress and inventories is extended 
beyond the boundaries of the firm and is approached from a supply chain perspective, 
thus more appropriately capturing the external influences on firms’ (inventory) decisions 
(Cox et al. 2003, Dobson 2005). More specifically, it is argued that a firm’s buying and 
selling power moderates the distress-inventory relationship. This contingency framework 
may help reconcile prior findings by defining when and under what conditions the effect 
of firm distress on inventories is greatest. This research thus adds to both the inventory 
and supply chain literatures by analyzing the relationships between firm financial 
distress, supply chain power, and firm inventories. 
 
Besides its academic theoretical appeal, this research also has potentially important 
managerial implications for supplier selection. If, for example, distressed firms are shown 
to use their power to push inventory ownership to buyers or suppliers, firms may want to 
carefully evaluate a potential partner firm’s financial condition and determine how the 
                                                 
41 Amihud and Mendelson (1989) study how firm market power affects firm inventory. They do not, 
however, consider a firm’s power over suppliers or market concentration measures. Blazenko and 
Vandezande (2003), in turn, investigate the relationship between market concentration and inventories only 
and also ignore characteristics of the upstream supplier market. 
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partner’s distress might affect inventory ownership in the supply chain. In addition, 
Halley and Nollet (2002) note that supplier selection and supplier development become 
increasingly strategic, long-term firm decisions. An investigation of the role and impact 
of financial considerations on such decisions, therefore, seems timely and managerially 
relevant. 
 
3.2. The financial distress-inventory relationship 
 
In this section, the theoretical bases for a link between firm financial distress and 
inventories are reviewed. Most prior research relied on economic theory when 
investigating this relationship. This literature and the underlying theoretical rationales are 
reviewed below. The second subsection discusses the firm finance-inventory link from an 
inventory theory perspective. It is also suggested that inventory theory offers various 
determinants of firm inventories that have not been included in prior economics research. 
This section concludes with the formulation of a baseline hypothesis. 
 
3.2.1. Economic theory 
 
Within the economics stream of research, three articles, all first published in 1994, merit 
particular attention. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) are among the first to explore the 
relationship between monetary policy (interest rates) and firm inventory levels. Kashyap 
et al (1994) present a very similar study but use firm liquidity rather than security-market 
interest rates as a measure of financial condition. Both papers support the lending view 
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which suggests that a firm’s dependence on external finance drives the strength of the 
relationship between firm financial condition and inventories. Carpenter et al (1994), 
finally, focus uniquely on the availability of internal finance as a determinant of 
inventory (dis)investments and disregard macroeconomic factors such as security-market 
interest rates. All three papers are discussed in more detail below. 
 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) investigate the relationship between monetary policy and 
firm behavior with respect to sales and inventories. The authors present two theoretical 
rationales which suggest that tight monetary policy (i.e. an increase in interest rates) 
negatively affects firm output and inventories. First, it is noted that rising interest rates 
weaken firms’ balance sheet positions by reducing cash flows (net of interest) and 
lowering the value of collateral assets. Consequently, borrowers reduce their spending 
which implies output and inventory contractions. Second, monetary policy regulates the 
pool of funds that is available to bank-dependent borrowers. The effect of monetary 
policy on firm behavior is argued to be particularly strong for firms with limited access to 
public capital markets. Both rationales, thus, suggest that monetary policy may affect 
firm sales and inventories, and that firm financial factors, the access to capital markets in 
particular, influence this relationship. 
 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) use firm size to approximate a firm’s access to capital 
markets and use industry-level time series data disaggregated by firm size classes to 
estimate the effects of monetary policy on firm behavior. Descriptive analyses and the 
estimation of structural inventory equations with the firm’s coverage ratio (cash flow 
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over total interest payments) as the key independent variable of interest indicate that 
small firms’ sales and inventories decline more significantly during and after periods of 
tight monetary policy. This result is shown to be significant and quantitatively 
meaningful for small firms but not for large firms which supports the contention that tight 
monetary policy particularly affects small firms with limited access to public capital 
markets. 
 
The work of Kashyap et al (1994) is closely related to that of Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) 
and is motivated by the observation that there has been little empirical support for a 
relationship between real interest rates and inventory investment. Yet, the observations 
that inventory movements explain a substantial portion of the variability in aggregate 
output, and that economic downturns typically follow periods of tight credit strongly 
suggest such a relationship. 
 
Kashyap et al (1994) attribute the lack of empirical support to measurement 
imperfections. More specifically, the authors suggest that measures such as security-
market interest rates do not fully capture firm financial conditions or the cost of external 
finance (e.g. bank loans). The latter, however, is argued to have a greater impact on 
inventories than security-market interest rates. The authors’ key hypothesis thus states 
that firms that depend on external finance should see their inventories fall more sharply 
than firms with higher levels of internal funds and better access to public debt markets. 
This contention is frequently referred to as the “lending view” in extant research. 
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Kashyap et al (1994) seek to empirically validate their hypothesis by regressing the 
change in inventories on a set of firm-level determinants which include most notably the 
inventory/sales ratio, the change in sales over the current and preceding years, and a 
measure of liquidity (cash and marketable securities over total assets). A series of 
different regression analyses using time series data indicate that firm liquidity is 
consistently positively and significantly related to changes in inventory. This is, however, 
only true for the 1974-75 and 1981-82 time periods when there were substantial liquidity 
constraints. Data from 1985-86 are used as a control sample, and for this time period the 
coefficient of the “liquidity” variable is statistically insignificant. In summarizing, the 
authors thus conclude that financial factors influence inventory movements during tight 
money (recessionary) episodes but not otherwise. 
 
Most prior research relating inventory investments to financial parameters focuses on the 
effects of monetary policy (e.g. Gertler and Gilchrist 1994) or financial factors such as 
commercial paper spread and the mix of bank loans and commercial paper on firm 
inventories (e.g. Kashyap et al. 1993). Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen (1994) build on 
this stream of research and add to it on two accounts: First, they focus on the flow of 
internal finance as opposed to on monetary policy effects (see Gertler and Gilchrist 1994) 
and external (bank) finance (see Kashyap et al. 1994). Moreover, Carpenter et al (1994) 
test the importance of financing constraints using high-frequency (i.e. quarterly) panel 
data and are thus able to observe short term changes in inventory investment levels. The 
perspective of financing constraints, as adopted by Carpenter et al (1994), builds on the 
notion that external finance (e.g. loans, bonds, commercial paper) is substantially more 
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expensive than internal finance (e.g. earnings and depreciation flows). The latter, thus, is 
the preferred means of financing (inventory) investments. 
 
Internal finance, however, is extremely volatile over the business cycle as it is 
immediately affected by a slow-down in sales revenues given fixed or quasi-fixed 
production costs in the short-run. As a consequence, comparatively liquid assets with 
relatively low adjustment costs, such as inventories, are likely to absorb most of the 
internal finance fluctuations of financially constrained firms. Carpenter et al (1994) argue 
that this is particularly true for small firms whose access to external finance alternatives 
such as corporate bonds and commercial paper is impeded by the lack of publicly 
available information and the ensuing information asymmetry, adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems. Small firms, the authors suggest, are thus forced to rely on 
expensive bank loans as a last recourse to compensate for fluctuations in internal finance. 
The effect of internal finance constraints on inventory (dis)investment is therefore 
expected to be even greater for small firms than for large firms. The authors further 
suggest that the magnitude of this effect depends on the optimality of inventory levels at 
the beginning of the period. This contention builds on the idea that the marginal cost of 
liquidating inventory stocks increases as current inventory levels (negatively) deviate 
from optimal inventory levels. 
 
Carpenter et al (1994) use Compustat data from the U.S. manufacturing industry (1981-
1992) to perform a series of regression analyses. The results generally indicate that the 
level of cash flows is positively related to inventory investment, or put differently, 
    98
internal finance flows account for a significant portion of the variability in inventory 
investment. While this is found to be true for both small and large firms, the authors note 
that the effect tends to be greater in magnitude for small firms. The general result, thus, is 
in line with the authors’ theoretical expectations. It is further noted, that the movements 
of cash flows are highly procyclical, which, combined with the identified cash flow-
inventory link, provides a rationale for the high volatility of inventory investment over 
the business cycle. 
 
More recent empirical research also finds partial support for the contention that (firm) 
financial factors impact firm inventory. Corbett et al (1999), for example, present a study 
of UK and Japanese industries. They find that interest rates are significant predictors of 
inventory investments in the paper, chemicals, and non-electric machinery industries 
(UK), as well as in the Japanese chemicals, steel and iron, and metal manufacturing 
industries. A study by Guariglia (1999) of UK manufacturing firms further explores the 
effect of financial factors – Guariglia uses the coverage ratio as a measure of a firm’s 
financial condition – on inventories. Her findings indicate a significant positive 
relationship between coverage ratios and inventory levels during recessions and periods 
of tight monetary policy. 
 
In summary, it is noted that researchers in the economics field expect that less favorable 
financial conditions will result in lower inventory levels. The significance levels of 
empirical findings, however, vary greatly from study to study, depending on the 
measures, data sets, and time periods used. It is also noted that researchers have used a 
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broad range of financial variables (interest rates, coverage ratios, and cash levels, for 
example). No prior research has attempted to more comprehensively measure the 
multifaceted firm financial distress construct and relate the latter to firm inventories. This 
essay fills this gap. In addition, it will be argued in this research that previously 
unobserved factors may also impact firm inventories and moderate the magnitude of the 
financial distress-inventory relationship. 
 
3.2.2. Inventory theory 
 
Firms hold inventory for at least two reasons. First, delivery and production cycles are 
typically not perfectly aligned. Natural stocks of raw materials as well as intermediate 
and finished products therefore occur at various points throughout the production and 
distribution process. These inventories are typically referred to as cycle stocks. Second, 
inventories buffer against uncertainty. Specifically, unexpectedly high demand or longer 
than usual lead times may lead to costly disruptions in manufacturing and delivery. Safety 
stocks are a means of mitigating this risk by holding extra inventory that will be used 
only if the need arises.  
 
Determining the magnitude of cycle and safety stocks is a crucial task in inventory 
management. While holding inventory is costly due to warehousing and opportunity 
costs, not holding inventory may result in substantial stockout costs. The latter can take 
the form of backorder (e.g. expediting) or lost sales costs, for example. Inventory theory 
has been concerned with developing optimal, i.e. cost-minimizing or profit-maximizing 
    100
inventory policies. Multiple models have been proposed for different settings and 
assumptions (see e.g. Tersine 1994). It is not the focus of this research to provide a 
comprehensive review of these models. Rather, two questions are asked. First, which 
determinants of inventories are proposed by inventory theory? And second, how may 
firm financial distress be related to inventories from an inventory theory perspective? To 
address these questions, two widely used and commonly known inventory models, the 
r,Q model and the s,S model are briefly reviewed below. Particular attention is paid to the 
r,Q model, and most of the subsequent discussion refers to this inventory policy. The 
general results relating to the determinants of inventory levels and the relationship 
between financial distress and inventory levels do, however, hold for most other 
inventory models as well. 
 
The r,Q inventory model is an extension of the well-known and widely used economic 
order quantity (EOQ) model which, in its most basic form, balances ordering and 
inventory holding costs42. First developed by Harris (1913), the EOQ and its variants 
have been prominently featured in inventory management research and practice for over 
ninety years (see Erlenkotter 1990 for a review of the early history of the EOQ model). 
This model’s appeal lies in its relative simplicity and ease of use, as well as in its 
robustness (Alstrom 2001). Reuter (1978) surveyed a total of 228 firms in five states in 
the U.S. and finds that 75.4% of all respondents use the EOQ on a continuing basis with 
an additional 9.6% indicating occasional use of the EOQ. In a study conducted by 
McLaughlin et al (1994), 28% out of 236 survey respondents reported using the EOQ. In 
                                                 
42 See any textbook on inventory management for a detailed discussion of the economic order quantity 
model and its variants (e.g. Tersine 1994) 
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a more recent survey, Rabinovich and Evers (2002) find that the EOQ is deemed 
important in managerial practice and is commonly used by logistics managers to 
determine optimal order quantities43. Zinn and Charnes (2005) note that quick response 
(QR) inventory policies have become increasingly popular in modern inventory 
management and therefore analyze the relative merits of the EOQ and QR methods, 
respectively. Based on a series of numerical analyses, Zinn and Charnes (2005) conclude 
that the EOQ continues to be the preferred inventory policy when order costs are 
relatively high44. Numerous researchers have conducted sensitivity analyses and have 
found that moderate deviations from the EOQ’s assumptions do not have a substantial 
impact on order quantities and associated total inventory costs (e.g. Sun and Queyranne 
2002). Its popularity, simplicity, and robustness make the EOQ a good starting point for 
developing an inventory theory perspective on the financial distress-inventory 
relationship. 
 
The classical EOQ is based on the following assumptions: the demand rate is constant, 
continuous and known, and lead times are zero. Replenishments are received 
instantaneously and all at once, and the cost of placing an order as well as unit holding 
costs are constant. The classical EOQ model considers only a single product and assumes 
that there are no interactions with other inventory items. Moreover, it is assumed that the 
firm has sufficient capital and capacity to purchase the economic order quantity. In the 
r,Q model, the rather unrealistic assumptions of constant demand and zero lead times are 
                                                 
43 On a five point scale (1 = unimportant, 5 = very important) 256 survey respondents ascribe an average 
weight of 3.27 to the EOQ, and 19.61% report the use of the EOQ for determining finished goods orders. 
44 See Zinn and Charnes (2005) for a summary of their study’s results. Table 6 (p.139) identifies the 
conditions under which QR and EOQ policies are preferred, respectively. 
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relaxed. With stochastic demand, nonzero but constant lead times, and per-unit backorder 
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The control parameters of the r,Q inventory policy are thus defined by the expected sales 
                                                 
45 The inventory literature commonly uses the term Demand instead of sales volume. It is noted however, 
that inventory decisions are made a priori based on forecasts. 
46 In a manufacturing context, these order costs may also be thought of as production setup costs. 
47 Since Q is a function of r and vice versa, the optimal solutions for these parameters are found by 
iteration. 
48 Lead times are assumed constant. See Tersine (1994) for more detail. 
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volume, sales variability, lead times, ordering costs, holding costs and backorder costs. 
Inventory theory suggests that these parameters appropriately predict a firm’s inventory 
decisions and thereby firm inventory levels. Figure 10 provides a graphic illustration of 









Figure 10: Illustration of the r,Q policy 
 
The s,S policy is similar to the r,Q inventory policy but may differ from the latter in that 
the order quantity is variable when inventories are reviewed periodically only, or when 
demand is lumpy, i.e. does not follow a pure Poisson process with unit demand. Each 
time the inventory level drops below a threshold level (or reorder point) s, on order of 
size (S-s) is placed. For details on the mathematical derivation of the inventory control 
parameters (s,S) the interested reader is referred to Denardo (2003), for example. In this 
context, it shall suffice to note that the s,S policy is defined by the magnitude of demand, 
the item’s unit costs, per-unit holding and backorder costs, as well as ordering costs. 
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models. The determinants of an s,S inventory control policy, thus, are essentially the 
same as the determinants of the r,Q policy. 
 
In summary, inventory theory suggests that firm inventories should be a function of 
average demand, demand variability, lead times, ordering costs, holding costs and 
backorder costs (or lost sales costs), regardless of the specific inventory control policy in 
place. 
 
Next, the potential effects of firm financial distress on inventories are discussed from an 
inventory theory perspective. Financial costs are most directly reflected in a firm’s 
holding costs. Holding costs include a financial cost component representing the capital 
cost of inventories (Followill et al. 1990). While holding costs also comprise a noncapital 
carrying charge49, Timme (2003) notes that the financial component of holding costs 
usually exceeds noncapital carrying charges. In accordance with this contention, the 
survey results presented by Fraser and Gaither (1984) suggest that 68% of all firms 
approximate inventory carrying costs with borrowing costs. The latter are a function of a 
firm’s financial condition (see e.g. Buzacott and Zhang 2004, Wiersema 2005). 
Specifically, a deterioration of a firm’s financial condition implies higher borrowing costs 
and thereby higher inventory holding costs. Returning to the inventory control parameters 
of the r,Q policy, it is evident that higher holding costs entail lower inventory levels, all 
                                                 
49 Noncapital carrying costs comprise the costs of warehousing, obsolescence, pilferage, damage, and 
insurance, as well as taxes and administrative charges (see Timme, 2003). 
    105
else equal50. The optimal order quantity 
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51. This translates to a lower safety factor k and 
consequently to a lower reorder point r  ( )* LTS Sr M k SL k Lσ σ= + ⋅ = + ⋅ . A negative 
relationship between firm financial distress and optimal firm inventories can therefore 
straightforwardly be established from an inventory theory perspective. 
 
While the author is unaware of any empirical inventory research relating firm financial 
condition to inventory levels, there is some analytical research on the relationship 
between various financial factors in a broader sense and inventory decisions. For 
completeness, a few examples of such research are discussed below. 
 
One literature stream, for example, investigates the effects of trade credits, permissible 
payment delays granted by suppliers, on economic order quantities. Haley and Higgins 
(1973) analyze the interdependence of inventory decisions and credit terms, and 
determine jointly optimal order quantities and payment schedules. Most subsequent 
research assumed credit terms as exogenously given (i.e. unilaterally defined by the 
supplier) and focused on the effects of trade credits on order quantities. Chapman et al 
                                                 
50 In addition, higher holding costs may imply lower firm output choices and hence lower demand. 
51 Note that the optimal stockout probability is also a function of Q, which, in turn, decreases in H . *P  
therefore increases in H and decreases in H , Overall, the optimal stockout probability increases in H . 
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(1984), for example, conduct an average cost analysis and conclude that trade credit 
periods, while significantly impacting total costs, do not affect optimal order quantities. 
Chand and Ward (1987), on the contrary, find that order quantities increase as payment 
delay times increase. Rachamadugu (1989) reconciles these contradictory findings and 
ascribes them to differences in the assumptions and setup of the respective models. In 
summary, Rachamadugu’s (1989) analyses corroborate Chand and Ward’s (1987) 
intuitively appealing findings, as do the results of a more recent study conducted by 
Chang and Teng (2004). For a review of some earlier works on inventory models with 
consideration of permissible payment delays the interested reader is referred to Kim and 
Chung (1990).  
 
Another stream of research is concerned with the impact of budget constraints of 
inventory decisions. Financially distressed firms are likely to operate under budgetary 
constraints. Rosenblatt (1981) formulates a constrained inventory optimization problem 
with limited budget availability. He uses the Lagrangian procedure to demonstrate the 
intuitive result that the optimal order quantity will be restricted to the maximum 
affordable level when the budget constraint is tight. A multi-item newsvendor problem 
with a budget constraint is analyzed by Moon and Silver (2000). The authors’ attention 
focuses on rules for optimally allocating scarce resources to different products. In the 
context of this research, however, it is sufficient to note that a restriction on total 
expenditure is shown to lead to lower than optimal order quantities and increased overall 
costs (Moon and Silver 2000). Abdel-Malek and Montanari (2005) extend Moon and 
Silver’s (2000) work by conducting an analysis of the multi-product newsvendor problem 
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with two (generic) constraints. Rustenburg et al (2000) also present a study similar to that 
of Moon and Silver (2000) in the context of spare parts logistics, where resupply 
decisions for multiple items must be made under limited budgets. One of the basic 
finding’s of Rustenburg et al (2000) is that budget constraints result in lower part 
availability levels. 
 
Empirical inventory research is challenging from a data collection standpoint and 
therefore rather scarce (examples include Ballou 1981, Roumiantsev and Netessine 
2007). Inventory theory is, however, indispensable when empirically explaining 
inventory levels and analyzing the relationship between firm financial distress and 
inventories. This research builds on prior work in the economics area by drawing on 
inventory theory to explain this relationship and by incorporating a set of previously 
ignored inventory variables in the regression model. 
 
3.2.3. The financial distress-inventory hypothesis 
 
The theoretical link between firm financial distress and inventories has been discussed 
from both an economics perspective and an inventory theory perspective in the previous 
subsections. Clearly, both theories suggest that greater levels of financial distress (i.e. less 
favorable financial conditions) result in lower inventory levels, all else equal. Most prior 
research argues that budgetary constraints and increased borrowing costs lead distressed 
firms to hold less inventory. Prior research has found some support for this hypothesized 
relationship (Carpenter et al. 1998, Carpenter et al. 1994, Gertler and Gilchrist 1994, 
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Kashyap et al. 1994). As Roumiantsev and Netessine (2007) point out, however, this 
body of work “might contain biases because many important micro-economic data points 
that affect inventories have been left out, including lead times, demand uncertainty, 
inventory holding costs, etc.” (p.6). This study reexamines the financial distress-
inventory link while controlling for these inventory determinants.  
 
Besides the previously discussed rationale that financial distress results in budgetary 
constraints and increased borrowing costs, it may be argued that managers of distressed 
firms have an incentive to liquidate assets (Hofer 1980) such as inventories in an effort to 
increase liquidity and improve key firm performance measures such as the Return on 
Assets (RoA). In summary, there appears to be clear theoretical and at least some 
empirical support for Hypothesis 8: 
 
Hypothesis 8: Holding demand constant, greater levels of financial distress result in 
lower inventories. 
 
So far, the focus has been on firm level determinants of inventories. In the next section, 
this focus is expanded to include a firm’s supply chain partners. Specifically, the effect of 
power on inventories and the financial distress-inventory link is discussed. 
 
3.3. The supply chain perspective 
 
In this section, the relationship between distress and inventories is analyzed from a 
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supply chain perspective. Specifically, the role of power in inter-firm relationships and 
firm (inventory) decision making is reviewed in Section 3.3.1. In line with prior research 
in the industrial organization economics field, it is suggested that a firm’s power position 
impacts its inventory decisions. The second subsection analyzes the moderating role of 
inter-firm power in the financial distress-inventory relationship. It is hypothesized that 
power determines to what extent financial distress affects firm inventories. The resulting 
contingency framework is subsequently tested using U.S. industry data. 
 
3.3.1. Supply chain considerations in inventory decisions 
 
Many parameters influence managerial decision making. While firm-level variables such 
as holding and purchasing costs, for example, naturally have a strong impact on 
managerial decisions relating to sales prices and inventories, market factors and inter-
firm relationship variables cannot be ignored. 
 
First, competitors’ actions clearly impact a firm’s choices. Researchers from both the 
economics and strategy fields have contended that managers must anticipate competitive 
reactions and evaluate their implications when deciding on sales prices (see e.g. Chen et 
al. 1992, Gibbons 1992). By the same token, firms also compete on inventories. Cachon 
(2001), for example, analyzes competitive inventory policies and, for a given set of 
assumptions, defines a competitive Nash equilibrium in inventories (see also e.g. 
Mahajan and Ryzin 2001). As a consequence, a firm’s inventory decisions are a direct 
function of competitors’ inventory choices.  
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Second, firms are typically a part of supply chains that extend across many companies 
from raw material suppliers to the end customer. As firm decisions impact the 
functioning of the entire supply chain, supply chain firms are necessarily interdependent 
(Cox et al. 2001). This interdependence is of particular interest in this research. When the 
Case Corporation reduced its inventories as a part of its restructuring efforts, for example, 
suppliers had to bear the burden, but were willing to do so to improve customer service 
levels (Buxbaum 1995). Chrysler’s aggressive cost-cutting measures implemented in 
2000 and 2001, in turn, were considered “acts of war” (p.32) by some suppliers who 
agreed to cooperate only because they had little choice (Stundza and Milligan 2001). 
 
These examples illustrate how firms’ (inventory) decision making can be constrained by 
cooperative arrangements and coercive pressure exerted by buying and supplying firms. 
The extent to which firms are willing or forced to yield to these constraints is a function 
of the inter-firm power balance. It is argued in this research that power not only impacts a 
firm’s inventory decision but also moderates the link between financial distress and 
inventories. Following a brief review of the role of power in inter-firm relationships and 
some related literature, the corresponding hypotheses are derived below. 
 
3.3.1.1. Inter-firm relationships: The role of power 
 
There exists a sizeable literature base on the nature, drivers, and consequences of power 
in inter-firm relationships. Gaski (1984) provides a review of the early work in this field 
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and, in summarizing, defines power as the “ability to evoke change in another’s 
behavior” (p.10). Emerson (1962) relates power to dependence and suggests that Firm 
A’s power over Firm B equals Firm B’s dependence on Firm A. The sources of (firm) 
power in (inter-firm) relationships were first analyzed by French and Raven (1959). 
According to French and Raven (1959) these bases of power include: 
▪ Reward power: A can motivate B by granting rewards; 
▪ Coercive power: A can effectively punish B; 
▪ Legitimate power: A has a legitimate right to prescribe B’s behavior; 
▪ Referent power: A serves as a model to B; 
▪ Expert power: A’s expertise conveys A the power to influence B. 
 
The term power often carries a negative connotation (Hingley 2005). French and Raven’s 
power bases, however, suggest that power may be used both collaboratively and 
coercively. Along the same lines, Frazier and Antia (1995) suggest distinguishing 
between the possession and the application of inter-firm power. Frazier and Antia (1995) 
argue that the channel context and the specific inter-firm power constellation drive the 
communication style between firms. The latter can be either threatening (as seen above in 
the case of Chrysler) or collaborative (as evidenced in the previously mentioned example 
of Case Corp.).  Firms with some degree of power can, thus, exert either coercive control 
or collaborative control to affect other firms’ forced or voluntary behavioral change, 
respectively (Frazier and Antia 1995, Hingley 2005). 
 
Cox et al (2003) note that power is an element of every buyer-supplier relationship. The 
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authors suggest that each relationship can be characterized by one of four power 
structures: buyer dominance, supplier dominance, buyer-supplier interdependence, and 
buyer-supplier independence. Cox (2001) further notes that firms strive to be in a 
dominant position over buyers and suppliers so as to extract the maximum amount of 
value generated in the supply chain. Cox et al (2001) have coined the term “value 
appropriation” to describe this mechanism which can take the form of cost squeezing on 
the supply side or high-margin pricing on the sales side, for example. As the previously 
cited examples of Chrysler and Case Corp. (Buxbaum 1995, Stundza and Milligan 2001) 
have illustrated, firms may also use their dominant power position to shift inventory 
ownership to suppliers or buyers. In this vein, Wallin et al (2006) contend that “if a firm 
within a specific buyer-supplier relationship were to hold bargaining power, this would 
greatly enhance its ability to dictate to and make certain demands of a specific supplier” 
(p.59) with respect to the inventory management approach used in the supply chain (see 
also Dobson 2005). This research empirically tests the contention that a firm’s power 
relative to its suppliers and buyers will impact firm inventory levels, ceteris paribus. 
Prior work in this area is reviewed in the following subsection. 
 
3.3.1.2. Supply chain power and inventory decisions 
 
Few researchers have investigated the effect of power on inventories. Blazenko and 
Vandezande (2003) ascribe the lack of power-inventory research to the fact that “the 
academic literature on inventory focuses on production and procurement as the principal 
determinants of […] inventory […] management” (p.256) while “the principal focus of 
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the study of inventory in the economics literature is on the macroeconomic role of 
inventory as a stabilizing or destabilizing factor for production in business cycles” 
(p.256). Much of the research relating dyadic power, i.e. a firm’s power vis-à-vis another 
firm, to inventories remains descriptive in nature and is mostly based on case studies (see 
e.g. Dobson 2005). Within the supply chain management literature, articles on power and 
its implications are, for the most part, purely conceptual. The author is aware of only two 
papers that empirically investigate the effects of power on inventories. Both papers are 
housed within the industrial organization economics literature and are discussed in turn. 
 
Amihud and Mendelson (1989) suggest that “a firm with market power will use inventory 
as a wedge between the quantity available for sale and the quantity shipped to market” 
(pp.269-270). According to Amihud and Mendelson (1989), firms build up inventories 
when supply exceeds demand in an effort to maintain higher prices and keep production 
at constant levels. With demand greater than supply, in turn, firms deplete inventories to 
maximize revenues. A firm’s motivation to use inventories to smooth price fluctuations 
thereby increases with the firm’s market power as “greater market power implies a 
stronger effect of the firm’s sales quantity on price” (p.270). Amihud and Mendelson 
(1989) test the market power-inventory relationship using Compustat data from the U.S. 
manufacturing industry. The results suggest that firm market power, measured by either 
the Lerner index ([price – marginal cost]/price) or the firm’s market share, positively 
affects firm inventories after controlling for firm sales, sales trends, sales variability, and 
average industry inventory levels. The authors therefore conclude that “market power has 
a sizeable effect on inventory, which has been overlooked so far” (p.275). 
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Blazenko and Vandezande (2003) build their article on the contention that stockout costs 
should be represented in inventory estimation models. The authors suggest that greater 
levels of competition erode profit margins and thereby reduce the amount of profits 
foregone in case of a stockout, while, at the same time, more competition also increases 
stockout costs due to the greater availability of alternative sources of supply. According 
to Blazenko and Vandezande (2003) the effect of market concentration (an indicator of 
the level of power firms possess in a given market) on inventories is ambiguous and 
depends on whether the effects of lower foregone profit or increased lost sales costs 
prevail. The authors empirically investigate the effect of industry concentration 
(measured by the two-firm concentration ratio) on finished goods inventory levels (at the 
industry level). The control variables included in the model are, most notably, industry 
gross-margins and a set of industry indicator variables. Data from the U.S. manufacturing 
industry are used for the empirical analyses. The results suggest that higher industry 
concentration levels result in lower inventory levels, ceteris paribus. Blazenko and 
Vandezande (2003) conclude that “a less competitive product market reduces the adverse 
consequences of stock outs and firms respond by reducing inventories” (p.263). 
 
In summary, Amihud and Mendelson (1989) suggest that greater levels of market power 
imply higher inventory levels, while Blazenko and Vandezande (2003) find that 
inventories are lower in more concentrated markets (implying more powerful firms). This 
conflict may, in part, be explained by different levels of analysis (firm vs. industry), and 
differences in measurement. In addition, it is noted that both models fail to include 
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variables prescribed by inventory theory, such as lead times and the cost of holding 
inventory, for example. The results may, therefore, be biased (Roumiantsev and 
Netessine 2007). Also, neither article attempts to relate focal firm or industry power to 
the power levels of buyers and suppliers. Yet, power is dyadic in nature (Cox et al. 2001, 
Emerson 1962, Frazier and Antia 1995, Gaski 1984), and a complete evaluation of power 
must consider a firm’s power relative to another firm or industry. Prior research has 
focused uniquely on downstream power vis-à-vis buyers but has ignored the upstream 
supply side. Power, however, is “Janus-faced”, i.e. double-sided (Cox 2001), as firms are 
engaged in power relationships with both their buyers and their suppliers (as well as with 
their competitors). This research addresses this shortcoming in terms of measurement of 
power and proposes a comprehensive set of power measures (see Chapter 3.4) capturing 
not only focal firm power, but also power levels in the buying and supplying industries. 
 
3.3.1.3. The power-inventory hypotheses 
 
As outlined previously, prior research on the role of power in supply chain relationships 
has suggested that greater levels of power allow firms to obtain more favorable terms and 
conditions in negotiations with their buyers and suppliers (Blazenko and Vandezande 
2003, Cox 2001, Cox et al. 2001, Wallin et al. 2006). More powerful firms may thus be 
able to push the burden of inventory ownership onto buyers and suppliers to a greater 
extent than less powerful firms. Hypothesis 9 is therefore proposed as a baseline power-
inventory hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 9: Greater firm power results in lower inventory levels. 
 
Hypothesis 9 can be refined by distinguishing between firm power relative to suppliers 
and buyers, respectively. Accordingly, Hypothesis 10 and Hypothesis 11 are introduced 
below. 
 
Wallin et al (2006), for example, argue that a firm with bargaining power may impose 
item availability targets on suppliers, thus forcing suppliers to hold larger inventories to 
meet these targets while reducing the need to hold inventory at the buying firm (see also 
Cox et al. 2001). In addition, a powerful firm may be able to demand inventory 
consignments from its suppliers, thus providing the buying firm with improved item 
availability without incurring the cost of inventory ownership (Wallin et al. 2006). 
Hypothesis 10 therefore suggests that greater power over suppliers implies lower 
inventory levels, all else equal. 
 
Hypothesis 10: Greater firm power relative to suppliers results in lower inventory 
levels. 
 
Hypothesis 11 mirrors the reasoning underlying Hypothesis 10 and projects it to the 
downstream relationship between a firm and its buyers. Accordingly, greater levels of 
power over buying firms are expected to be associated with lower inventory levels, all 
else equal. While the work of Blazenko and Vandezande (2003) presents some evidence 
in support of this contention, the results of the study published by Amihud and 
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Mendelson (1989) appear to contradict this expectation. The latter researchers implicitly 
assumed that firms can use inventories to mitigate price fluctuations only if they directly 
own these inventories. Powerful firms in supply chains, however, may be able to dictate 
the release and buildup of inventories even when these inventories are not under direct 
ownership and control. From a supply chain perspective, Hypothesis 11, therefore, does 
not necessarily disagree with the arguments and results presented by Amihud and 
Mendelson (1989). 
 
Hypothesis 11: Greater firm power relative to buyers results in lower inventory levels. 
 
Besides the direct effect of power on firm inventories, it is also contended that firm 
power impacts the extent to which firms can reduce inventories when experiencing 
financial distress. These moderating hypotheses are developed below. 
 
3.3.2. Firm power as a moderator of the distress-inventory link 
 
The inconsistency of the results presented by prior research on the link between financial 
variables and inventories may be an indication that there are factors that affect the 
magnitude and significance of this relationship. Prior research has suggested that firm 
size may be such a moderator. This rationale is briefly reviewed below. This essay, in 
turn, focuses on the moderating role of firm power. The related reasoning is discussed in 
Section 3.3.2.2 and the corresponding hypotheses are formulated. 
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3.3.2.1. Prior research: Firm size as a moderator of the distress-inventory link 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, most studies on the link between financial factors and 
inventories have suggested that the magnitude of this relationship may differ by firm size. 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Carpenter et al (1998, 1994), for example, perform 
separate regression analyses by firm size classes (small vs. large). These authors find 
empirical support for their contention that smaller financially constrained firms 
experience stronger inventory contractions due to their limited access to capital markets 
and, thus, means of financing inventory investments. Kashyap et al (1994) find that the 
effect of firm liquidity on inventories is stronger for firms without bond ratings than for 
firms with bond ratings. Since unrated firms typically are smaller firms, their results also 
suggest that the effect of financial constraints on inventories differs by firm size. 
 
Firm size may be a proxy for a firm’s power, with larger firms being more powerful than 
smaller firms, all else equal. Following this reasoning, the negative effect of firm distress 
on inventories (as hypothesized in Hypothesis 8) may be expected to decrease with the 
firm’s power. It is noted, however, that the arguments set forth in prior research focus 
uniquely on the operating implications of financial constraints, suggesting that firms with 
limited resources must reduce inventory investments, particularly when external funds 
can be procured at high costs only. This research, in turn, suggests that financially 
distressed firms want to reduce inventories and will do so to the largest extent possible. In 
other words, reducing inventories is considered desirable as long as potentially negative 
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consequences of inventory cutbacks, such as stockouts and decreases in customer service 
levels, can be mitigated by increased buyer and supplier efforts (e.g. in terms of increased 
inventory holdings, shorter lead times, etc.). This contention is discussed in more detail in 
the following subsection. 
 
3.3.2.2. The power moderator hypotheses 
 
While firms consistently strive to increase efficiency and profitability, these efforts are 
reinforced during corporate turnarounds (e.g. Hofer 1980). Tom Sidlik, then Executive 
Vice President with Chrysler, for example, indicated that “we’ve accelerated our ongoing 
cost-reduction programs so that we can take 15% costs out of the system by the end of 
2002.” (Stundza and Milligan 2001, p. 30). Sidlik continued to note that “in the current 
business situation, we are counting on our supplier partners to stand with our company 
[…] in these difficult times” (p.31). The importance of concessions and support offered 
by suppliers during corporate turnarounds is further illustrated by Arogyaswamy and 
Yasai-Ardekani (1995) who argue that cutting inventory can only be a successful 
turnaround strategy if potentially resulting delivery delays can be mitigated through 
suppliers’ or buyers’ increased efforts, for example. Finkin (1985) also notes that during 
company turnarounds “[t]erms and conditions of sale are worth fighting over” (p.17) and 
that a supplier’s agreement to shorter lead times may help reduce inventory levels. 
Clearly, a firm’s bargaining power vis-à-vis its suppliers and buyers will determine to 
what extent such concessions will be made. In a similar vein, Hambrick and Schecter 
(1983) note that a firm’s power might affect its choice of turnaround strategy as “strong 
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channels of distribution […] could allow [the distressed firm] to solve [the] problems at 
less human and organizational cost” (p.234), with loyal and obedient distributors carrying 
larger shares of the burden. 
 
These arguments and examples lend support for the contention that distressed firms may 
be able to reduce inventories to a greater extent when they have higher degrees of power 
relative to their suppliers and buyers. Hypothesis 12 is formulated accordingly: 
 
Hypothesis 12: The effect of firm financial distress on inventories increases with the 
firm’s power. 
 
Hypothesis 12 can be specified for a firm’s power relative to buyers and suppliers, 
respectively: 
 
Hypothesis 13: The effect of firm financial distress on inventories increases with the 
firm’s power relative to suppliers. 
 
Hypothesis 14: The effect of firm financial distress on inventories increases with the 
firm’s power relative to buyers. 
 
The moderating effect of firm power on the distress-inventory relationship is graphically 
illustrated in Figure 11.  On average, a negative relationship between the magnitude of 
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firm financial distress and inventories is expected (Hypothesis 8). This relationship, 











Figure 11: The moderating effect of power on the distress-inventory relationship 
 
An overview of the resulting model is given in Figure 12. In summarizing, a set of 
hypotheses on the link between firm financial distress and inventories has been 
formulated based on a variety of theoretical perspectives. Particular attention is given to 






















Figure 12: Research model 
 
3.4. Data and methodology 
 
The hypotheses set forth in the previous sections are tested using data sets comprising 
information on a cross-section of U.S. industries. Details on the data samples, 









• Firm power relative to suppliers
• Firm power relative to buyers
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3.4.1. Sample selection 
 
The empirical tests are conducted using data from U.S. manufacturing firms. Two data 
sets from 1997 and the time period from 1998 to 2004, respectively, are used for the 
analyses. This subsection provides information on the sample selection criteria. 
 
Industries 
Most empirical inventory research has focused on manufacturing industries for the 
obvious reason that manufacturing firms are likely to hold substantial inventories 
(Carpenter et al. 1998, Carpenter et al. 1994, Corbett et al. 1999, Gertler and Gilchrist 
1994, Guariglia and Schiantarelli 1998, Kashyap et al. 1994, Roumiantsev and Netessine 
2007). Manufacturing industries are defined by the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS). The NAICS system has replaced the U.S. Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) system and all U.S. government agencies commonly report 
industry statistics by NAICS codes. NAICS codes have between two and six digits and 
are structured hierarchically. The first two digits of a NAICS code designate the 
“economic sector” and the third digit identifies the “subsector”. The fourth, fifth, and 
sixth digits designate the “industry group”, “NAICS industry”, and “national industry”, 
respectively. Manufacturing industries are part of the economic sectors 31-33. All firms 
in these sectors for which complete data are available are included in the empirical 
analyses. 
 
This study approaches the analysis of inventories from a supply chain perspective and 
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investigates, among other things, the role of a firm’s power on firm inventories and on 
the relationship between financial distress and inventories (see Figure 12). Given the 
dyadic nature of power, the data set also comprises information on the wholesale and 
retail trade industries52 as these industries likely are manufacturing firms’ principal 
suppliers and buyers (besides buyers and suppliers within the manufacturing industries). 
Other industries that may potentially buy from or sell to manufacturing industries are not 
included in the analysis for the two following reasons: 
▪ Service industries: Service industries53 are of limited interest in the context of 
inventory studies and are not considered in this research (see also Roumiantsev 
and Netessine 2007). 
▪ Insufficient data availability: The remaining economic sectors are Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fishing and Hunting (11), Mining (21), Utilities (22), Construction (23). 
While these industries may potentially be involved in the exchange of goods (i.e. 
inventories) with manufacturing firms, these industries must be excluded from the 
data analysis due to insufficient data availability at the industry level. 
Specifically, industry sales data and industry concentration ratios are available at 
highly aggregated levels only and, thus, are not usable in the empirical analyses. 
 
 
                                                 
52 NAICS codes 42, 44, and 45. 
53 Service industries are found in the following economic sectors (two-digit NAICS codes are given in 
parentheses): Transportation and Warehousing (48,49), Information (51), Finance and Insurance (52), Real 
Estate, Rental and Leasing (53), Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services (54), Management of 
Companies and Enterprises (55), Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation 
Services (56), Educational Services (61), Health Care and Social Assistance (62), Arts, Entertainment, and 
Recreation (71), Accommodation and Food Services (72), Other Services (except Public Administration) 
(81), Public Administration (92). 
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Time periods 
This research uses data from 1997 to 2004. This time period is selected for two reasons. 
First, consistent data at the industry level are available for this time period only. More 
recent data (after 2004) were not available at the time of writing, and older data (prior to 
1997) were aggregated differently as the industry classification system was revised in 
1997 with the move from the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) system to the 
NAICS system. Second, the selection of a relatively recent time period is adequate given 
that inventory dynamics may have been significantly different in earlier time periods 
prior to the widespread adoption of information systems and Just-In-Time practices, for 
example (Roumiantsev and Netessine 2007). 
 
In the U.S., an Economic Census is conducted every five years (years ending with “2” 
and “7”). During the time period considered here (1997-2004), Economic Census data 
were thus collected in 1997 and 2002. While the 2002 Economic Census data were not 
available at the time of writing, data from the 1997 Economic Census could be obtained 
from the website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The Economic Census data 
provide more detailed industry information, for example on industry sales and 
concentration ratios, than the data that are collected by the BEA during years in which no 
Economic Census is conducted. Therefore, the empirical analyses are performed using 
two different datasets: First, a panel data set is constructed. This panel data set contains 
information on a cross-section of U.S. manufacturing industries for the time period from 
1998 to 2004. Second, a cross-sectional data set using data from 1997 only is constructed. 
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Using two distinct data sets for the empirical analyses has several advantages. The time 
series data set, henceforth denoted “data set I”, is relatively large with multiple 
observations per firm. Larger sample sizes generally facilitate the empirical analyses and 
typically result in more robust coefficient estimates. The 1997 data set, in turn, provides 
more fine-grained industry level data. This data set, henceforth denoted “data set II”, thus 
is particularly useful when attempting to evaluate the relative power balances between 
industries. In addition, the robustness and validity of the model are underlined if both 
data sets produce consistent coefficient estimates. 
 
Frequency 
As noted by Carpenter et al (1998, 1994), high-frequency quarterly data may be desirable 
for the analysis of firm inventories and financial factors due to their dynamic and volatile 
nature. Many firms, however, report only selected parameters on a quarterly basis. Raw 
materials and finished goods inventory data, for example, are often available on an 
annual basis only. In line with prior research and due to greater data availability, annual 
data are used in this study (Guariglia 1999). 
 
3.4.2. Model specification 
 
The purpose of this section is to derive an empirical inventory estimation model which is 
grounded in inventory theory and supply chain management research. This research 
thereby enhances prior economics research which generally modeled inventories as a 
function of (lagged) sales, financial indicators, and a small set of control variables only. 
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According to inventory theory, firm inventory decisions should be a function of order 
quantities (Q) and safety stock (SS) (see also Figure 10). The specific magnitude of end-
of-period inventories will then also be a function of sales realization ( )tS . In addition, it 
is argued in this essay that a firm’s distress and power will affect firm inventories.  
Dummy variables to account for inventory accounting differences (LIFO, AvgCost54) are 
included as well (Carpenter et al. 1994, Gertler and Gilchrist 1994, Kashyap et al. 1994, 
Roumiantsev and Netessine 2007). This yields the following inventory model: 
(1)  ( ), , , , , ,tInv f Q SS S Distress Power LIFO AvgCost= . 
As seen in Chapter 3.2.2, the order quantity Q is a function of expected sales (  tS ), order 
costs (A), backorder costs (B) and holding costs (H): 
(2) ( ), , ,tQ f S A B H= . 
Similarly, safety stocks are shown to be a function of lead times (L), sales (  tS ), sales 
variability (
S
σ ), and the safety factor k which, in turn, is a function of the optimal 










 (see Chapter 3.2.2). Safety stocks can, thus, be 
represented as follows: 
(3) ( ), , , , tSSS f L H B Sσ= . 
The author is unaware of prior empirical inventory research that measured order and 
backorder costs. For lack of suitable proxy measures, it is common practice to exclude 
order and backorder costs from empirical inventory analyses (see e.g. Lieberman et al. 
                                                 
54 Further detail is provided in Section 3.4.3.2.  
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1999, Roumiantsev and Netessine 2007). While an attempt is made to approximate 
order/setup costs (see section 3.4.3.2), backorder costs are not further considered in this 
research. Holding costs are a function of the cost of the item that is purchased or 
produced and the holding cost rate. Unit cost measures are not readily available due to a 
lack of output indicators. Total costs of goods sold, however, are highly correlated with 
sales, and are therefore not included in the regression model. A proxy for a firm’s capital 
carrying charge will be used to approximate holding costs. Substituting Equations (2), 
and (3) in Equation (1) and dropping the above mentioned variables, Equation (1) can be 
rewritten as follows: 
(4) ( ), , , , , , , , ,tt SInv f S S A H L Distress Power LIFO AvgCostσ= . 
Expected sales (  tS ) and realized sales ( tS ) are naturally highly correlated with 
 S
tt t
S S ε= + , where S
t
ε  is the forecast error. To avoid excessive multicollinearity55, 
Equation (4) is therefore restated as follows: 
(5) ( ), , , , , , , , ,S SInv f S A H L Distress Power LIFO AvgCostε σ= . 
 
The resulting basic empirical estimation equation is defined in Equation (6) below: 
(6) Inventoryitf = β0 + β1 SalesForecastitf + β2 ForecastErroritf + β3 SalesVariabilityitf  
+ β4 SetupCostitf + β5 HoldingCostitf + β6 LeadTimeitf + β7 Distressitf 
+ β8 Poweritf + β9 LIFOitf  + β10 AvgCostitf  + β11 Distressitf * Poweritf + εitf 
 
The subscripts i, t, and f designate the industry, time period, and firm respectively. 
                                                 
55 Not only are actual and expected sales highly correlated, but actual sales and the standard deviation of 
sales are correlated as well. 
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Inventoryitf, for example, indicates firm f’s inventory level in time period t, where firm f 
operates in industry i. The interaction term (Distressitf * Poweritf) is included to test 
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 12, Hypothesis 13, and Hypothesis 14. 
 
This inventory model specification differs from prior specifications on multiple accounts: 
First, the model presented here controls for important predictors of firm inventories as 
prescribed by inventory theory. The author is aware of only one study that controlled for 
sales variability and lead times (Roumiantsev and Netessine 2007). The latter study, 
however, does not investigate the effect of financial distress on inventories, nor does it 
consider the role of firm power in inventory management. Second, measures of a firm’s 
buying power and selling power are included. While few prior studies analyzed the 
impact of market power on inventories (Amihud and Mendelson 1989, Blazenko and 
Vandezande 2003), this is the first study to differentiate between power over buyers and 
power over suppliers. In addition, a more comprehensive measure of financial distress is 
proposed. Prior research relied on one-dimensional measures such as market interest rates 
or firm cash flows to estimate holding costs or a firm’s financial situation. Market interest 
rates, however, are poor approximations of holding costs (or firm financial condition, for 
that matter), as such measures do not account for the heterogeneity of firms’ borrowing 
rates. Measures such as cash flows, in turn, may not comprehensively evaluate firm 
financial condition. Consequently, this is—to the best of the author’s knowledge—the 
first study to investigate the effects of firm financial distress on inventories from an 
inventory theory and supply chain management perspective. 
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3.4.3. Variables and Measurement 
 
Variable measurement has been a major challenge in inventory research and probably is 
the most important reason for the scarcity of empirical inventory studies. The measures 
used in this research are in part based on the work of Roumiantsev and Netessine (2007) 
and Carpenter et al (1994). The dependent and independent variables are discussed in 
turn. 
 
3.4.3.1. Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable in this study is firm-level inventory, i.e. firm f’s inventory in 
period t. Specifically, three distinct firm inventory measures are used: total inventory, 
raw materials inventory, and finished goods inventory56. Several researchers have 
previously used these inventory variables in empirical analyses (e.g. Blazenko and 
Vandezande 2003, Guariglia 1999). In line with prior research, absolute inventory values 
are used (see e.g. Roumiantsev and Netessine 2007). Total inventories of firm f (which is 
affiliated with industry i) in time period t are denoted 
itf
TotalInv  and are measured in 
U.S. dollars as reported on the balance sheet (see e.g. Amihud and Mendelson 1989)57. 
Analogously, raw materials inventories and finished goods inventories are denoted 
itf
RawMatInv  and 
itf
FinGoodsInv , respectively. 
 
                                                 
56 Work-in-process inventories are reported by few firms only and are therefore not analyzed separately. 
57 Roumiantsev and Netessine (2007) note that it is generally not necessary to adjust dollar values in time 
series data since inflation has been at very low levels in the United States over the past decade. 
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All inventory data are obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. Only, firms 
with at least $5,000 worth of (total) inventory are included in the dataset to ascertain that 
only inventory-carrying firms are analyzed. The regression analyses are performed with 
all three inventory measures.  
 
3.4.3.2. Independent variables 
 
The set of independent variables is discussed next. Variables suggested by inventory 
theory are discussed first, followed by a review of the measures of firm power. Unless 
otherwise stated, all data are obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. 
▪ SalesForecastitf 
Inventory ordering decisions are made based on expected demand. For each firm and 
time period, annual sales are forecast as follows:  ( )1 1 2t tS S g−= ⋅ + , where the 
average growth rate over the past two years ( )g  is defined as 
( ) ( )2 3 3 1 2 2
2
t t t t t t
S S S S S S
g
− − − − − −− + −= . When only incomplete prior sales data are 
available or prior sales were impacted by merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, the 
average growth rate equals the growth rate for the years for which data are available 
and no M&A activity was observed.  
▪ SalesSurpriseitf 
While firms make inventory decisions based on expected demand, the magnitude of 
inventories at the end of the year is impacted by actual demand. If actual demand 
exceeds expected demand, year-end inventory levels should be lower. Conversely, 
    132
lower than expected sales should result in larger year-end inventories. The 
SalesSurprise variable provides some control for the difference between expected 
demand (SalesForecast) and realized demand. Following the procedure suggested by 
Roumiantsev and Netessine (2007), a binary variable is created. Specifically, this 
variable equals “1” if actual demand is greater than expected demand and is 
“0”otherwise.  
▪ SalesVariabilityitf 
SalesVariability is measured as the coefficient of variation of sales and is a proxy for 
demand variability. The more variable firm demand, the more inventory a firm will 
hold, ceteris paribus. While sales may not be equal to actual demand in case of 
stockouts, demand variability is approximated with sales variability. The coefficient 
of variation of sales is computed as the ratio of the standard deviation of sales over 
the past three periods and the mean of sales over the past three periods: 
( )
( )
 1, 2, 3
 1, 2, 3
Sales i t t t f
itf






= . The SalesVariability variable thus is a standardized 
measure of the variability of sales. 
▪ SetupCostitf 
Information on firms’ average cost of setting up production or placing orders is not 
readily available. The magnitude of setup costs may, however, be reflected in the 
magnitude of firms’ order backlogs. Clearly, there are many reasons why firms 
backlog orders: high demand, long lead times, or manufacturing problems are just a 
few potential causes of order backlogs. On average, however, larger backlogs may 
simply reflect higher order setup costs: Firms may prefer to accumulate orders before 
starting production if the cost of setting up production is high. Since the absolute 
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value of backlogged orders is likely highly correlated with sales, the standardized 









Inventory holding costs consist of warehousing/handling costs and capital carrying 
costs (Timme 2003). While the former component cannot be estimated based on 
available accounting information, the latter can be approximated as follows: The 
capital cost of holding inventory is a function of the capital interest rate which 
represents either the opportunity cost of internally financed (inventory) investments 
or the borrowing cost of externally financed (inventory) investments. The firm-










The measure of lead times follows the novel procedure suggested by Roumiantsev 









=  where 
itf
AP  stands for Accounts Payable and 
itf
COGS  
stands for the Cost of Goods Sold. While not a measure of physical lead times, this 
proxy captures the quarterly cash conversion cycle which may, to some extent reflect 
physical shipment times. Roumiantsev and Netessine (2007) further justify the use of 
this measure as follows: 
“[A]ccounts payable are credited, then [the] product is shipped and is typically debited, 
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then it is received and [payment is made]. Hence, financial transactions are correlated with 
times of shipment and delivery of inputs and therefore are correlated with the lag a 
company has to respond to changing market environment by adjusting inventories.“ (p.13). 
Roumiantsev and Netessine (2007) empirically verify “that the lead time proxy is not 
dominated by standard payment terms (e.g. 30 or 60 days)” (p.14), and that lead times 
are not merely a function of firm power (as measured by the firm’s market share)58. In 
the data sets used here, the correlation coefficients between LeadTime and the firm 
power measures are small and negative ( 0.06
LeadTime MarketShare
r − = −  and 
0.08
LeadTime IndSalesNet
r − = − ; see Table 10), suggesting that more powerful firms tend to 
have shorter permissible payment delays. It may also be argued that longer payment 
lead times result from a distressed firm’s inability to pay suppliers (implying inflated 
accounts payable). The correlation coefficients between LeadTime and Distress are 
positive and statistically significant in both data sets, although limited in magnitude 
( 0.19r ≤ ; see Table 10). This suggests that the lead time proxy used here may indeed 
be a function of, amongst other factors, financial distress. Given the lack of suitable 
alternative lead time proxies and the limited size of the distress-lead time correlation, 
the LeadTime proxy is included in the subsequent analyses. The lead time proxy 
yields the expected positive sign in Roumiantsev and Netessine’s (2007) analyses of 
firm inventories. 
▪ Distressitf 
Distress is a measure of firm f’s financial distress. The Distress variable is the 
negative value of a firm’s Z score, a measure which was first developed by Altman 
                                                 
58 Firms with greater levels of power may be able to squeeze their suppliers and obtain longer permissible 
payment delays, thus increasing accounts payable. 
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(1968). Based on discriminant analysis, Altman (1968) developed the following 
model to estimate a firm’s financial fitness: 
1 2 3 4 50.012* 0.014* 0.033* 0.006* 0.999*Z X X X X X= + + + + , 
where X1 = working capital / total assets, X2 = retained earnings / total assets, X3 = 
Earnings Before Interests and Taxes (EBIT) / total assets, X4 = market value of equity 
/ total liabilities, and X5 = sales / total assets. The information needed to compute the 
Z scores is included in the firms’ balance sheets and profit and loss statements. These 
data, as well as stock market data are obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat 
database. High Z scores indicate financial health, while low and negative scores 
indicate (serious) financial distress. Specifically, a score of 2.67 or above indicates 
financial health, and a score of 1.81 or below suggests (severe) financial distress 
(Altman 2002). The Z scores are then rescaled to indicate the level of financial 
distress, i.e. ( )1itfDistress ZScore= − ⋅ , such that higher (positive) Distress scores 
indicate greater financial distress (see also Ferrier et al. 2002). The Distress variable 
is included to test the effect of firm financial distress on inventories as hypothesized 
in Hypothesis 8. 
▪ DistressDummyitf 
While Distress is a continuous variable, DistressDummy is a binary variable which 
indicates whether a carrier is considered financially distressed. Firms are categorized 
as distressed and non-distressed based on the above-mentioned cutoff levels 
suggested by Altman (1968). Specifically, firms with Z scores of less than 1.81 (i.e. 
Distress scores of greater than -1.81) are considered financially distressed 
(DistressDummy equals “1”). The sensitivity of the results with respect to the 
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definition of this cutoff value is investigated in Section 3.5. The DistressDummy 
variable is used to investigate if distressed firms, on average, hold less inventory 
(Hypothesis 8), and to split the data samples into distressed and non-distressed firms 
(see Chapter 3.4.6 for further detail).  
 
This study adds to prior research by investigating the effects of firm buying and selling 
power on inventories and on the distress-inventory relationship. In the past, researchers 
have used relatively simple measures of firm power and have ignored the inherently 
dyadic nature of power (Cox 2001, Cox et al. 2001). Amihud and Mendelson (1989), for 
example approximate firm power with either the firm’s market share or the firm’s gross 
profit margin. Blazenko and Vandezande (2003), in turn, use a market concentration 
measure to approximate the average level of power firms possess in a particular industry. 
These measures may not fully capture inter-firm power balances. Unlike prior research, 
this study uses a set of firm power measures which proxy not only the focal firm’s power, 
but also the power levels in the supplying and buying industries. Since a focal firm’s 
specific supply chain transaction partners (i.e. buyers and suppliers) cannot be identified 
using accounting data, buyer and supplier industry characteristics are used as proxies of 
buyer and supplier power. The measures of focal firm, supplier industry and buyer 
industry power are presented below. 
▪ IndustrySalesNetitf 








approximate a firm’s power (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson 1989). The regression 
model established in Section 3.4.2, however, already contains the SalesForecast 
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variable and thus controls for the magnitude of firm sales. Including market shares in 
the regression model would thus entail two potential problems: First, multicollinearity 
problems may arise given the high correlation between sales forecasts and market 
shares, thus resulting in inefficient estimates. Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
the market share variable might then pick up a size effect (larger firms hold more 
inventory) rather than the firm power effect it is intended to measure. This issue is 
addressed by transforming the market share variable. Since firm sales are already 
controlled for by means of the SalesForecast variable, the size of the firm’s 
competitors may indicate the level of power a firm exerts in a market. Specifically, 
the IndustrySalesNet variable indicates the sales volume (measured in U.S. $) of all 
the other firms in the market (excluding the focal firm). To simplify the interpretation 
of the coefficient estimates, the industry sales volume (net of firm sales) is inverted so 









. This variable thus indicates the 
effect of an increase (decrease) in the sales volume of a firm’s competitors on the 
firm’s inventory holdings after controlling for firm sales (~ SalesForecast). 
Specifically, a positive coefficient estimate of the IndustrySalesNet variable would 
suggest the following: The smaller the firm’s competitors, i.e. the more powerful the 
focal firm, the more inventory the (focal) firm will hold. Conversely, a negative 
coefficient would confirm the expectation expressed in Hypothesis 9: More powerful 
firms, on average, hold less inventory. 
For the empirical analyses, industries are defined at the six-digit NAICS level. While 
some researchers have computed market shares at the four-digit NAICS level 
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(Amihud and Mendelson 1989), it is believed that the more fine-grained six-digit 
NAICS industry data are better suited for the purpose of the analyses. The sensitivity 
of the empirical results with respect to the granularity of industry definitions will be 
investigated in Section 3.5. Industry sales data are obtained from the website of the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data include the values of exports by 
U.S. firms, but do not include imports from foreign firms. 
▪ IndCR4it 
Researchers in the industrial organization economics area have suggested that the 
level of market concentration is an indicator of the competitiveness of markets (e.g. 
Ravenscraft 1983). Specifically, firms in more concentrated markets are believed to 
be more powerful since there are fewer competitors and collusion between firms is 
easier to achieve (Waldman and Jensen 2001). While Blazenko and Vandezande 
(2003) use two-firm concentration ratios (i.e. the sum of sales of the two largest firms 
divided by total sales in the industry) as a measure of market concentration, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes 4, 8, 20, and 50 firm industry 
concentration ratios. Given its widespread use in the extant literature (see e.g. Pryor 
2001, Ravenscraft 1983), the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) is used here. 
Holding all else constant, greater values of the four-firm concentration ratio imply 
greater firm power. IndCR4 thus is one of the measures of firm power used to test 
Hypothesis 9 to Hypothesis 14 in the analysis of the second data set (part II) in which 
generic industrial supply chains are constructed. 
As with IndustrySales, industry concentration is measured at the six-digit NAICS 
level. Industry concentration data are provided by the Bureau of Economic Analyses 
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and are available in Economic Census years only. The IndCR4 measure is therefore 
included in the second data set (part II) only. 
▪ SupplyCR4(i-1)t 
Analogous to the IndCR4 measure, SupplyCR4 is an indicator of the weighted 
average concentration levels of those industries that sell to a focal industry. The 
Input-Output Tables published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, illustrate the 
flow of goods (and services) between industries. Specifically, the I-O Tables not only 
identify those industries that sell goods to another industry, but also indicate the value 
of the respective transactions. As a result, the relative importance of supplying 
industries to a focal industry can be evaluated and the weighted average four-firm 
concentration ratio of the supplying industries can be computed (SupplyCR4) as 
illustrated in Figure 13 below. As discussed in Section 3.4.1, this study focuses on 
inventory-carrying industries. The average supplying industry concentration 
measures, therefore, are based on the four-firm concentration ratios of manufacturing, 
wholesale and retail trade industries only. Other (e.g. service) industries are not 
considered in the computation of the SupplyCR4 measures. Moreover, only domestic 
suppliers are considered when computing the supplying industry concentration ratio; 
imports from foreign suppliers are not included. 
Holding all else constant, an increase in the SupplyCR4 measure, suggests a relative 
decrease in the focal industry’s (and focal firm’s) power. This variable is thus used to 
test Hypothesis 10 and Hypothesis 13. 
▪ BuyCR4(i+1)t 
Symmetrical to the SupplyCR4 measure, the BuyCR4 measure is the weighted average 
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of the four-firm concentration ratios of a focal industry’s buying industries (see 
Figure 13). Holding all else constant, an increase in the BuyCR4 measure, suggests a 
relative decrease in the focal industry’s (and focal firm’s) power. This variable is thus 











Figure 13: Illustration of the construction of industrial supply chains 
 
There are three widely used methods of inventory accounting: The First In, First Out 
(FIFO) method values inventories assuming that items are sold out of inventory in the 
same order they were inventoried. Hence, the cost of the most recently added items 
determines the value of end-of-period inventories. The Last In, First Out (LIFO) method 
values inventories assuming that the most recently inventoried items are sold first. 
Consequently, at the end of the accounting period, the oldest items are left over in 
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all units available for sale during the accounting period. As prices typically change over 
time, each inventory accounting method results in different inventory valuations at the 
end of the accounting period. Specifically, with generally increasing prices, the use of the 
LIFO method will understate the true value of inventories, whereas the FIFO method 
more appropriately reflects the value of ending inventories. The average cost procedure 
results in inventory values that lie between LIFO and FIFO. To account for these 
differences, it is common practice to include an indicator variable which identifies those 
firms that use one of the “extreme” accounting methods. Following the example of prior 
research (e.g. Blazenko and Vandezande 2003), two binary variables are included in the 
model to account for differences in inventory accounting methods: 
▪ LIFOitf 
This indicator variable equals “1” if the firm uses LIFO as the primary inventory 
accounting method and equals “0” otherwise (see also Roumiantsev and Netessine 
2007). 
▪ AvgCostitf 
This indicator variable equals “1” if the firm uses the average cost method as the 
primary inventory accounting method and equals “0” otherwise. (see also 
Roumiantsev and Netessine 2007)  
 
3.4.4. Data sources 
 
All firm-level data are obtained from the Compustat database which is maintained by 
Standard & Poor’s. This database includes accounting information on publicly traded 
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firms. While the focus on public companies excludes smaller, not publicly traded firms 
from the analyses, this selection also ensures that all reported operating and financial data 
conform to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Roumiantsev and 
Netessine 2007). The Compustat database contains firm specific accounting data which 
are commonly found in balance sheets and profit and loss statements, including all the 
information that is required to construct the firm-specific variables. 
 
Industry level data, most notably industry sales, are obtained from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. Specifically, the BEA provides annual estimates of total industry 
shipments (in U.S. dollars) for U.S. manufacturing industries. At the time of writing, data 
were available for the time period from 1998 to 200459. As noted above, the availability 
of these data thereby defines the timeframe studied in the first part of the data analysis. 
 
Industry level data for the year 1997 were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. This 
agency’s website provides access to detailed industry statistics collected through the 
Economic Census survey (1997).  Total industry sales and industry concentration ratios 
were collected from the Economic Census website. 
 
The information relating focal firms to buying and supplying industries is found in the 
Input-Output Tables, which are also published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The 
data in these tables summarize the trade flows between industries. Specifically, the “Use” 
tables indicate from which industries firms in a particular industry purchased goods and 
                                                 
59 These data are found in the file “GDPbyInd_SHIP_NAICS.xls” available on the BEA website. 
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services and indicate the respective dollar volumes such that the relative importance of 
supplying industries can be evaluated. Conversely, the I-O Tables also identify the 
industries that purchase from firms in a focal industry, and the relative importance of 
buying industries in terms of the shares of total focal industry sales can be inferred. 
 
The major limitation of using I-O Tables is that these tables focus on U.S. domestic firms 
only and disregard foreign buyers and suppliers. As a consequence, the industry power 
proxies used here (concentration ratios) may overstate the true power levels in these 
industries, particularly when foreign firms hold significant market shares in these 
industries. By the same token, industry sales data do not include imports from foreign 
firms. This may result in incorrect estimates of the true size of industries and of firms’ 
market shares. It is believed, however, that the I-O Tables provide at least reasonable 
estimates of industry characteristics for the purpose of inter-industry comparisons. 
 
3.4.5. Descriptive statistics 
 
This section provides descriptions of the data samples used in this research. Both data 
sets (Part I and Part II) are discussed in turn. 
 
3.4.5.1. Descriptive statistics: Part I 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4.1, data from U.S. manufacturing industries (NAICS 3xxxxx) 
for the time period from 1998 to 2004 are used for the empirical analyses. All 
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manufacturing firms for which information on all relevant variables were available for 
any or all years in the 1998-2004 time period were included in the data set. The firm 
observations in this data set represent about 8.5% of total sales and 9.9% of total 
inventory holdings by all publicly traded U.S. manufacturing firms that are included in 
the Compustat database. 
 
A two-sample Hotelling T-squared test is implemented to evaluate to what extent the 
firms included in this data set differ from those firms for which data are available in 
Compustat but which are not included in the analyses due to missing data on one or more 
variables. Specifically, the Hotelling test compares these two groups on the following 
variables: Total inventories, sales, cost of goods sold, total assets and total debt. The test 
yields a test statistic of 2.89. This statistic follows an F distribution and, thus, is 
statistically significant at the five percent level. This result suggests that the data sample 
used for the empirical analysis differs significantly from the population of firms included 
in the Compustat database. Upon closer examination of the data, it becomes apparent 
that, on average, the sample firms tend to be smaller (in terms of inventories, sales, costs, 
assets, and debt) than those firms that are not included in the data sample (see Appendix 
6). The results of the analyses presented here may, therefore, not be generalizable to 
firms of all size classes. 
 
The composition of the final data set is shown in Table 7. About forty percent of all firm 
observations are in the computer and electronics industry. The second largest industry in 
this data set is the machinery industry with 852 observations or about sixteen percent of 
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all observations. While the remainder of the data set comprises firms from a broad array 
of manufacturing industries, it cannot be ascertained that the empirical results of this 
study will be generalizable to all manufacturing industries, given the dominance of the 
computer and electronics, and machinery industries60.  
 
NAICS Industry N %
334 Computer and electronics 1983 37.9%
333 Machinery 852 16.3%
336 Transportation equipment 341 6.5%
339 Miscellaneous 275 5.3%
335 Electrical equipment 273 5.2%
332 Fabricated metal 252 4.8%
325 Chemical 203 3.9%
315 Apparel 187 3.6%
331 Primary metal 159 3.0%
316 Leather 137 2.6%
326 Plastics and rubber 136 2.6%
337 Furniture 111 2.1%
313 Textile mills 78 1.5%
327 Nonmetallic mineral 69 1.3%
323 Printing 57 1.1%
321 Wood 44 0.8%
322 Paper 36 0.7%
311 Food 26 0.5%
314 Textile products 11 0.2%
312 Beverage and tobacco 6 0.1%
Total 5236 100%  
Table 7: Sample composition (Part I) 
 
Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics of this sample. It is noted that raw materials and 
finished goods data were not available for all firms. Hence, the sample size is smaller for 
these particular variables. There is substantial variability in all variables. In some 
instances, however, the standard deviations are larger than the means suggesting 
skewness in the data. Consequently, all inventory variables, as well as SalesForecasts 
                                                 
60 In future research, within-industry analyses could be performed. 
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and DaysPayable (LeadTime) are log-transformed prior to the empirical estimation. It is 
also noted that, on average, sales forecasts closely approximate actual sales and that 
about 27 percent of all observations are for financially distressed firms. 
 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max N
Inventory Total (million $) 103.9 483.36 0.005 12,207 5236
Inventory RawMat (million $) 24.17 78.74 0.002 1,802 4505
Inventory FinGood (milion $) 43.98 249.23 0.001 7,319 4307
Sales (million $) 835.6 5,164.7 0.05 155,974 5236
Sales Forecast (million $) 847.2 5,149.6 0.01 158,827 5236
SalesSurprise 0.49 0.5 0 1 5236
Coeff. of Variation of Sales 0.20 0.19 0.001 1.73 5236
OrderBacklog/Sales 0.32 1.43 0 90.34 5236
Interest Rate 0.18 0.28 0 1 5236
Days Payable 49.69 50.57 1.32 1,248 5236
Distress -3.79 13.90 -333.2 220.9 5236
Distress Dummy 0.27 0.45 0 1 5236
Market Share (6 dig. NAICS) 0.07 0.18 0.000001 1 5236
LIFO 0.14 0.35 0 1 5236
AvgCost 0.09 0.28 0 1 5236  
Table 8: Pooled descriptive statistics (Part I) 
 
Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics for distressed and non-distressed firms 
separately. The most striking differences are found in raw materials inventories and days 
payable outstanding. Specifically, distressed firms appear to hold less raw materials 
inventory and have larger accounts payable than non-distressed firms. The latter 
observation can likely be attributed to distressed firms’ lower ability to pay. The former 
observation, however, is interesting and lends some support for the contention that 
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distressed firms try to reduce inventories61. This is most easily done with raw materials 
inventories since extant stock can be reduced by consuming materials while not placing 
any new raw materials orders. 
 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max N Mean Std. dev. Min Max N
Inventory Total (million $) 104.8 388.85 0.011 8,349 3804 101.5 672.94 0.005 12,207 1432
Inventory RawMat (million $) 27.32 85.02 0.005 1,802 3278 15.76 57.99 0.002 993 1227
Inventory FinGood (milion $) 42.44 142.07 0.001 2,209 3180 48.35 424.88 0.001 7,319 1127
Sales (million $) 829.4 3,340.5 0.05 58,198 3804 851.8 8,241.6 0.05 155,974 1432
Sales Forecast (million $) 836.8 3,380.2 0.09 68,849 3804 875.0 8,163.7 0.01 158,827 1432
SalesSurprise 0.51 0.5 0 1 3804 0.42 0.5 0 1 1432
Coeff. of Variation of Sales 0.18 0.16 0.001 1.73 3804 0.25 0.23 0.002 1.73 1432
OrderBacklog/Sales 0.30 0.75 0 34.0 3804 0.40 2.46 0 90.34 1432
Interest Rate 0.18 0.30 0 1 3804 0.15 0.22 0 1 1432
Days Payable 41.74 27.02 1.78 630 3804 70.82 82.46 1.32 1,248 1432
Distress -6.57 11.82 -333.2 -1.8 3804 3.60 16.14 -1.8 220.9 1432
Market Share (6 dig. NAICS) 0.08 0.19 0.000001 1 3804 0.04 0.12 0.000002 1 1432
LIFO 0.15 0.36 0 1 3804 0.11 0.31 0 1 1432
AvgCost 0.08 0.28 0 1 3804 0.10 0.30 0 1 1432
Non-distressed firms Distressed firms
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics (Part I) – distressed vs. non-distressed firms 
 
A two-sample Hotelling T-squared test is performed to assess whether distressed firms 
are statistically significantly different from non-distressed firms based on the variables 
listed in Table 9. The test yields a test statistic of F = 58.23 which is statistically 
significant at the one percent level, indicating that distressed firms, on average, differ 
from non-distressed firms. 
                                                 
61 An alternative explanation may be that suppliers are reluctant to sell to distressed firms, especially when 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Inventory Total (million $)
2 Inventory RawMat (million $) 0.89
3 Inventory FinGood (million $) 0.91 0.74
4 Sales (million $) 0.94 0.85 0.87
5 Sales Forecast (million $) 0.92 0.83 0.85 0.98
6 Sales Surprise 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.08 -0.06
7 Coeff. of Variation of Sales -0.25 -0.19 -0.24 -0.25 -0.23 -0.06
8 OrderBacklog/Sales -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.06
9 Interest Rate -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 0.00 0.05 0.03
10 Days Payable -0.14 -0.09 -0.10 -0.17 -0.17 0.03 0.21 0.01 -0.02
11 Distress -0.14 -0.10 -0.07 -0.15 -0.14 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.19
12 Distress Dummy -0.26 -0.23 -0.21 -0.28 -0.26 -0.08 0.17 0.03 -0.05 0.28 0.33
13 Market Share (6 dig. NAICS) 0.53 0.45 0.51 0.54 0.53 0.05 -0.12 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.11
14 Net Industry Sales (inverted) 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.01 -0.10 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.07 0.75
15 LIFO 0.29 0.24 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.00 -0.18 -0.03 -0.04 -0.15 0.01 -0.06 0.15 0.09
16 AvgCost 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.12  
(Values in bold are significant at the 5% level) 




Pairwise correlations are displayed in Table 10. Several observations are worth noting: 
▪ As expected, all size variables (inventories, sales, forecasts) are highly and positively 
correlated. Market shares are also highly correlated with sales and forecasts (as 
discussed previously in Section 3.4.3.2), with correlation coefficients of up to 0.54. 
While NetIndustrySales (inverted) are also significantly and positively correlated with 
the size variables, the correlation coefficients are much smaller in magnitude (about 
0.20 to 0.22).  
▪ The correlation coefficient of 0.98 between actual and forecasted sales is an 
indication of the good quality of the sales forecasts. 
▪ In line with the hypotheses presented here, the Distress variable is negatively 
correlated with the inventory variables. There are, however, no excessive correlations 
between the distress measures and other independent variables. 
 
3.4.5.2. Descriptive statistics: Part II 
 
The second data set (Part II) differs from the first data set (Part I) in that it comprises 
observations from a cross-section of U.S. manufacturing firms for the year 1997 only. 
The firm observations in this data set represent about 10.7% of total sales and 12.4% of 
total inventory holdings by all publicly traded U.S. manufacturing firms that are included 
in the Compustat database. 
 
A two-sample Hotelling T-squared test is implemented to investigate potential 
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differences between those firms that are included in the data sample and those firms that 
are not included in the empirical analyses due to missing data. The Hotelling test 
compares these two groups on the following variables: Total inventories, sales, cost of 
goods sold, total assets and total debt. The implementation of this test yields a test 
statistic of 4.15 which is statistically significant at the one percent level. On average, the 
sampled firms tend to be smaller (in terms of inventories, sales, costs, assets, and debt) 
than those firms that are not included in the data sample (see Appendix 6). It is therefore 
noted that the results of the analyses presented here may not be generalizable to firms of 
all size classes. 
 
The composition of the second data set is very similar to that of the first data set: 446 out 
of 755 observations are from firms in the computer and electronics, and machinery 
industries (see Table 11). The remainder of the data sample comprises observations of 
firms from broad variety of U.S. manufacturing industries. 
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NAICS Industry N %
334 Computer and electronics 291 38.5%
333 Machinery 155 20.5%
335 Electrical equipment 48 6.4%
339 Miscellaneous 47 6.2%
336 Transportation equipment 46 6.1%
332 Fabricated metal 34 4.5%
331 Primary metal 28 3.7%
337 Furniture 21 2.8%
313 Textile mills 16 2.1%
327 Nonmetallic mineral 14 1.9%
325 Chemical 14 1.9%
321 Wood 11 1.5%
323 Printing 8 1.1%
322 Paper 6 0.8%
311 Food 5 0.7%
316 Leather 3 0.4%
326 Plastics and rubber 3 0.4%
315 Apparel 3 0.4%
314 Textile products 2 0.3%
Total 755 100%  
Table 11: Sample composition (Part II) 
 
Table 12 presents the descriptive statistics of this sample. The conclusions that can be 
drawn upon observing these statistics are consistent with what was noted about the first 
data set. There is substantial variability in all variables. The inventory variables, 
SalesForecasts and DaysPayable (LeadTime), however, have particularly large standard 
deviations relative to the means and are log-transformed. It is further noted that the sales 
forecasts are, on average, substantially larger than actual sales. This result is driven by a 
relatively small set of observations for which the particular forecasting technique 
employed62 here resulted in substantial overpredictions. The log-transformation of the 
SalesForecast variable deemphasizes the impact these outliers have on the regression 
                                                 
62 Forecasts were calculated based on prior year sales which were progressed using the average sales 
growth rate over the previous three years (see Section 3.4.3.2 for more detail). 
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estimates, such that the inferior quality of the sales forecasts is not a great concern63.  
 
Compared to the first data set, this data sample also contains three new variables: 
IndCR4, SupplyCR4, BuyCR4. The data in Table 12 indicate that, on average, the four 
largest firms in the focal, supplying and buying industries control between 29 and 38 
percent of the market. 
 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max N
Inventory Total (million $) 110.9 623.42 0.036 12,102 755
Inventory RawMat (million $) 20.92 51.38 0 728 678
Inventory FinGood (milion $) 39.02 296.35 0 7,347 656
Sales (million $) 835.2 6,161.3 0.44 154,329 755
Sales Forecast (million $) 1412.4 17,899.8 0.02 465,806 753
SalesSurprise 0.51 0.5 0 1 755
Coeff. of Variation of Sales 0.23 0.22 0.005 1.72 755
OrderBacklog/Sales 0.38 1.42 0 36.99 755
Interest Rate 0.16 0.58 0 11.33 755
Days Payable 38.26 41.79 2.67 736 755
Distress -4.80 9.62 -114.4 50.5 755
Distress Dummy 0.18 0.39 0 1 755
Market Share (6 dig. NAICS) 0.05 0.13 0.00002 1 755
IndCR4 37.74 16.37 4.6 94.5 755
SupplyCR4 28.96 6.71 14.8 83.2 755
BuyCR4 37.38 15.08 6.8 86.9 755
LIFO 0.16 0.36 0 1 755
AvgCost 0.08 0.27 0 1 755  
Table 12: Pooled descriptive statistics (Part II) 
 
                                                 
63 The correlation coefficient between (logged) Sales and (logged) SalesForecasts is r = 0.97 (see Table 
36).  
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Table 13 presents the split-sample comparison between distressed and non-distressed 
firms. In this sample, distressed firms appear to be larger than non-distressed firms and 
therefore tend to hold more inventory. At the same time, distressed firms, on average, 
have smaller market shares than non-distressed firms. This may be an indication that the 
distressed firms tend to be concentrated in some (larger) industry sectors. 
 
The result of a two-sample Hotelling T-squared test suggests that, overall, distressed 
firms are statistically significantly different from non-distressed firms. The test statistic is 
F = 8.0767 which is statistically significant at the one percent level. 
 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max N Mean Std. dev. Min Max N
Inventory Total (million $) 101.0 442.36 0.044 8,967 617 155.0 1121.07 0.036 12,102 138
Inventory RawMat (million $) 22.26 50.21 0 728 561 14.49 56.45 0 509 117
Inventory FinGood (milion $) 31.41 84.39 0 1,078 544 76.01 694.06 0 7,347 112
Sales (million $) 712.7 2,790.0 1.52 45,800 617 1382.9 13,174.0 0.44 154,329 138
Sales Forecast (million $) 1425.7 18,863.6 0.11 465,806 617 1351.9 12,692.2 0.02 147,672 136
SalesSurprise 0.53 0.5 0 1 617 0.42 0.5 0 1 138
Coeff. of Variation of Sales 0.22 0.21 0.005 1.46 617 0.26 0.27 0.01 1.72 138
OrderBacklog/Sales 0.33 0.48 0 5.86 617 0.59 3.17 0 36.99 138
Interest Rate 0.15 0.44 0 6.66 617 0.22 0.98 0.01 11.33 138
Days Payable 34.36 36.43 2.67 736 617 55.70 57.18 5.78 438 138
Distress -6.38 9.41 -114.4 -1.8 617 2.27 6.98 -1.8 50.5 138
Market Share (6 dig. NAICS) 0.06 0.14 0.00002 1 617 0.03 0.09 0.00003 1 138
IndCR4 38.03 16.20 4.6 94.5 617 36.45 17.09 4.6 88.3 138
SupplyCR4 29.10 6.81 16.1 83.2 617 28.34 6.25 14.8 54.3 138
BuyCR4 37.78 15.15 6.8 86.9 617 35.60 14.68 6.8 83.2 138
LIFO 0.16 0.37 0 1 617 0.12 0.33 0 1 138
AvgCost 0.07 0.26 0 1 617 0.11 0.31 0 1 138
Distressed firmsNon-distressed firms
 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics (Part II) – distressed vs. non-distressed firms 
 
Pairwise correlations are presented in Table 14. Again, all size variables are highly 
correlated, but no excessive correlations between independent variables are found. Given 
the relatively small sample size, few correlation coefficients are statistically significant.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 Inventory Total (million $)
2 Inventory RawMat (million $) 0.92
3 Inventory FinGood (million $) 0.87 0.76
4 Sales (million $) 0.94 0.88 0.84
5 Sales Forecast (million $) 0.91 0.86 0.81 0.97
6 Sales Surprise -0.12 -0.04 -0.10 -0.13 -0.09
7 Coeff. of Variation of Sales 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 -0.09 -0.09
8 OrderBacklog/Sales -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.01 -0.01
9 Interest Rate -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.11 0.01 0.06 0.00
10 Days Payable -0.14 -0.11 -0.12 -0.22 -0.21 0.27 -0.03 0.02 0.04
11 Distress -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.15 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.16
12 Distress Dummy -0.31 -0.32 -0.25 -0.33 -0.31 0.07 -0.08 0.07 0.05 0.24 0.35
13 Market Share (6 dig. NAICS) 0.55 0.48 0.52 0.58 0.55 -0.08 0.09 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 0.03 -0.09
14 Net Industry Sales (inverted) 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.08 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.11 0.04 -0.02 0.58
15 IndCR4 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.11 -0.02 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.07 -0.06 -0.04 0.13 -0.19
16 SupplyCR4 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.31 0.51
17 BuyCR4 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 0.05 -0.24 0.55 0.41
18 LIFO 0.29 0.25 0.31 0.30 0.29 -0.19 0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.20 0.05 -0.04 0.16 0.09 -0.11 -0.04 -0.14
19 Avg. Cost 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.13  
(Values in bold are significant at the 5% level) 







The empirical methodology is discussed in this section. A series of regression analyses 
are performed to test the hypotheses developed in this essay. An overview of these 
regressions is presented in the following subsection. Both the panel data set (Part I) and 
the cross-sectional data set (Part II) present particular econometric challenges that have to 
be considered when choosing an empirical estimation procedure. The methodologies for 
the analyses of both data sets are discussed in turn in Subsections 3.4.6.2 and 3.4.6.3. 
 
3.4.6.1. Overview of regression analyses 
 
The hypotheses set forth in this essay are tested by means of a series of regression 
analyses. Table 15 provides an overview of the regressions that are performed. 
 




Baseline Split-sample Distressed firms 
with interaction 
effect 













R7 R8 R9 R16 R17 R18 
 
Table 15: Overview of regression analyses 
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As described previously, two separate data sets are used for the empirical analyses. Nine 
regressions are performed to analyze each data set (R1-R9 and R10-R18). For the 
analysis of each data set, three lines of regressions are required to estimate the model for 
three different dependent variables: Total inventory, raw materials inventories, and 
finished goods inventories. For each dependent variable, a baseline regression using the 
full data set is implemented first. In a second step, the data set is split into distressed and 
non-distressed firms, and the regression is implemented for both subsamples separately. 
The Distress*Power interaction effect is included in the third regression model which is 
implemented using the subsample of distressed firms only and designed to test 
Hypothesis 12 to Hypothesis 14. 
 
The regression models are further discussed in the following paragraphs. The models 
below show TotalInventory as the dependent variable. The same models are also 
analyzed with raw materials inventories and finished goods inventories as the dependent 
variables. 
 
The first regression (R1) estimates the baseline model shown below. This regression is 
performed using the entire data sample (part I). The measures of financial distress 
(DistressDummy) and of firm power (IndSalesNet) are of particular interest. It is expected 
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(R1) lnTotalInventoryitf = β0 + β1 lnSalesForecastitf + β2 SalesSurpriseitf  
+ β3 SalesVariabilityitf + β4 SetupCostitf + β5 HoldingCostitf + β6 lnLeadTimeitf  
+ β7 DistressDummyitf + β8 lnIndSalesNetitf + β9 LIFOitf  + β10 AvgCost + εitf 
 
The second regression (R2) is nearly identical to R1. This regression however, is 
performed for distressed and non-distressed firms separately, using the DistressDummy 
variable to split the sample into these groups. The continuous Distress variable then 
replaces the DistressDummy variable in the model. It is expected that greater levels of 
financial distress result in lower inventory levels for distressed firms64. 
 
(R2) lnTotalInventoryitf = β0 + β1 lnSalesForecastitf + β2 SalesSurpriseitf  
+ β3 SalesVariabilityitf + β4 SetupCostitf + β5 HoldingCostitf + β6 lnLeadTimeitf  
+ β7 Distressitf + β8 lnIndSalesNetitf + β9 LIFOitf  + β10 AvgCost + εitf 
 
The third regression (R3) is similar to R2 for distressed firms, the only difference being 
that the Distress*IndSalesNet interaction term is included to test the contention that the 
(negative) effect of financial distress on inventories increases with the firm’s power. 
 
(R3) lnTotalInventoryitf = β0 + β1 lnSalesForecastitf + β2 SalesSurpriseitf  
+ β3 SalesVariabilityitf + β4 SetupCostitf + β5 HoldingCostitf + β6 lnLeadTimeitf  
+ β7 Distressitf + β8 lnIndSalesNetitf + β9 LIFOitf  + β10 AvgCost  
+ β11 Distressitf * lnIndSalesNetitf + εitf 
                                                 
64 This study focuses on the analysis of financially distressed firms’ inventories. The effect of financial 
health on inventories is not investigated here.  
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The regression models used to analyze the second data sample (part II) are similar to 
those described above. 
 
Regression 10 (R10) estimates the baseline model which includes the focal industry’s 
four-firm concentration ratio, as well as the weighted average concentration ratios of the 
supplying and buying industry in addition to the variables included in R1. The new 
variables are added to approximate firms’ supply chain power. R10 is performed using 
the entire data sample (part II). 
 
(R10) lnTotalInventoryitf = β0 + β1 lnSalesForecastitf + β2 SalesSurpriseitf  
+ β3 SalesVariabilityitf + β4 SetupCostitf + β5 HoldingCostitf + β6 lnLeadTimeitf  
+ β7 DistressDummyitf + β8 lnIndSalesNetitf + β9 IndCR4itf  
+ β10 SupplyCR4itf + β11 BuyCR4itf + β12 LIFOitf  + β13 AvgCost + εitf 
 
Regression 11 (R11) is performed for distressed and non-distressed firms separately, 
similar to R2. The continuous Distress variable then replaces the DistressDummy variable 
in model R10. 
 
(R11) lnTotalInventoryitf = β0 + β1 lnSalesForecastitf + β2 SalesSurpriseitf  
+ β3 SalesVariabilityitf + β4 SetupCostitf + β5 HoldingCostitf + β6 lnLeadTimeitf  
+ β7 Distressitf + β8 lnIndSalesNetitf + β9 IndCR4itf + β10 SupplyCR4itf  
+ β11 BuyCR4itf + β12 LIFOitf  + β13 AvgCost + εitf 
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Building on R11, regression 12 (R12) adds the interaction terms between the Distress and 
IndSalesNet, IndCR4, SupplyCR4, and BuyCR4 variables, respectively. 
 
(R12) lnTotalInventoryitf = β0 + β1 lnSalesForecastitf + β2 SalesSurpriseitf  
+ β3 SalesVariabilityitf + β4 SetupCostitf + β5 HoldingCostitf + β6 lnLeadTimeitf  
+ β7 Distressitf + β8 lnIndSalesNetitf + β9 IndCR4itf + β10 SupplyCR4itf  
+ β11 BuyCR4itf + β12 Distressitf * lnIndSalesNetitf + β13 Distressitf * IndCR4itf  
+ β14 Distressitf * SupplyCR4itf + β15 Distressitf * BuyCR4itf + β16 LIFOitf  
+ β17 AvgCost + εitf 
 
3.4.6.2. Empirical methodology: Part I 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the OLS assumptions of homoskedasticity and independence 
are frequently not met when dealing with cross-sectional time series data (Greene 2003). 
Tests for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error terms are implemented prior 
to selecting the appropriate empirical estimation procedure. 
 
The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Lagrange multiplier test (Breusch and Pagan 1979, 
Cook and Weisberg 1983) evaluates the correlation between the residuals of an OLS 
regression and the dependent variable (e.g. TotalInventory). If no such correlation is 
found, the homoskedasticity assumption is valid and OLS regressions can be assumed to 
provide efficient and unbiased estimates. The test is implemented after estimating 
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regression R1 (see Table 15) using the OLS procedure. The resulting test statistic is 
844.18 which follows a χ2 distribution. This result is statistically significant at the less 
than one percent level and suggests that the magnitude of the residuals varies with the 
levels of the dependent variable (heteroskedasticity). 
 
The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data (Drukker 2003, Wooldridge 2002) 
is implemented to determine if the residuals are serially correlated over time. This test is 
particularly suitable for panel data sets since it evaluates serial correlations within panels 
only. The test statistic is F = 144.745 and is significant at the one percent level. This 
suggests the presence of first-order autocorrelation. 
 
A generalized least squares procedure (GLS) is recommended for the analysis of panel 
data with heteroskedastic and serially correlated error terms (Greene 2003). As noted in 
Section 2.3.4, the GLS procedure can be implemented with the unobserved cross-
sectional and time effects modeled as either random or fixed effects. The appropriate 
procedure (fixed effects or random effects) is determined by implementing the Hausman 
specification test (Hausman 1978). This test analyzes whether the error terms are 
independent of the independent variables. If that is the case, the random effects procedure 
is preferred, while the fixed effects procedure should be selected otherwise. The test 
produces a χ2 distributed statistic of W = 845.51 which is significant at the less than one 
percent level. The null hypothesis of no correlation is therefore clearly rejected, 
suggesting that the fixed effects model should be selected. 
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The STATA software package is used for the empirical analyses. This software lets users 
specify the way in which the first-order autocorrelation of the error terms should be 
modeled. The default method is to compute the autocorrelation based on the Durbin-
Watson statistic. This method is applied here, although the results are found to be largely 
insensitive to the way in which autocorrelation is computed. 
 
3.4.6.3. Empirical methodology: Part II 
 
The second data set used for the empirical analyses contains firm-level observations from 
the year 1997. Given that there is only one observation per firm (rather than a time series 
of firm-level observations), serial correlation of the error terms is not a concern with this 
data set. Heteroskedasticity may, however, be observed. Therefore, the Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Lagrange multiplier test (Breusch and Pagan 1979, Cook and 
Weisberg 1983) is implemented after an OLS regression (R10, see Table 15). The test 
statistic is 23.81 with a χ2 distribution. This result is statistically significant at the one 
percent level. This indicates that the magnitude of the residuals varies with the levels of 
the dependent variable (heteroskedasticity). This constitutes a violation of the OLS 
assumption of homoskedasticity. 
 
Robust estimation techniques provide a mechanism to control the heteroskedasticity of 
errors. While the coefficient estimates themselves remain unchanged relative to the 
standard OLS estimation procedure, the values of standard errors are adjusted for 
correlations across observations. The robust regression procedure in STATA uses Huber-
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White sandwich estimators to compute robust standard errors (White 1980). The 
empirical results are presented and discussed in the following section. 
  
3.5. Empirical results and discussion 
 
The empirical analyses are performed for both data sets (Part I and Part II) separately. 
The regression results are discussed in Subsections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, respectively, and the 
empirical support for the hypotheses set forth in this paper is evaluated. 
 
3.5.1. Empirical results: Part I 
 
In this section, the results of the analyses of data set Part I are discussed in four 
subsections: 
▪ First, the regression results for TotalInventory as the dependent variable are 
presented. Specifically, the baseline regression (R1, see Table 15) and the split-
sample regression (R2) results are reported, and the interaction between distress 
and power is evaluated for distressed firms (R3). 
▪ Second, the sensitivity of the regression results (R1) with respect to the definition 
of the DistressDummy variable and the granularity of industry definitions (6-digit 
NAICS versus 4-digit NAICS) is also evaluated. 
▪ Third, the regression results for RawMatInventory (raw materials inventory) as 
the dependent variable are discussed (R4-R6, see Table 15). 
▪ Fourth, the regression results for FinGoodInventory (finished goods inventory) as 
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the dependent variable are discussed (R7-R9, see Table 15). 
 
3.5.1.1. Regression results: Total inventory 
 
As discussed previously, the baseline regression is specified as follows: 
(R1) lnTotalInventoryitf = β0 + β1 lnSalesForecastitf + β2 SalesSurpriseitf  
+ β3 SalesVariabilityitf + β4 SetupCostitf + β5 HoldingCostitf + β6 lnLeadTimeitf  
+ β7 DistressDummyitf + β8 lnIndSalesNetitf + β9 LIFOitf  + β10 AvgCost + εitf 
This model is tested using the panel data set described in Section 3.4.5.1 and the 
autoregressive linear regression estimation procedure outlined in Section 3.4.6.2. The 
empirical estimation results are presented in Table 16. 
 
The model’s F statistic (F = 135.8) is statistically significant at the one percent level, and 
the R-squared within statistic is 0.33 indicating that the model explains about one third of 
the variability in the dependent variable. The coefficient estimates are discussed below: 
▪ Forecast: Higher expected demand should result in larger order quantities and 
larger average cycle stocks. This expectation is confirmed by the positive and 
significant coefficient ( )0.361β = . Specifically, this result suggests that a one 
percent increase in expected demand should result in an increase in total inventory 
holdings by 0.361%. It is noted that this result is consistent with Ballou’s (1981) 
contention that inventories should increase as the square-root of demand. 
▪ SalesSurprise: Greater than expected demand should result in lower end-of-period 
inventory holdings. This variable’s coefficient ( )0.202β = , however, is positive 
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and significant. One explanation may be that firms build up inventory once it 
becomes apparent that demand may exceed expectations. 
▪ Coefficient of Variation of Sales: Greater demand variability should result in 
larger safety stocks and, thus, greater inventory levels. The coefficient estimate 
( )0.027β = − , however, is statistically insignificant. 
▪ OrderBacklog/Sales: The standardized value of order backlogs is used as a proxy 
for production setup costs. The higher this cost, the higher production quantities 
and average cycle stocks should be. The coefficient estimate ( )0.007β =  is 
positive as expected although only marginally significant. 
▪ InterestRate: The InterestRate measure is used as a proxy for inventory carrying 
costs. Higher carrying costs should equal lower inventory levels. The coefficient 
estimate ( )0.038β = −  has the expected sign but is statistically insignificant. 
▪ DaysPayable: Days payable outstanding is used as a proxy for lead times. The 
longer the lead times, the more inventory firms should hold. This expectation is 
confirmed by the positive and significant coefficient estimate ( )0.120β = . 
▪ DistressDummy: As discussed previously, the DistressDummy variable identifies 
those firms that have high Distress scores and thus find themselves in situations 
of financial distress. The key contention of this research is that distressed firms 
will hold less inventory, all else equal (Hypothesis 8). The coefficient estimate is 
negative and statistically significant ( )0.065β = − . This result suggests that, on 
average, distressed firms hold 6.5 percent less inventory than financially healthier 
firms. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 8. 
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▪ IndSalesNet: This variable measures a firm’s power in a market relative to its 
competitors. As stated in Hypothesis 9, more powerful firms are expected to hold 
less inventory, ceteris paribus. The coefficient estimate ( )0.105β = −  provides 
strong support for this hypothesis. 
▪ LIFO and AvgCost: The coefficient estimates of both the LIFO and AvgCost 
variables are not statistically significantly different from 0. The results therefore 
suggest that in this particular data sample, differences in inventory accounting 
methods did not significantly affect inventory valuations. 
 












Number of obs 3,862
F(10,2758) 135.8
Prob > F 0.000
R-sq. within 0.330
R-sq. between 0.806
R-sq. overall 0.781  
Table 16: Regression results: Total inventory (R1) 
 
The regression model discussed above is also implemented for both distressed and non-
distressed firms separately (R2, see Table 15), using the DistressDummy variable to split 
the sample into these groups. In addition, the moderating effect of power (IndSalesNet) 
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on the Distress-Inventory relationship is evaluated by estimating the corresponding 
interaction effect for distressed firms (R3). Table 17 presents these regression results. 
 
Total Inv Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Constant -0.121 0.014 -0.689 0.000 -0.691 0.000
Forecast 0.432 0.000 0.191 0.000 0.187 0.000
SalesSurprise 0.197 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.162 0.000
Coeff. of Variation 0.044 0.509 -0.025 0.850 -0.022 0.868
OrderBacklog/Sales 0.077 0.058 0.005 0.387 0.005 0.383
InterestRate -0.026 0.369 -0.269 0.004 -0.268 0.005
DaysPayable 0.201 0.000 0.014 0.706 0.013 0.724
Distress -0.001 0.344 -0.011 0.000 -0.015 0.272
IndSalesNet -0.032 0.009 -0.197 0.000 -0.199 0.000
LIFO 0.002 0.970 0.010 0.954 0.010 0.955
AvgCost 0.076 0.235 0.073 0.688 0.076 0.678
Distress*IndSalesNet 0.000 0.733
Number of obs 2,701 857 857
F 157.0 19.4 17.6
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-sq. within 0.458 0.289 0.289
R-sq. between 0.863 0.627 0.616
R-sq. overall 0.842 0.604 0.593
Distressed firmsNon-distressed firms
w/o interaction with interaction
 
Table 17: Split-sample regression results: Total inventory (R2, R3) 
 
The leftmost column of Table 17 shows the regression results for non-distressed, i.e. 
healthy firms. It is noted that the coefficient estimates are generally consistent with the 
results for the entire data sample (Table 16). The key difference is that the model shown 
in Table 17 contains the (continuous) Distress variable.  It is interesting to note that the 
level of Distress (or financial health in this case65) does not appear to impact non-
distressed firms’ inventory holdings. 
 
                                                 
65 Note that non-distressed firms will have low or negative Distress scores, indicating financial health. 
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The right part of Table 17 shows the regression results for distressed firms. Given the 
smaller number of observations (n = 857), the model fit is lower than for non-distressed 
firms (F = 19.4, 17.6; R-squared = 0.289). The coefficient estimates are, however, 
generally consistent with those for the entire sample (Table 16) and those for non-
distressed firms (Table 17, left column). A few results of the analysis of distressed firms 
merit further discussion: 
▪ The coefficients of the OrderBacklog/Sales and DaysPayable variables are 
statistically insignificant for distressed firms. 
▪ The InterestRate variable, on the other hand, has a statistically significant 
negative coefficient ( )0.269β = − . 
▪ The Distress variable carries a negative and statistically significant coefficient 
( )0.011β = −  in the model without the interaction effect. This suggests that, for 
distressed firms, greater levels of distress result in even lower inventory levels. 
This finding provides further support for Hypothesis 866. 
▪ The interaction effect between Distress and IndSalesNet is added to the model in 
the rightmost column of Table 17. The corresponding coefficient estimate is close 
to zero and does not add any explanatory power to the model. Hypothesis 12 is, 
thus, not supported. 
 
In summary, the regression model is of at least reasonable quality and most coefficient 
estimates have the expected signs. In particular, the results indicate that distressed firms 
                                                 
66 A squared term of the Distress variable was also tested to investigate if the relationship between financial 
distress and inventories is non-linear.  While the results are not reported here, it is noted that the squared 
Distress variable carries a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that the magnitude of the effect 
of distress on prices increases with the severity of financial distress. 
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hold less inventory than financially healthy firms (Hypothesis 8), and that greater levels 
of distress equate to lower inventory levels. The contention that power moderates the 
distress-inventory relationship (Hypothesis 12) is not supported. 
 
3.5.1.2. Sensitivity analyses 
 
The sensitivity of the regression results with respect to the definition of the 
DistressDummy, IndSalesNet and SalesSurprise variables is assessed in this section. In 
addition, it is investigated if the results hold if average inventories rather than end-of-year 
inventories are used as dependent variables 
 
The DistressDummy variable indicates whether a firm has a Distress score of greater than 
-1.81. This cutoff level, initially proposed by Altman (1968), is, of course, somewhat 
arbitrary. The effect of alternative cutoff definitions on the estimation results is 
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Figure 14 illustrates the cutoff levels that are proposed here. The standard cutoff level of 
-1.81 is shown in the middle of the graph. As seen in Table 12, this results in 27 percent 
of the firms in the full data sample being classified as financially distressed. An equal 
split into relatively distressed and relatively healthy firm is obtained by using the median 
Distress value (-2.80) as a cutoff level. The resulting indicator variable is named 
DistressMedDummy. Conversely, a stricter definition of financial distress is obtained by 
moving the cutoff level to the right. The DistressNegZDummy variable identifies all 
severely distressed firms with negative Z scores (i.e. positive Distress scores). With this 
cutoff level, about twelve percent of all firms are considered distressed. Table 18 
juxtaposes the regression results for all three cutoff definitions.  
 
TotalInventory Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Constant -0.317 0.000 -0.312 0.000 -0.314 0.000
Forecast 0.361 0.000 0.360 0.000 0.361 0.000
SalesSurprise 0.202 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.203 0.000
Coeff. of Variation -0.027 0.621 -0.024 0.665 -0.028 0.617
OrderBacklog/Sales 0.007 0.095 0.005 0.203 0.007 0.094
InterestRate -0.038 0.188 -0.035 0.223 -0.036 0.207
DaysPayable 0.120 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.119 0.000
DistressDummy -0.065 0.003 -0.150 0.000 -0.033 0.113
IndSalesNet -0.105 0.000 -0.105 0.000 -0.106 0.000
LIFO -0.005 0.928 -0.005 0.928 -0.007 0.903
AvgCost 0.016 0.803 0.020 0.760 0.013 0.842
Number of obs 3,862 3,862 3,862
F 135.8 139.0 134.5
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-sq. within 0.330 0.335 0.328
R-sq. between 0.806 0.809 0.804
R-sq. overall 0.781 0.784 0.778
DistressMedDummyDistressDummy DistressNegZDummy
 
Table 18: Sensitivity analysis: Distressed vs. non-distressed firms 
 
The coefficient estimates are robust across all three cases and there are only minimal 
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variations in the overall fit of the model. Specifically, the only notable result is that the 
DistressMedDummy variable does not yield a statistically significant coefficient. This is 
not surprising considering that the DistressMedDummy variable is based on a very broad 
definition of financial distress. The alternative variables (DistressDummy and 
DistressNegZDummy) both carry negative and statistically significant coefficients. It is 
therefore concluded that the results are largely insensitive to variations in the definition 
of financial distress. The DistressDummy variable (as defined initially) is retained for the 
remainder of the analyses. 
 
A second sensitivity analysis is performed to evaluate how the regression results change 
as the definition of industries changes. Specifically, industries may be defined at different 
levels of granularity. While a narrow definition based on six-digit NAICS codes is used 
as a default, the model is re-estimated using the broader four-digit NAICS definition. 
These definitions affect the magnitude and variability of the IndSalesNet variable. 
 
Table 19 presents the regression results for both the six and four-digit NAICS industry 
definitions. While the broader four-digit NAICS definition provides slightly better results 
in terms of model fit than the six-digit NAICS definition, the results are robust and 
consistent across both regressions. The six-digit NAICS industry definition is retained to 
ensure consistency with the granularity of industry definitions in the second part of the 
data analysis67. 
 
                                                 
67 The analysis of the second data set (Part II) introduces the concept of supply chain power by adding 
weighted average industry concentration levels in the buying and supplying industries. To obtain sufficient 
variability in these variables, industries must be defined at the full six-digit NAICS level. 
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TotalInventory Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Constant -0.317 0.000 -0.986 0.000
Forecast 0.361 0.000 0.272 0.000
SalesSurprise 0.202 0.000 0.159 0.000
Coeff. of Variation -0.027 0.621 -0.076 0.161
OrderBacklog/Sales 0.007 0.095 0.006 0.128
InterestRate -0.038 0.188 -0.043 0.126
DaysPayable 0.120 0.000 0.077 0.000
DistressDummy -0.065 0.003 -0.072 0.001
IndSalesNet -0.105 0.000 -0.204 0.000
LIFO -0.005 0.928 -0.015 0.779
AvgCost 0.016 0.803 -0.003 0.965
Number of obs. 3,862 3,862
F 135.8 151.4
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R-sq. within 0.330 0.354
R-sq. between 0.806 0.743
R-sq. overall 0.781 0.721
6-digit NAICS 4-digit NAICS
 
Table 19: Sensitivity analysis: Granularity of industry definitions 
 
 
Following the example of Roumiantsev and Netessine (2007), the SalesSurprise variable 
is included in the regression to capture the effect of unexpectedly large sales on 
inventories. Specifically, this indicator variable takes on the value “1” if actual sales 
exceed forecasted sales. Alternatively, the actual value of the difference between actual 
sales and forecasted sales, i.e. the forecast error (ForecastError), can be included in the 
regression model as a more finegrained measure of the magnitude of the deviation of 
actual sales from forecasted sales. The regression results using the SalesSurprise and 
ForecastError variables, respectively, are compared in Table 20. The model with the 
ForecastError variable is of poorer quality than the model with the SalesSurprise 
variable. The signs of the coefficient estimates, however, are consistent across both 
models. The SalesSurprise variable is retained for all subsequent analyses. 
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TotalInventory Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Constant -0.317 0.000 -0.082 0.134
Forecast 0.361 0.000 0.234 0.000
SalesSurprise / Error 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.000
Coeff. of Variation -0.027 0.621 0.001 0.985
OrderBacklog/Sales 0.007 0.095 0.006 0.197
InterestRate -0.038 0.188 -0.039 0.186
DaysPayable 0.120 0.000 0.132 0.000
DistressDummy -0.065 0.003 -0.104 0.000
IndSalesNet6D -0.105 0.000 -0.154 0.000
LIFO -0.005 0.928 0.015 0.798
AvgCost 0.016 0.803 0.053 0.427
Number of obs 3,862 3,862
F 135.8 97.3
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R-sq. within 0.330 0.261
R-sq. between 0.806 0.561
R-sq. overall 0.781 0.536
SalesSurprise ForecastError
 
Table 20: Sensitivity analysis: SalesSurprise vs. ForecastError 
 
 
As noted in Section 3.4.3.1, end-of-year inventories as reported in firms’ balance sheets 
are the dependent variables used in this research. It may be argued that end-of-year 
inventory values are biased estimates of true average inventory levels as firms may 
reduce inventory levels toward the end of the year in order to improve key financial and 
operating performance indicators. This concern is addressed as follows: For each firm in 
the dataset, an average annual inventory value is approximated by averaging the firm’s 
inventory levels at the end of the first, second, third, and fourth quarters. As shown in 
Table 8, the mean total inventory (end-of-year inventory values) in the panel data set 
(Part I) is $103.9 million. The mean average total inventory, in contrast, is $107.78 
million. A paired two-sample t test indicates that end-of-year total inventories and 
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average total inventories are statistically significantly different (t = 4.86, p = 0.000). This 
result, thus, is consistent with the above mentioned contention that end-of-year inventory 
values may be biased proxies for average inventories. A regression analysis with average 
total inventories as the dependent variable is performed and compared to the results with 
end-of-year total inventories as the dependent variable. This comparison in shown in 
Table 21 below. 
Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Constant -0.317 0.000 -0.279 0.000
Forecast 0.361 0.000 0.376 0.000
SalesSurprise 0.202 0.000 0.174 0.000
Coeff. of Variation -0.027 0.621 0.007 0.903
OrderBacklog/Sales 0.007 0.095 0.006 0.159
InterestRate -0.038 0.188 -0.029 0.299
DaysPayable 0.120 0.000 0.060 0.000
DistressDummy -0.065 0.003 -0.033 0.135
IndSalesNet6D -0.105 0.000 -0.119 0.000
LIFO -0.005 0.928 0.022 0.681
AvgCost 0.016 0.803 0.021 0.740
Number of obs 3,862 3,862
F 135.8 135.0
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R-sq. within 0.330 0.329
R-sq. between 0.806 0.799
R-sq. overall 0.781 0.774
Total Inventory Average Inventory
 
Table 21: Sensitivity analysis: Measurement of total inventories 
 
The coefficient estimates are generally consistent across both the TotalInventory and 
AverageInventory regressions. The significance levels, however, are weaker when 
average inventories are used as the dependent variable. It is noted that there is no 
indication suggesting that the use of end-of-year inventories results in biased estimation 
results. As has been done in prior research (e.g. Carpenter et al 1994, Roumiantsev and 
Netessine 2007), end-of-year inventories are, therefore, retained for the empirical 
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analyses. 
 
The regression results for raw materials inventories are discussed next. 
 
3.5.1.3. Regression results: Raw materials inventory 
 
The full data sample, comprising both distressed and non-distressed firms is used to 
estimate the regression model using raw materials inventory as the dependent variable 
(R4, see Table 15). The results are reported in Table 22. 
 
The estimation results are consistent with the previously presented results for total 
inventories. The sales variability and production setup cost proxies (Coeff. of Variation 
and OrderBacklog/Sales, respectively), as well as the LIFO and AvgCost control 
variables are the only variables that have statistically insignificant coefficient estimates. 
All other variables carry significant coefficients with the expected signs. The 
DistressDummy variable is of particular interest. The negative coefficient ( )0.096β = −  
indicates that distressed firms tend to hold less inventory than their healthier counterparts 
(Hypothesis 8). 
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Number of obs 3,288
F(10,2758) 49.1
Prob > F 0.000
R-sq. within 0.174
R-sq. between 0.709
R-sq. overall 0.675  
Table 22: Regression results: Raw materials inventory (R4) 
 
The split-sample regression results for non-distressed and distressed firms are shown in 
Table 23. Focusing on the results for non-distressed firms in the leftmost column first, it 
is interesting to note that greater levels of financial health (Distress) do not impact 
inventory holdings ( )0.000β = . In addition, the insignificant coefficient of the 
IndSalesNet variable indicates that financially sound firms do not leverage their power to 
push inventory ownership up or down the supply chain. The results for distressed firms 
(without interaction effect), in contrast, suggest that greater levels of financial distress 
(Distress) and greater levels of power (IndSalesNet) result in lower raw materials 
inventory holdings. These findings provide support for Hypothesis 8 and Hypothesis 9, 
respectively. Moreover, the significant and negative coefficient of the interaction effect 
between the Distress and IndSalesNet variables ( )0.004β = −  suggests that the 
magnitude of the effect of distress on raw materials inventories increases with the firm’s 
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power. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 12. 
 
Raw Mat Inv Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Constant -0.195 0.004 -0.902 0.000 -0.920 0.000
Forecast 0.393 0.000 0.160 0.006 0.139 0.019
SalesSurprise 0.180 0.000 0.082 0.098 0.071 0.154
Coeff. of Variation 0.126 0.176 -0.029 0.872 -0.012 0.948
OrderBacklog/Sales 0.088 0.189 0.001 0.904 0.001 0.866
InterestRate -0.131 0.001 -0.394 0.001 -0.396 0.001
DaysPayable 0.073 0.006 0.094 0.057 0.091 0.063
Distress 0.000 0.947 -0.013 0.000 -0.054 0.026
IndSalesNet 0.015 0.458 -0.096 0.073 -0.108 0.044
LIFO -0.012 0.867 -0.044 0.837 -0.046 0.831
AvgCost -0.018 0.855 -0.047 0.824 -0.027 0.899
Distress*IndSalesNet -0.004 0.088
Number of obs 2,304 731 731
F 41.1 7.6 7.2
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-sq. within 0.207 0.160 0.166
R-sq. between 0.687 0.591 0.517
R-sq. overall 0.658 0.552 0.481
Non-distressed firms Distressed firms
w/o interaction with interaction
 
Table 23: Split-sample regression results: Raw materials inventory (R5, R6) 
 
The regression results for finished goods inventories are discussed in the following 
subsection. 
 
3.5.1.4. Regression results: Finished goods inventory 
 
In this section, the regression model is estimated using finished goods inventories as the 
dependent variable. The results for the full data set, consisting of both distressed and non-
distressed firms, are provided in Table 24. 
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Number of obs 3,130
F(10,2758) 29.0
Prob > F 0.000
R-sq. within 0.117
R-sq. between 0.749
R-sq. overall 0.711  
Table 24: Regression results: Finished goods inventory (R7) 
 
It is noted that the overall quality of the model is markedly lower for finished goods 
inventories, than for total and raw materials inventories. The F statistic is 29.0 and the R-
squared within is only 0.117. Many independent variables, including the DistressDummy 
variable, carry statistically insignificant coefficient estimates. While financially distressed 
firms, on average, appear to hold less total and raw materials inventory this is not found 
to be true for finished goods inventories. Hypothesis 8, thus, is not supported for finished 
goods inventories. 
 
The regression results for non-distressed and distressed firms (without and with 
interaction effect) are shown in Table 25. Surprisingly, the Distress variable carries a 
positive and marginally significant coefficient in the regression analysis of non-distressed 
firms (leftmost column). For distressed firms, however, the Distress variable carries the 
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expected negative sign ( )0.024β = − . The IndSalesNet variable also has a negative and 
significant coefficient ( )0.200β = − . The Distress*IndSalesNet interaction effect, 
however, is not statistically significant (rightmost column). 
 
FinGoodInv Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Constant -0.402 0.001 -1.889 0.000 -1.833 0.000
Forecast 0.472 0.000 0.173 0.062 0.186 0.045
SalesSurprise 0.184 0.000 0.160 0.036 0.167 0.029
Coeff. of Variation -0.216 0.088 -0.409 0.127 -0.443 0.099
OrderBacklog/Sales 0.276 0.009 0.001 0.935 0.001 0.953
InterestRate -0.074 0.183 -0.243 0.217 -0.266 0.178
DaysPayable 0.029 0.450 0.077 0.325 0.077 0.324
Distress 0.003 0.076 -0.024 0.001 0.055 0.340
IndSalesNet 0.022 0.376 -0.200 0.011 -0.192 0.016
LIFO -0.076 0.460 -0.148 0.621 -0.146 0.627
AvgCost 0.361 0.009 0.147 0.652 0.145 0.658
Distress*IndSalesNet 0.009 0.17
Number of obs 2,228 661 661
F 31.8 4.9 4.7
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-sq. within 0.174 0.123 0.128
R-sq. between 0.730 0.434 0.440
R-sq. overall 0.701 0.410 0.419
Non-distressed firms Distressed firms
w/o interaction with interaction
 
Table 25: Split-sample regression results: Finished goods inventory (R8, R9) 
 
The analysis of finished goods inventories, thus, provides only limited support for the 
hypotheses set forth in this paper. It generally seems as though the hypothesized 
relationships between financial distress, power and inventories are strongest for total and 
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3.5.2. Empirical results: Part II 
 
The second data set (Part II) used for the empirical analyses is described in Section 
3.4.5.2. This data set comprises observations from 1997 only, but provides more detailed 
industry level statistics. Specifically, focal industry, buying industry, and supplying 
industry four-firm concentration ratios are added to the model. 
 
The analysis of the second data set (Part II) is also conducted in three parts: Total 
inventories are analyzed, followed by raw materials, and finished goods inventories, 
respectively. For each of these dependent variables, three regression analyses are 
performed. First, the model is estimated using the full data set (comprising both 
financially healthy and financially distressed firms). Then, the model is estimated for 
healthy and distressed firms, separately. In a third step, the interaction effects between the 
Distress and Power variables are added to the model which is then estimated using the 
subsample of financially distressed firms only. The reader is referred to Table 15 for an 
overview of the regression analyses. 
 
3.5.2.1. Regression results: Total inventory 
 
The basic regression model used to analyze total inventories is shown below (R10, see 
Table 15). This model includes the focal industry’s four-firm concentration ratio, as well 
as the weighted average concentration ratios of the supplying and buying industries in 
addition to the variables included in R1 (see Table 15). The new variables are added to 
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approximate a firm’s supply chain power. 
 
(R10) lnTotalInventoryitf = β0 + β1 lnSalesForecastitf + β2 SalesSurpriseitf  
+ β3 SalesVariabilityitf + β4 SetupCostitf + β5 HoldingCostitf + β6 lnLeadTimeitf  
+ β7 DistressDummyitf + β8 lnIndSalesNetitf + β9 IndCR4itf  
+ β10 SupplyCR4itf + β11 BuyCR4itf + β12 LIFOitf  + β13 AvgCost + εitf 
 
This model is estimated using an OLS regression procedure with robust standard errors. 
Specifically, the Huber-White sandwich estimator of standard errors is used to provide 
some control for heteroskedasticity. 
 
The regression results for TotalInventory are shown in Table 26. The model explains 
about 86 percent of the variability in total inventories, and the model’s F statistic is 
215.33 which is statistically significant at the less than one percent level. 
 
While some variables have statistically insignificant or unexpected coefficients 
(SalesSurprise, Coefficient of Variation, OrderBacklog/Sales, InteresRate), many 
variables have significant coefficients with the expected signs. Specifically, total 
inventories are shown to increase with forecasted sales (β = 0.868) and days payable 
outstanding (the lead time proxy, β = 0.247). The coefficient of the DistressDummy 
variable is negative (β = -0.182), thus supporting Hypothesis 8 which states that 
financially distressed firms should hold less inventory than their healthier counterparts. 
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F( 13,   739) 215.33
Prob > F 0.000
R-squared 0.863  
Table 26: Regression results: Total inventory (R10) 
 
Some of the coefficient estimates of the power variables also have the expected signs: 
Greater levels of (focal) industry concentration, suggesting greater firm power, are shown 
to be associated with lower inventory levels (β = -0.003, Hypothesis 9). In addition, the 
buying industry power (BuyCR4) has a positive and statistically significant coefficient (β 
= 0.007). An increase in the buying industry’s concentration level (holding focal industry 
concentration levels constant), thus, implies that firms will hold more inventory. This 
finding supports Hypothesis 11. The SupplyCR4 variable, however, does not have a 
statistically significant coefficient, and the coefficient of the IndSalesNet variable, while 
significant, does not have the expected sign. 
 
In summary, the analysis of the second data set (Part II) is generally consistent with the 
results from the analysis of the first data set (Part I, see Table 16). 
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Table 27 shows the split-sample regressions (non-distressed and distressed firms) and the 
interaction effects between Distress and the Power variables are included in the 
regression analysis of distressed firms in the rightmost column.  
 
Despite the relatively small sample sizes all models explain 85 percent of the variability 
in the dependent variable. Many of the coefficient estimates, however, are statistically 
insignificant which may be a function of the small number of observations, especially in 
the case of distressed firms (n = 136). 
 
Focusing on the results for non-distressed firms first (Table 27, leftmost column), it is 
noted that the statistically significant coefficient estimates are consistent with the results 
shown in Table 26. The only unexpected result is the positive and significant coefficient 
of the Distress variable (β = 0.006). The other coefficients, including those of the four-
firm concentration ratio variables are statistically insignificant. 
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Total Inv Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Constant -1.909 0.000 -2.780 0.001 -2.715 0.002
Forecast 0.857 0.000 0.829 0.000 0.831 0.000
SalesSurprise 0.384 0.000 0.594 0.000 0.562 0.000
Coeff. of Variation -0.306 0.308 -0.207 0.659 -0.247 0.613
OrderBacklog/Sales 0.165 0.014 0.365 0.002 -0.016 0.129
InterestRate 0.016 0.733 -0.014 0.151 0.071 0.381
DaysPayable 0.263 0.000 0.069 0.368 0.356 0.003
Distress 0.006 0.026 -0.036 0.015 -0.038 0.799
IndSalesNet 0.054 0.008 0.591 0.039 0.008 0.917
IndCR4 -0.001 0.654 0.143 0.710 -0.010 0.114
SupplyCR4 0.006 0.152 0.010 0.897 -0.009 0.587
BuyCR4 0.002 0.283 -0.012 0.042 0.019 0.007
LIFO 0.136 0.042 -0.006 0.685 0.569 0.050
AvgCost 0.182 0.060 0.020 0.004 0.116 0.771
Distress * IndShipValueNet -0.014 0.273
Distress * IndCR4 -0.002 0.066
Distress * SupplyCR4 -0.004 0.450
Distress * BuyCR4 0.001 0.464
Number of obs 617 136 136
F 248.02 105.47 90.11
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.859 0.851 0.857
Non-distressed firms Distressed firms
w/o interaction with interaction
 
Table 27: Split-sample regression results: Total inventory (R11, R12) 
 
The results for distressed firms (second column in Table 27) closely resemble the results 
for non-distressed firms. The significance are, however, generally lower due to the small 
sample size (n = 136).  The Distress variable carries a negative and significant coefficient 
(β = -0.036) which is in line with Hypothesis 8. This hypothesis suggests that distressed 
firms hold less inventory than healthier firms. 
 
The only power measure with a statistically significant coefficient is BuyCR4. The 
coefficient is negative (β = -0.012) which suggests that greater buying industry power 
results in lower focal firm inventory holding. This finding is surprising and inconsistent 
with Hypothesis 11 and the results for the entire data sample (see Table 26). 
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The only distress-power interaction effect that is significant is that of the IndCR4 variable 
(β = -0.002, see rightmost column in Table 27). This result indicates that the negative 
effect of (focal) industry concentration—a proxy for a firm’s power—on the firm’s 
inventory holdings is greater the more distressed the firm is. This finding lends some 
support to Hypothesis 12. There are, however no statistically significant interaction 
effects between Distress and the IndSalesNet, BuyCR4, and SupplyCR4 variables. 
 
3.5.2.2. Regression results: Raw materials inventory 
 
The key results for the analysis of raw materials inventories are similar to those for total 
inventories. Table 28 presents the regression results for the entire sample of non-
distressed and distressed firms (n = 676). 
 
Again, distressed firms are shown to hold less raw materials inventory than healthy firms 
(Distress, β = -0.206), thus confirming Hypothesis 8. It is also interesting to note that all 
power variables have statistically significant coefficients: 
▪ IndSalesNet: Greater levels of firm power, as approximated by the IndSalesNet 
variable, are shown to be associated with greater inventory holdings (β = 0.094). 
The same unexpected result was found in the analysis of total inventories. 
▪ IndCR4: The negative coefficient of the IndCR4 variable (β = -0.007), in turn, is 
consistent Hypothesis 9 and suggests that greater power, as approximated by focal 
industry concentration levels, should result in lower inventory holdings. 
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▪ BuyCR4 and SupplyCR4: Both the BuyCR4 and SupplyCR4 variables have 
positive and significant coefficients (β = 0.009 for BuyCR4 and β = 0.013 for 
SupplyCR4). These results support Hypothesis 11 and Hypothesis 10, suggesting 
that, while holding focal industry power levels constant, greater buying and 
supplying industry power levels result in larger inventory holdings.  
 
















F( 13,   662) 141.38
Prob > F 0.000
R-squared 0.769  
Table 28: Regression results: Raw materials inventory (R13) 
 
The results for non-distressed firms only (see Table 29) are largely consistent with the 
results for the entire data set. The analysis of distressed firms (second and third columns 
in Table 29), in turn, yields only few statistically significant coefficient estimates. 
Specifically, the coefficient of the Distress variable (β = -0.034) is not statistically 
significant in these regressions, and the only power variables with significant coefficients 
are IndCR4 (β = - 0.017) and BuyCR4 (β = 0.015). The Distress*IndCR4 interaction 
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effect also carries a negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate (β = -0.003). 
This finding suggests that financial distress only affects firms’ raw materials inventories 
when these firms operate in highly concentrated industries, i.e. when firms possess some 
degree of market power. This finding thus is consistent with Hypothesis 12. There is, 
however, no support for the contention that the distress-inventory effect increases with 
the level of buying industry or supplying industry concentration (Hypothesis 13 and 
Hypothesis 14, respectively). 
 
Raw Mat Inv Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Constant -1.952 0.000 -6.013 0.000 -5.839 0.000
Forecast 0.759 0.000 0.844 0.000 0.807 0.000
SalesSurprise 0.309 0.000 0.662 0.000 0.595 0.001
Coeff. of Variation 0.056 0.845 -0.260 0.551 -0.260 0.552
OrderBacklog/Sales -0.033 0.805 -0.027 0.001 -0.033 0.000
InterestRate 0.093 0.002 0.052 0.377 0.037 0.558
DaysPayable 0.213 0.006 0.642 0.000 0.597 0.000
Distress 0.003 0.436 -0.034 0.140 -0.109 0.557
IndSalesNet 0.123 0.000 -0.066 0.481 -0.094 0.313
IndCR4 -0.005 0.114 -0.017 0.002 -0.011 0.082
SupplyCR4 0.014 0.006 0.025 0.140 0.010 0.621
BuyCR4 0.007 0.017 0.015 0.028 0.019 0.011
LIFO 0.073 0.445 0.277 0.397 0.310 0.347
AvgCost 0.108 0.425 0.203 0.613 0.160 0.701
Distress * IndShipValueNet -0.006 0.746
Distress * IndCR4 -0.003 0.002
Distress * SupplyCR4 0.004 0.576
Distress * BuyCR4 0.000 0.922
Number of obs 561 115 115
F 87.19 136.42 107.48
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.731 0.825 0.842
Non-distressed firms Distressed firms
w/o interaction with interaction
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3.5.2.3. Regression results: Finished goods inventory 
 
The results for finished goods inventories are shown in Table 30 and in Table 31. 
Unfortunately, the estimation results are of generally poorer quality than the results for 
total and raw materials inventories. None of the hypotheses set forth in this essay are 
empirically supported for finished goods inventories and few variables carry statistically 
significant coefficients. The lack of significant findings may be attributable to, among 
other factors, the particularly small sample sizes. 
 
















F( 13,   640) 81.28
Prob > F 0.000
R-squared 0.701  
Table 30: Regression results: Finished goods inventory (R16) 
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Fin Good Inv Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Constant -3.231 0.000 -1.578 0.246 -1.393 0.360
Forecast 0.885 0.000 0.847 0.000 0.817 0.000
SalesSurprise 0.445 0.000 0.588 0.028 0.556 0.045
Coeff. of Variation -0.772 0.061 0.270 0.700 0.308 0.656
OrderBacklog/Sales -0.645 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.059 0.000
InterestRate 0.088 0.338 -0.099 0.874 -0.139 0.795
DaysPayable 0.388 0.000 0.120 0.547 0.101 0.628
Distress 0.003 0.419 0.015 0.664 0.135 0.630
IndSalesNet 0.057 0.090 0.098 0.491 0.093 0.551
IndCR4 -0.001 0.723 -0.012 0.197 -0.007 0.514
SupplyCR4 -0.001 0.868 -0.012 0.646 -0.025 0.378
BuyCR4 -0.002 0.586 -0.001 0.896 0.002 0.841
LIFO 0.412 0.003 0.631 0.240 0.595 0.266
AvgCost 0.519 0.013 0.415 0.464 0.430 0.468
Distress * IndShipValueNet -0.006 0.841
Distress * IndCR4 -0.001 0.508
Distress * SupplyCR4 -0.001 0.891
Distress * BuyCR4 -0.003 0.282
Number of obs 544 110 110
F 107.14 15.12 14.7
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.717 0.672 0.686
Non-distressed firms Distressed firms
w/o interaction with interaction
 
Table 31: Split-sample regression results: Finished goods inventory (R17, R18) 
 
 
3.6. Summary and discussion 
 
This paper develops a comprehensive theoretical perspective of the firm distress-
inventory relationship, drawing on theories and prior research from the economics, 
inventory theory, and supply chain management fields. Previously, researchers generally 
ignored the role of firm financial distress when investigating inventories. This study 
contends that financial distress plays a significant role in inventory management and that 
a firm’s power relative to its buyers and suppliers will impact the magnitude of this 
distress-inventory effect. Specifically, the hypotheses set forth in this essay contend that 
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▪ financially distressed firms hold less inventory than healthier firms 
(Hypothesis 8), 
▪ more powerful firms hold less inventory than less powerful firms (Hypothesis 9), 
▪ greater power relative to suppliers results in lower inventory holdings 
(Hypothesis 10), 
▪ greater power relative to buyers results in lower inventory holdings 
(Hypothesis 11), 
▪ the effect of financial distress on inventories increases with the firm’s power 
(Hypothesis 12), 
▪ greater power relative to suppliers increases the magnitude of the distress-
inventory effect (Hypothesis 13), 
▪ greater power relative to buyers increases the magnitude of the distress-inventory 
effect (Hypothesis 14). 
 
The results of the empirical analyses of total, raw materials and finished goods 
inventories are summarized in Table 32 and Table 33. Table 32 shows the hypothesis 
testing results obtained from the analyses of both distressed and non-distressed firms. 
Table 33, in turn, focuses on the results for distressed firms only. 
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Data Part I 
(1998-2004) 





















T R F T R F 
8 DistressDummy – – – 0 – – 0 
9 IndSalesNet – – – – + + + 
9 IndCR4 – – – 0 
10 SupplyCR4 + 0 + 0 
11 BuyCR4 + 
 
+ + 0 
T = Total inventory, R = Raw materials inventory, F = Finished goods inventory 
0 = statistically insignificant result  
Table 32: Summary of results for entire data set 
 
Focusing on the results for the entire data sets (both Part I and Part II, see Table 32) first, 
it is evident that there is strong support for the contention that distressed firms, on 
average, hold less inventory than financially healthy firms (Hypothesis 8). This finding, 
however, is not confirmed for finished goods inventories. This is not surprising since raw 
materials inventories can easily be reduced by consuming extant stock without reordering 
further supplies. 
 
The hypothesis that greater levels of power should be associated with lower inventory 
levels (Hypothesis 9) also finds some empirical support. As shown in Table 32, the 
IndSalesNet variable carries the expected negative coefficients in the analysis of the panel 
data set (Part I), thus indicating that inventories decrease as firm power (as measured by 
the IndSalesNet variable) increases. The analysis of 1997 data (Part II), in turn, 
consistently yields (unexpected) positive coefficients for the IndSalesNet variable. At the 
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same time, however, the industry concentration variable (IndCR4), carries negative 
coefficients (for total and raw materials inventories). While this latter finding is 
consistent with Hypothesis 9, the positive coefficients of the IndSalesNet variable are not 
consistent with Hypothesis 9. The multicollinearity between the power variables 
(IndSalesNet, IndCR4, SupplyCR4, BuyCR4) may partly explain this contradictory result. 
 
Hypothesis 10 and Hypothesis 11 suggest that greater levels of power over suppliers and 
buyers, respectively, should result in lower inventory holdings. Table 32 shows positive 
coefficients for SupplyCR4 (raw materials inventory only) and BuyCR4 (total and raw 
materials inventory). These results imply that greater supplying and buying industry 
concentration levels—i.e. lower focal firm power when focal industry concentration 
levels are held constant—equate to greater firm inventory holdings. This is, to the best of 
the author’s knowledge, the first study to present empirical evidence for the contention 
that inter-firm power balances in the supply chain affect the location and ownership of 
inventories in supply chains. The results also indicate that power levels affect raw 
materials inventories to a much greater extent than finished goods inventories which do 
not appear to be impacted by supply chain power. 
 
The results of the analysis of distressed firms only are summarized in Table 33. The 
negative coefficients of the Distress variable further support Hypothesis 8. This result 
suggests that the magnitude of financial distress impacts the magnitude of the distressed 
firm’s inventory reductions. 
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Data Part I 
(1998-2004) 





















T R F T R F 
8 Distress – – – – – 0 0 
9 IndSalesNet – – – – + 0 0 
9 IndCR4 – 0 – 0 
10 SupplyCR4 + 0 0 0 
11 BuyCR4 + 
 
– + 0 
12 Distress*IndSalesNet – 0 – 0 0 0 0 
12 Distress*IndCR4 – – – 0 
13 Distress*SupplyCR4 + 0 0 0 
14 Distress*BuyCR4 + 
 
0 0 0 
T = Total inventory, R = Raw materials inventory, F = Finished goods inventory 
0 = statistically insignificant result  
Table 33: Summary of results for distressed firms 
 
The results for the power-inventory hypothesis (Hypothesis 9) are mixed. In the analysis 
of the panel data set (Part I), the IndSalesNet variable carries negative coefficients as 
expected, suggesting that more powerful distressed firms tend to hold less inventory. As 
seen in Table 32, however, the analysis of the second data set yields unexpected (or 
insignificant) coefficient estimates for the IndSalesNet variable. The four-firm 
concentration ratio (IndCR4), an alternative proxy for power, is shown to significantly 
impact distressed firms’ inventory holdings only in the case of raw materials inventories. 
Specifically, distressed firms in more concentrated industries are found to hold less raw 
materials inventory, all else equal. 
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The supplying and buying industry concentration variables (SupplyCR4 and BuyCR4) 
mostly carry insignificant or unexpected coefficients. Only the BuyCR4 variable has a 
positive and significant coefficient in the raw materials inventory regression. This result 
suggests that distressed firms facing more powerful buyers may be forced to hold greater 
raw materials inventories and provides some support for Hypothesis 11. 
 
There is, finally, only scant evidence that distressed firms reduce inventories to a greater 
extent when they are more powerful. Only in three instances did the interaction effects 
between Distress and the power variables have the expected negative coefficient 
estimates. In the first part of the data analysis (Part I), the effect of financial distress on 
raw materials inventories is shown to increase with the firm’s power (IndSalesNet). The 
same result is obtained in the second part of the data analysis (Part II) when power is 
approximated with the industry concentration ratio (IndCR4). These findings provide 
some evidence in support of Hypothesis 12. There is, however, no support for the 
contention that the distress-inventory effect depends on the levels of supplying and 
buying industry power (Hypothesis 13 and Hypothesis 14). 
 
In summary, many of the hypotheses set forth in this study are empirically supported. It is 
shown that a firm’s financial condition significantly impacts a firm’s inventory decisions. 
Moreover, it is shown that power balances in supply chains may impact the distribution 
of inventory ownership in supply chains. At the same time, the data provide only limited 
evidence for the contention that power moderates the distress-inventory relationship.  
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This research contributes to the extant literature on multiple accounts: Different 
theoretical perspectives are synthesized to investigate the financial distress-inventory 
relationship. Specifically, insights from inventory theory and supply chain management 
research are used to improve upon the specification of empirical estimation models 
presented in prior economics research. Novel proxies for variables such as order and 
holding costs are proposed to overcome measurement problems that have previously 
hindered empirical inventory research. 
 
The analyses presented in this essay not only refine the extant knowledge of the distress-
inventory relationship but also provide new insights on inventory management issues in a 
supply chain context. Specifically, this is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the first 
study to empirically explore the role of inter-firm power in inventory management. In 
addition, the moderating role of power in the financial distress-inventory relationship is 
investigated. 
 
Understanding the effect of a firm’s financial condition on its inventory decisions may 
also have important managerial implications in terms of supplier selection, for example. 
Managers should be aware of how a supply chain partner’s distress and power may affect 
inventory ownership in the supply chain. While this research does not evaluate how 
financial distress and power imbalances in supply chains affect overall supply chain 
performance, it is conceivable that the shifting of inventory ownership from the 
distressed firm to suppliers and buyers may reduce a supply chain’s effectiveness in 
terms of, for example, service levels and responsiveness. The investigation of these 
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questions is left for future research. 
 
This research investigates if and how financial distress affects firm inventories and it is 
shown that distressed firms tend to reduce inventory holdings. Future research may also 
investigate if and when cutting inventories is a viable turnaround strategy. 
 
As noted previously, this study adds to the small, emerging body of empirical inventory 
research. While efforts have been made to overcome the difficulties of data collection and 
variable measurement that are associated with doing research in this field, the work 
presented here must be considered exploratory. Secondary accounting data from public 
firms only were used for the empirical analyses. The generalizability of the results to the 
entire population of manufacturing firms, both public and private, can not be ascertained.  
 
In addition, buyer and supplier power levels could only be approximated using rather 
crude measures such as buying industry and supplying industry concentration ratios. The 
computation of these ratios relies on the Input-Output Tables and industry concentration 
data published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. As noted previously, the omission 
of international firms in the construction of these data may lead to a misrepresentation of 
inter-industry power constellations. Moreover, these industry power levels are only rough 
approximations of firm power levels. Future research may use qualitative methods and 
different data collection techniques, such as dyadic surveys, for example, to further 
investigate how power affects supply chain inventories and how it moderates the distress-
inventory relationship.
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4. Firm decision making under financial distress: Summary and outlook 
 
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm is a theoretical framework that is 
widely used in the industrial organization and strategic management literatures. The basic 
tenet of the SCP paradigm is that the structure of markets influences firms’ conduct, and 
the latter then is a determinant of firm and market performance. In addition, it is also 
recognized that feedback mechanisms may exist within this framework (Waldman and 
Jensen 2001, see also Figure 1). The performance observed in a market, for example, may 
attract new entrants, thus changing the market structure. Similarly, firms may change 
their conduct in the light of poor past performance. This dissertation is concerned with 
this particular feedback mechanism: How does a firm’s financial distress affect its 
conduct in terms of sales prices and inventories. While the potential existence of such 
relationships has been recognized previously, the author is unaware of any study that has 
systematically investigated the nature of these causal links. This dissertation addresses 
this gap in the literature by investigating the following two research questions: 
▪ Does financial distress have an impact on prices and inventories, after controlling 
for other relevant parameters? 
▪ If so, how can these effects be characterized, i.e. what factors influence the 
magnitude of the distress-price and distress-inventory relationships? 
 
These questions are investigated through analyses of prices in the U.S. airline industry 
and inventories in U.S. manufacturing industries. Upon reviewing the literature, two sets 
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of hypotheses relating financial distress to prices and inventories, respectively, are 
formulated. These hypotheses reconcile the conflicts revolving around prior 
conceptualizations of the distress-price, and distress-inventory links. More precisely, it is 
suggested that firm-specific and structural contingencies moderate these relationships. As 
a consequence, it is implied that financial distress may have a strong influence on prices 
and inventories in some instances, but not in others. 
 
Large-scale empirical analyses are conducted to test the hypotheses set forth in this 
research. Data from the U.S. airline industry are used to investigate how financial distress 
affects prices. The results present substantial evidence in support of the hypotheses. 
Financial distress is found to be negatively related to air fares, with the magnitude of this 
relationship depending on the distressed firm’s operating costs, market shares, and size. 
In addition, the degree of market concentration and the competitors’ financial situations 
are shown to impact the distress-price relationship.  
 
As to the effect of financial distress on inventories, data from the U.S. manufacturing 
industry are used for the empirical tests. It is shown that greater degrees of financial 
distress will result in lower inventory levels, ceteris paribus. In some instances, this 
effect is found to be stronger the greater the distressed firm’s power over its buyers and 
suppliers. 
 
Both the price and inventory studies thus suggest the following: 
▪ Firm financial distress is an important determinant of a firm’s actions. 
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▪ The nature of the distress-conduct relationship is further impacted by market 
structural and firm characteristics. Specifically such factors impact the occurrence 
and magnitude of the effect of distress on firm conduct parameters. 
This research thus helps refine and enhance researchers’ understanding of the relationship 
between structure, conduct and performance. While only one particular feedback 
mechanism within the structure-conduct-performance paradigm—the effect of distress on 
firm conduct—is investigated here, it is expected that there exist further, previously 
unexplored links between structural, conduct, and performance parameters. The analyses 
of such relationships are suggested for future research. 
 
Managers may benefit from this work through an enhanced understanding of how firms’ 
financial conditions may impact (competing) firms’ behavior. Competitors of distressed 
firms, for example, may be able to better anticipate distressed firms’ competitive moves, 
and as a consequence, may be in a better position to implement preemptive measures or 
respond to distressed firms’ actions. Moreover, the findings of this work may be of 
interest to cooperation partners of distressed firms. Specifically, managers may want to 
understand how a distressed firm’s actions may ultimately impact the cooperating firm, in 
terms of service levels, costs, or required inventory holdings, for example. While the 
findings presented here do not provide direct evidence for the implications of a firm’s 
distress on its cooperation partners, there are some indications that a distressed firm’s 
supply chain partners will be affected by the changes in the distressed firm’s conduct. It 
is suggested that future research further explore these issues. 
 
    199
 
This dissertation research, thus, enhances researchers’ and managers’ understanding of 
how firm financial distress affects prices and inventories. Following these descriptive 
causal analyses, a normative approach to the research question at hand is suggested for 
future research. Specifically, the following questions could be addressed: 
▪ Is the cutting of prices or the reduction of inventories a viable turnaround strategy, 
i.e. do distressed firms that lower prices or reduce inventories exhibit greater 
turnaround performance? 
▪ In what specific instances is price or inventory cutting advisable? Are there 
certain organizational or situational characteristics that influence the extent to 
which lower prices or inventories result in distressed firms’ performance 
improvements? 
▪ How does distress affect firm and supply chain operating performance? Are there 
any effects in customer service levels or purchasing lead times, for example? 
These and more questions may be of great interest to both the academic and practitioner 
communities. While these issues are not within the scope of this dissertation, the work 
presented here provides a solid basis for further investigations of the managerial 
implications and consequences of firm financial distress. 
 
This dissertation empirically investigates the relationship between financial distress and 
select firm conduct parameters using secondary data from the U.S. airline and 
manufacturing industries. The use of secondary data is desirable in that advanced 
statistical methods can be utilized to analyze large data sets and obtain robust and 
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generalizable estimation results. At the same time, however, the use of secondary data 
often requires researchers to approximate variables for which no direct measures are 
available or to omit explanatory factors from empirical models altogether should data not 
be available. In this dissertation, variables such as order costs and sourcing lead times, for 
example, could not be measured directly but could only be approximated. In addition, 
some data sources present inherent deficiencies and limitations. The data from the Input-
Output tables, which are used to construct industrial supply chains for the analyses of the 
distress-inventory relationship, for example, do not include information on trade flows 
involving foreign buyers and suppliers. While a research design based on the analysis of 
secondary data is deemed suitable for an initial study of the distress-conduct link, future 
research could employ qualitative methods such as case studies, for example, to gain an 
in-depth understanding of the managerial decision processes that are triggered by the 
deterioration of a firm’s financial condition. At the same time, insights could be gained 
into when and why specific turnaround strategies and actions result in performance 
improvements. 




Table 34 below presents the residuals of the regression of airlines’ operating expenses per 
available seat-mile (ASM) on average stage length. This regression was performed to 
evaluate U.S. carriers’ operating costs after controlling for differences in the airlines’ 
average stage length. Negative residuals indicate relative cost advantages, while positive 
residuals suggest relative cost disadvantages. Based on the results displayed in Table 34, 
twelve carriers were identified as low-cost carriers (LCC). While the cut-off between 
low-cost and high-cost carriers (HCC) is arbitrary, it is noted that there is a sizeable 
difference in the magnitude of the residuals between the highest-cost LCC (Valujet 
Airlines:  -0.142), and the lowest-cost HCC (Carnival Airlines: -0.105). In the empirical 
analyses, the top twelve airlines in Table 34 are, therefore, identified as LCCs. 
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Carrier code Carrier name Ranked residuals LCC indicator
WN Southwest Airlines, Co. -0.371 1
QQ Reno Air, Inc. -0.303 1
SY Sun Country Airlines -0.268 1
NK Spirit Air Lines -0.237 1
B6 Jetblue Airways -0.231 1
W7 Western Pacific Airlines -0.223 1
FL Airtran Airways Corporation -0.216 1
TZ American Trans Air, Inc. -0.214 1
BE Braniff Int'l Airlines, Inc -0.172 1
HP America West Airlines, Inc. -0.157 1
F9 Frontier Airlines, Inc. -0.142 1
J7 Valujet Airlines, Inc. -0.142 1
KW Carnival Air Lines, Inc. -0.105 0
AS Alaska Airlines, Inc. -0.099 0
NJ Vanguard Airlines, Inc. -0.081 0
KP Kiwi International -0.073 0
N7 National Airlines -0.051 0
TW Trans World Airlines, Inc. -0.039 0
XJ Mesaba Airlines -0.036 0
NW Northwest Airlines, Inc. -0.022 0
BF Markair, Inc. -0.010 0
WV Air South, Inc. -0.002 0
HQ Business Express -0.001 0
DL Delta Air Lines, Inc. 0.012 0
CO Continental Air Lines, Inc. 0.018 0
EV Atlantic Southeast Airlines 0.031 0
JI Midway Airlines, Inc. 0.086 0
YV Mesa Airlines, Inc. 0.090 0
ZN Key Airlines, Inc. 0.090 0
OE Westair Airlines 0.093 0
AQ Aloha Airlines, Inc. 0.112 0
RU Continental Express Airline 0.125 0
FF Tower Air, Inc. 0.132 0
AA American Airlines, Inc. 0.140 0
ZW Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp 0.166 0
UA United Air Lines, Inc. 0.170 0
US US Airways, Inc. 0.171 0
YX Midwest Express Airlines 0.179 0
HA Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. 0.195 0
TB USAir Shuttle 0.263 0
PA Pan American World Airways 1.243 0  
 
Table 34: Ranked residuals of regression of OpEx/ASM on avg. stage length (n=41) 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table 35 presents the OLS regression estimates of the empirical model presented in 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation. These basic regression results are used solely to investigate 
the presence of heteroskedasticity. This is done by means of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg Lagrange multiplier test (Breusch and Pagan 1979, Cook and Weisberg 1983). 
The test result suggests the presence of heteroskedasticity and motivates the choice of a 
generalized least squares procedure for the empirical analyses. 
 
Source SS df MS Number of obs 23039
Model 3522.49 20 176.12 F( 21, 23017) 2754.5
Residual 1471.77 23018 0.06 Prob > F 0.000
Total 4994.26 23038 0.22 R-squared 0.705
Adj R-squared 0.705
Root MSE 0.253
Fare Coefficient Std. error P>|t|
Constant 1.473 0.171 0.000
AirlinePass -0.048 0.002 0.000
Distance 0.713 0.048 0.000
DistanceSquared -0.023 0.004 0.000
SlotRoute 0.134 0.005 0.000
RouteHHI -0.005 0.006 0.416
MaxAirportHHI 0.107 0.005 0.000
RouteShare 0.001 0.000 0.000
MaxAirportShare 0.004 0.000 0.000
LCCCompForHCC -0.148 0.004 0.000
LCCCompForLCC -0.103 0.008 0.000
AltRouteLCC1M -0.016 0.004 0.000
Circuity -0.162 0.024 0.000
Distress 0.005 0.001 0.000
Loadfactor -0.004 0.000 0.000
AirlineCost 0.462 0.013 0.000
Size 0.034 0.002 0.000
Quarter 2 -0.086 0.005 0.000
Quarter 3 -0.120 0.006 0.000
Quarter 4 -0.060 0.005 0.000
2002 -0.260 0.006 0.000  
 
 






The regression results shown in Table 36 and Table 37 are used to evaluate the benefit of 
adding fixed effects to the regression model. This benefit is measured by means of an F 
statistic as proposed by (Greene 2003). The test returns a statistically significant F value, 
suggesting that a fixed effects model should be used for the empirical analyses. 
 
 
Source SS df MS Number of obs 23039
Model 1878.66 16 117.42 F( 17, 23021) 1582.87
Residual 3115.60 23022 0.14 Prob > F 0.000
Total 4994.26 23038 0.22 R-squared 0.3762
Adj R-squared 0.3757
Root MSE 0.3679
Fare Coefficient Std. error P>|t|
AirlinePass (fitted) 0.272 0.012 0.000
Distance -0.033 0.074 0.654
DistanceSquared 0.043 0.006 0.000
SlotRoute 0.051 0.008 0.000
RouteHHI 0.031 0.008 0.000
MaxAirportHHI 0.254 0.008 0.000
RouteShare -0.006 0.000 0.000
MaxAirportShare 0.000 0.000 0.103
LCCCompForHCC -0.223 0.006 0.000
LCCCompForLCC -0.158 0.011 0.000
AltRouteLCC1M -0.136 0.007 0.000
Circuity 1.136 0.057 0.000
Distress -0.001 0.001 0.277
Loadfactor -0.022 0.001 0.000
AirlineCost 0.960 0.016 0.000
Size 0.030 0.003 0.000
Constant 2.536 0.242 0.000  
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The Tables in Appendix 4 and Appendix 5 provide further details of the empirical 
estimation results. 
 
Table 37 (Appendix 4) presents the second-stage estimation results of the regression of air 
fares on the set of independent variables as specified in Sections 2.3.2.2 and 2.3.2.3. In 
addition, air carrier fixed effects are included in this regression to evaluate the contribution 
of these fixed firm effects to the explanatory power of the model. This analysis is needed to 
determine the appropriate econometric estimation technique as discussed in Section 2.3.4. 
 
Table 38 (Appendix 5) presents the first-stage estimation results for all five empirical 
models. This table, thus, is an extension of the baseline first-stage estimation results shown 
in Table 3. It is noted that the estimation results are generally consistent across all five 
models such that the discussion of the baseline first-stage results (see Section 2.4.1) also 






Source SS df MS Number of obs 23039
Model 2558.23 50 51.16 F( 51, 22987) 715.34
Residual 2436.04 22988 0.11 Prob > F 0.000
Total 4994.26 23038 0.22 R-squared 0.5122
Adj R-squared 0.5112
Root MSE 0.3255
Fare Coefficient Std. error P>|t|
AirlinePass (fitted) 0.247 0.011 0.000
Distance -0.033 0.066 0.618
DistanceSquared 0.040 0.005 0.000
SlotRoute 0.034 0.007 0.000
RouteHHI 0.069 0.008 0.000
MaxAirportHHI 0.192 0.007 0.000
RouteShare -0.006 0.000 0.000
MaxAirportShare 0.000 0.000 0.353
LCCCompForHCC -0.194 0.006 0.000
LCCCompForLCC -0.106 0.010 0.000
AltRouteLCC1M -0.118 0.006 0.000
Circuity 0.960 0.050 0.000
Distress -0.040 0.003 0.000
Loadfactor -0.022 0.001 0.000
AirlineCost 0.300 0.041 0.000
Size 0.090 0.017 0.000
Constant 0.527 0.376 0.161
Quarter2 -0.045 0.007 0.000
Quarter3 -0.048 0.009 0.000
Quarter4 -0.048 0.006 0.000
2002 -0.301 0.020 0.000
aq 0.097 0.143 0.499
as 0.002 0.050 0.961
b6 0.217 0.074 0.003
be 0.414 0.131 0.002
co 0.243 0.024 0.000
dl 0.060 0.010 0.000
f9 0.007 0.084 0.929
ff 0.190 0.182 0.295
fl 0.048 0.075 0.525
hp 0.172 0.050 0.001
hq 0.006 0.136 0.965
ji 0.794 0.121 0.000
kp -0.074 0.206 0.721
kw 0.656 0.165 0.000
n7 0.629 0.104 0.000
nj 1.345 0.116 0.000
nk 0.098 0.094 0.295
nw 0.133 0.015 0.000
oe 0.287 0.133 0.030
qq 0.287 0.146 0.048
sy -0.012 0.152 0.935
tb -0.479 0.140 0.001
tw 0.300 0.032 0.000
tz 0.162 0.068 0.017
ua 0.184 0.009 0.000
us 0.074 0.019 0.000
wn -0.393 0.037 0.000
yx 0.400 0.091 0.000
zn 3.164 0.374 0.000
zw 0.191 0.163 0.242  
 





First-stage G2SLS regression Number of obs. 23039 Obs. per group: min. 1
(fixed effects) Number of groups 4508 avg. 5.1
max. 8
Dependent variable:
AirlinePass Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t|
Constant 444.458 0.000 440.911 0.000 446.816 0.000 454.492 0.000 477.332 0.000
Distance -136.296 0.000 -134.880 0.000 -136.560 0.000 -139.647 0.000 -145.605 0.000
DistanceSquared 10.181 0.000 10.067 0.000 10.186 0.000 10.444 0.000 10.821 0.000
SlotRoute 0.099 0.001 0.101 0.001 0.103 0.000 0.104 0.000 0.085 0.004
RouteHHI -0.412 0.000 -0.411 0.000 -0.411 0.000 -0.420 0.000 -0.421 0.000
MaxAirportHHI -0.367 0.000 -0.373 0.000 -0.375 0.000 -0.366 0.000 -0.375 0.000
RouteShare 0.027 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.027 0.000
MaxAirportShare 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.013
LCCCompForHCC 0.227 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.223 0.000 0.221 0.000
LCCCompForLCC 0.238 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.224 0.000 0.236 0.000 0.249 0.000
AltRouteLCC1M -0.022 0.061 -0.021 0.068 -0.021 0.065 -0.022 0.055 -0.019 0.094
Circuity -2.326 0.000 -2.327 0.000 -2.326 0.000 -2.344 0.000 -2.335 0.000





Loadfactor 0.016 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.017 0.000
AirlineCost -0.095 0.023 -0.097 0.021 -0.089 0.034 -0.083 0.053 -0.091 0.029
Size 0.028 0.150 0.008 0.666 0.015 0.370 0.042 0.059 0.065 0.000
Quarter 2 0.048 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.044 0.000
Quarter 3 0.074 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.062 0.000
Quarter 4 0.047 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.044 0.000
2002 -0.055 0.315 -0.036 0.509 -0.038 0.485 -0.057 0.306 -0.108 0.046
Population 0.579 0.000 0.567 0.000 0.568 0.000 0.588 0.000 0.577 0.000





F 1038.3 1038.3 992.3 873.7 1051.3
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared: within 0.541 0.541 0.541 0.541 0.544
between 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.009
overall 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.010
1 3 4 52
 





Table 39 presents the means of select variables for those firms that are included in the 
statistical analyses and those firms for which data are available in the Compustat database 
but which have been deleted from the data sample due to missing data on one or more 
variables. As discussed in Sections 3.4.5.1 and 3.4.5.2, the sampled firms, on average, tend 
to be smaller than those firms firms that are not included in the data sample. A Hotelling T-
squared test confirms that the two groups are statistically significantly different in both 
time periods studied (1997 and 1998-2004). 
 
 
Variable Sample mean Compustat Sample mean Compustat
Total Inventory (million $) 110.9 190.5 103.9 186.2
Sales (million $) 835.2 1698.7 835.6 1788.2
COGS (million $) 626.0 1162.5 537.4 1217.0
Total Debt (million $) 148.0 488.4 158.1 574.9
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